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The premise of this research is to determine when the end of rentierism will occur 
in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as well as what actions the government is taking to 
prepare for it.  After compiling population growth, domestic consumption demand, and 
depreciating oil production into four separate future predictive scenarios, the results are 
that the end of rentierism will occur between 2022-2033 in Saudi Arabia.   
Analysis on the social, economic, and political landscapes was conducted to 
illustrate the current social and economic obligations that the government currently has. 
Alternatives to petroleum were analyzed, resulting in the finding that there are no viable 
natural resource alternatives to oil in order to maintain rentierism. 
The primary obstacles to preparing for the death of rentierism were found to be 
the extreme dissent within and between the House of Saud and the religious 
establishment, and the lack of stated goals with timelines and accountability for 

















“My grandfather rode a camel.  
My father rode a camel. 
I drive a Rolls Royce.  
My son flies a jet plane. 
His son will drive a Mercedes.  
But his son will ride a camel” 
 
Sheikh Rashid al Maktoum 
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 Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed al Maktoum, former Emir of Dubai, was fond of the 
saying, 
“My grandfather rode a camel. 
My father rode a camel.  
I drive a Rolls Royce.  
My son flies a jet plane. 
His son will drive a Mercedes.  
But his son will ride a camel” 
 Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed al Maktoum ruled for 32 years from 1958 until his death 
in 1990.  Oil was discovered in the United Arab Emirates in the year 1966 and production 
began in 1971.  Sheikh al Maktoum has shown the most foresight of any leader in the 
Middle East and recognized early on that he must develop the economy of Dubai so that 
it could survive after the end of oil production.  His proverbial saying about his great-
grandson riding a camel was his way of elucidating the day when oil revenues would run 
out and the desert would reclaim his people.1 In an effort to prevent this prophecy, the 
Sheikh was the driving force behind a number of major infrastructure projects to promote 
Dubai as a regional hub for trade.  While other Gulf leaders were squandering their !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!Gluckman, Ron. “Hong Kong of the Desert?” www.gluckman.com/dubaibiz.html 
 (accessed 1 June 2012). !
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money by building mansions and stockpiling munitions, Sheikh al Maktoum 
commissioned the building of Port Rashid, Al Shindagha Tunnel, Jebel Ali Port, Dubai 
World Trade Center, and the Dubai Drydocks.  Dubai has since been called the ‘City of 
Merchants’ and when oil is exhausted, the strategic location of Dubai combined with its 
sophisticated trading network of ports, drydocks, tunnels, buildings, and airports, will 
remain unaltered and commercial activity will only continue.2 
 In January 2012, the IMD World Competitiveness Centre Index ranked the United 
Arab Emirates as the 16th most diversified economy in the world. The United Arab 
Emirates ranked higher in economic diversification than the 20th ranked United Kingdom, 
39th ranked Turkey, and 53rd ranked Jordan.  The only other Middle East country in the 
top 60 was Qatar, with a ranking of being the 8th most diversified economy in the world.  
The ranking is from 0-100 and the 60th ranked most diversified economy was Venezuela 
with a ranking of 31.45.3 
 The topic of this thesis is to examine how the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is 
preparing for the end of rentierism.  Saudi Arabia was blessed with the world’s largest 
cache of oil deposits in 1939.  The economic rents that the Kingdom generated has 
allowed the government to become a nearly pure rentier economy. Rentierism for Saudi 
Arabia includes the subsidization of benefits for Saudi Arabian nationals ranging from 
free healthcare and education to the government charging below market rates for 
commodities such as gasoline, desalinated water, and other forms of energy.  The key to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!#!$%&'(!)!“The World Competitiveness Scoreboard.” January 2012. http://www.imd.org/ 
 research/publications/wcy/upload/scoreboard.pdf (accessed 4 June 
 2012.) !
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preparing for when the government no longer receives revenues from oil is the 
construction of a diversified economy.  Saudi Arabia is not one of the top 60 countries 
with a diversified economy. They are not officially ranked, but they are somewhere 
between having an economic diversification ranking of between 0- 31.45, according to 
the IMD World Competitiveness Centre Index.   
 While the United Arab Emirates has been called the ‘City of Merchants’ and the 
‘Hong Kong of the Middle East,’ Saudi Arabia has no such title or is anywhere close to 
being the trading hub into which the United Arab Emirates has evolved. As the first 
chapter of this thesis will show, Saudi Arabia was a major trading gateway between East 
and West prior to the discovery of oil.  Most merchant trade was discontinued and even 
the Bedouins moved into city centers after the discovery of oil and subsequent subsidies 
began to be distributed.  With revenue from oil, the House of Saud did invest into 
infrastructure and rapid development did occur, but between economic corruption, dissent 
between the religious establishment and the Royal Family and a population that would 
rather import labor than do the work themselves, Saudi Arabia has been a country 
completely reliant on oil since the first dollar of oil revenue was earned in 1939. 
 After compiling four statistical models to determine when domestic consumption 
will equal domestic production, the result is that the most likely outcome is that Saudi 
Arabia will cease to generate government income from oil between 2022-2033.   
 The term of ‘the death of rentierism’ is used to indicate the time when the 
government is no longer able to rely on the income from oil as a means for running the 
government. The premise of this research is to determine what actions the Saudi Arabian 
government is taking to prepare for the end of income from oil, the obstacles for reaching 
! *!
the goal of diversification and the research will ultimately conclude that the country is 





















THE FORMATION OF A KINGDOM 
 
In order to predict the future of rentierism in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and to 
determine if they are prepared for the end of it, the past must first be understood. Saudi 
Arabia, the birthplace of Islam, has a unique history not only within the Middle East, but 
also within the global framework.  The Prophet Mohammad was born in the city of 
Mecca into the Quraysh tribe in A.D. 570, and forever shaped the area now known as 
Saudi Arabia.   
 Prior to the birth of Islam, the city of Mecca was located at a commercially 
advantageous position. It sat at the juncture of the most important trade routes between 
Syria and Yemen.  Because of the fear of raids by caravans and the inhospitable weather, 
commercial activity was limited until the Meccan merchants formed alliances with the 
Bedouin tribes.  The Meccan merchants agreed to use the Bedouin-owned camels for a 
fee, in exchange for the allowance of the caravans to visit new and undiscovered areas 
and markets inside Arabia.  With the alliance between the Bedouin tribesmen and the 
Meccan merchants, international trade was able to commence.1   
The Meccan economy began to develop, and the merchants concentrated their 
capital within the area of the local markets. The power of the Meccan merchants 
increased, and wealth was soon a discernible attribute of the socially influential 
merchants.  The wealthy merchants evolved from the leaders of the tribes into the leaders 
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of their communities. They were placed at the top of the social ladder, and were able to 
control the political dealings of the city.2 
Until the birth of the Prophet Mohammad, local tribesmen in Arabia had fought 
destructive wars in order to gain control of the region. After the birth of the Prophet, 
Islam captivated the Arabian Peninsula. Bedouin tribesmen ceased their fighting and 
found a common loyalty for the Prophet and Islam.3  By the 16th Century, the city of 
Jeddah became the new commercial center for merchants and traders due to its natural 
harbor on the Red Sea.  Thousands of Hajj pilgrims would descend on Mecca via the 
harbor in Jeddah every year, replacing Mecca as the main trading and transportation 
artery in Arabia.  In addition to the influx of tourists visiting Jeddah every year, the city 
became the main import hub to the greater Arabian area. Jewels, spices, food, and textiles 
were imported through the Jeddah harbor. The citizens of Jeddah became completely 
focused on trade and commerce, not pursuing any type of manufacturing or trade that was 
not of direct and immediate necessity.  Two types of citizens emerged: the sea faring 
people who built boats and cultivated pearls, and the people involved with international 
trade and traffic within Arabia.4 
 A few trading families emerged as the de facto social and political leaders of the 
communities.  The tribal chiefs, or heads of the families, protected the movement of trade 
by collecting money and gifts from the local merchants. Violence by some of the rural 
tribesmen created problems along the trade routes, causing the heads of the families to 
organize a military style resistance to keep the trade routes safe.  Contrary to typical and 
contemporary economic and social strata, the tribal leaders and family heads made less of 
a yearly income than the merchants they were protecting.  The families thus turned to the 
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merchants for financial assistance.  The relationship from this interaction between the 
tribal leaders and the merchants became so powerful it was impossible to break the trade 
barrier they had established.5 
 During this time in the 1500s, the Al Saud family emerged as one of these 
powerful ruling families in the town of Najd, near Riyadh.  Najd was small, but as 
commercial trading increased and the city grew, the Al Saud family came to be well 
known. Their reputation as a protector of the trade routes spread, and they quickly 
became the most powerful family in Najd.  The rise of the Al Saud family grew in 
harmony with that of their family friend, Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab, who was alive 
between 1703-1787.  Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab and Muhammad ibn Saud became 
political and religious partners. They worked together and were bound by an oath to 
establish a state ruled according to Islamic principles.  The relationship thrived because 
Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab vowed to spread the legitimacy of a purified Islam, and 
Muhammad ibn Saud vowed to undertake jihad, a religious war against nonbelievers, on 
behalf of Mohammad, for the purpose of advancing Wahhab’s interpretation of Islam.  
By 1765 the two had established the brand of Islam now known today as Wahhabism. 
Through this partnership, Muhammad ibn Saud gained political authority over all of Najd 
and Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab gained religious legitimacy.6 
 By the 1800s, the economy of Arabia had evolved to include nomadic pastoral 
activities such as camel raising, camel grazing, growing cereals when rainfall permitted, 
fishing, pearling, and shipbuilding, among others.  Export was limited to sheep, dates, 
camel hides, and horses.  Imports consisted of essential commodities that people were 
unable, or unwilling, to produce in the Arabian Peninsula.  Some local commodities that 
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were unique to the region included pottery, soaps, rugs, date packaging, and 
metalworking.7 
At the beginning of the 1800s, the income of the Al Saud family was estimated to 
be approximately US$1,000,000 per year.  The income consisted of the annual zakat, a 
religious tithe which was calculated to be 2.5 percent of each Muslims net worth, a tax on 
trading, booty from the caravans and wars, miscellaneous fines from citizens and traders, 
and the proceeds from the Hajj, an annual pilgrimage to Mecca expected to be completed 
by any-and-all able bodied and financially stable Muslim believers.8 
 By 1916, the Al Saud family was headed by King Abdul Aziz. His main personal 
source of income was camel trading with Syria, but after World War I, the commercial 
relationship had dwindled.  He was not generating enough revenue for the family to 
maintain and run the government that he had established within the greater reaches of 
Najd, forcing him into national and personal debt.  In order to raise money, the family 
decided to conquer the city of Jeddah. Income from the prosperous merchant community, 
and an increase in Hajj revenues equal to US$56 per traveler, or US$22 million per year, 
buoyed the family’s income level, pushing them out of debt.  During the 1920s, Arabia’s 
economy was poor owing to the lack of any domestic or international communication 
mechanisms, the absence of any natural resources, the dire shortage of international 
capital investment, and the low skill level and education of local labor.9  
Everything began to change for King Abdul Aziz and the Arabian Peninsula when 
the Americans began to receive news that there might be natural resources in Arabia that 
were not already claimed. Prior to World War I, the United States, unlike the British, had 
! %!
no interest in the Middle East. It was not until the issues of colonization and oil became 
important that the United States became interested in Arabia.10   
In 1931, the first visit by an American to the Arabian Peninsula was by Charles 
Crane, a Chicago millionaire, philanthropist, world traveler, and former ambassador.  The 
purpose of the visit with King Abdul Aziz was to explore Arabia for assets beneath the 
soil, namely water.  Once there, Crane summoned Karl Twitchell to Arabia, who was a 
Vermont mining engineer and who eventually became the mining engineer to Jeddah.  
Twitchell was instrumental in drawing the attention of the American oil companies to the 
Peninsula’s potential for oil.   In 1932, King Abdul Aziz established the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia as a state with the help of al Wahhab and his religious Ikwan soldiers.  
Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab had organized a group of Wahhabi puritans, named the 
Ikwan, or brothers, who were fighters in the name of Islam.  King Abdul Aziz had 
promised the Ikwan that if they helped him conquer the area of Arabia, he would protect 
and advance Wahhabi Islam within his Kingdom.  The Ikwan complied and helped King 
Abdul Aziz conquer the area now known as Saudi Arabia.  The Ikwan were successful at 
their attempt at conquering their fellow tribes and wanted to continue to spread Wahhabi 
Islam and create a Wahhabi empire inside the boundaries of Arabia as well as outside. 
King Abdul Aziz denied their efforts at Wahhabi expansion beyond the boundaries of 
Arabia, and beyond the boundaries of his control. The Ikwan attempted to battle King 
Abdul Aziz and his family and followers for denying them the right to expand.  At the 
beginning of the Ikwan’s rebellion, King Abdul Aziz consulted the ulema, or the 
religious clerics and scholars of Wahhabi Islam.  The Wahhabi religious component and 
the ulema were the chief reasons for King Abdul Aziz’s ascent to the throne, so he 
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protected the religious elite and sought their advice on political decisions within the 
country.  The ulema consulted the Quran  regarding the Ikwan’s uprising,  and they found 
that it is against the religion to fight against the leader.  This was the first time that the 
ulema were used as a real political deciding force, so with the consent of the ulema, King 
Abdul Aziz crushed the uprising of the Ikwan.11   
The King and his new country were nearly bankrupt and had no reasonable 
solution or means to change the situation. In July 1933, geologists from the United States 
landed in the port of Jubail off the Persian Gulf on the Eastern coast of Saudi Arabia.  A 
few days later, they found the largest oil field in the history of this planet; the Ghawar oil 
field. Measuring 174 by 131 miles,12 the massive oil field sits on a basement fault block 
dating back to the Carboniferous time, or about 320 million years ago.  Cretaceous 
tectonic activity enhanced the structure and the reservoir limestone rocks that hold the 
petroleum date back to the Jurassic time.  After the discovery, King Abdul Aziz granted 
the Standard Oil Company of California a 60-year concession to explore, research, drill, 
extract, manufacture, and transport petroleum and kindred bituminous matter.  The 
forthcoming agreement between Standard Oil Company and King Abdul Aziz became 
known as the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco). The conglomeration yielded the 
Saudi Arabian government the guarantee that they would be provided with steady 
income, and in return, Aramco was given exclusive rights to all oil underneath the 
Eastern desert.  In 1938, geologists for Aramco found oil in commercial quantities at the 
Dammam Dome near Dhahran. The next year, Aramco exported its first tanker load of 
petroleum.13  This dealing was considered the first of many forays by the United States 
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into Saudi Arabia and the beginning of their long and tumultuous relationship that is still 
in effect today.14 
  After the agreement was signed and the first barrel was exported, the influx of 
government income was astonishing.  Immediately, the Al Saud family’s position was 
fortified, and a consolidation of political control became a necessity.  The Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia was in need of a central leadership figure and King Abdul Aziz took on the 
role, becoming the supreme leader of all groups, tribes, societies, and cities within the 
Kingdom, again with the help of the religious elite and his Ikwan soldiers.15 
 In 1939, a year after geologists discovered oil in Saudi Arabia, the government 
revenues amounted to US$7.17 million per year. Of that number, only US$340,000 was 
from oil, US$2.23 million from Hajj collections, the rest coming from customs and local 
sources of income.  Oil revenue went directly to the recently established public treasury, 
but the money was treated as the personal bank account of King Abdul Aziz, with no 
distinction between his private assets and the public treasury.  The lack of distinction 
between personal and public money has continued to this day and has caused problems 
for the Royal Family.  By 1946, government income from oil equaled US$10 million. 
Five years later in 1951, the amount rose to US$110 million. The next year in 1952, 
income doubled and the House of Saud was bringing in US$212 million worth of oil 
revenue.  Nine years later in 1961, the amount doubled again to equal US$400 million. 
Seven years after that in 1968, government income stood at US$926 million. In 1970, a 
new threshold was reached and the country was earning US$1.2 billion.  The first true oil 
boom hit in 1973 and after another 4 years the country was selling US$22.5 billion worth 
of oil, a free natural resource requiring little manpower.16 
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 The 1950s ushered in another tumultuous era for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  
Social change was occurring rapidly, and for many, it marked a new way of life.  
Infrastructure programs were underway, and one of the first public service actions the 
Royal Family  took was to establish a land distribution program. The program gave each 
Saudi national their own plot of land and a small loan in order to build their own house. 
The social system was still based on the tribal and kinship model, but the rural Bedouins 
began moving into more urban areas because of the free land allotments, concentrating 
the population into the economic centers of the country.17   
 Tribal chiefs had begun to receive direct cash payments from the Al Saud family 
from oil revenues, no longer needing the generosity or alliance of the merchant class.  
With a sudden role reversal, the tribal leaders were now independent, which essentially 
robbed the merchant class of the social and political privileges it held over the tribal 
leaders.  Even worse, the gap between oil income and income from other resources such 
as the camel and pearling trades became too great, and income from those other resources 
was no longer needed.  The long-standing traditions of nomadic and pastoral resource 
cultivation became irrelevant with the discovery of oil.18  
The 1950s was a turning point in the development of the Saudi Arabian economic 
market as well as in the political atmosphere.  The founder of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, King Abdul Aziz, died in 1953, which required the appointment of his first 
successor.  King Abdul Aziz had appointed his son Saud as his Crown Prince, so when 
King Abdul Aziz died, King Saud was ready and willing to replace his father.  A rift 
occurred in the family over King Saud’s governing style, however.  He turned out to be 
an inconsequential leader who merely wanted to spend the family’s money and vacation 
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in Morocco and Europe. He was not as interested or as knowledgeable as the family 
would have liked him to have been on the political and economic matters of the state.  In 
1964, the brothers of King Saud consulted the ulema who then issued a fatwa, a legal 
pronouncement issued by religious law specialists, for the abdication of King Saud with 
King Faisal as the replacement.  King Saud was then exiled to Athens, Greece, where he 
died soon after.19 
The start of economic development in Saudi Arabia really began with two major 
national projects, Tapline, the worlds largest oil pipeline which ran from Saudi Arabia to 
Lebanon with a capacity of up to 500,000 barrels per day, and the new railway line that 
connected the port city of Dammam and Riyadh.  Although these were large investments 
into the national oil and transportation sectors, King Saud built little in the way of social 
infrastructure. Only a few hospitals, schools, and roads were built under his reign. He did 
spend lavishly on himself, building several massive palaces, and generously handing out 
large monetary gifts to the tribal leaders to maintain their support. He managed to fund 
these personal activities while leaving the Kingdom’s financial coffers virtually empty.  
By 1958, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had accumulated a foreign debt of US$310 
million, bankrupting the nation yet again.20   
 By 1954, only five industrial establishments had been pursued. The first 
productive enterprise created was the quarrying and processing of marble, due to the 
entrepreneurial initiative of Mohammad bin Laden and his brother, who were originally 
from Yemen.  Little other industrial or manufacturing companies besides a new cement 
company emerged outside of the bin Laden control until the reign of King Faisal in 1964. 
There has been considerable change over history as to how influential the ulema have 
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been, and much of that is dependent upon who the ruling king is.  In 1964, when King 
Saud was ruled to be an incompetent leader by the other members of the family, the 
religious establishment provided the Islamic religious justification for deposing him and 
replacing him with his brother Faisal. The reign of King Faisal from1964-1975 was the 
golden era of development for Saudi Arabia.  King Faisal actively pursued market 
reform, the modernization of the budget, and fiscal control.  Modern infrastructure 
including health services, education, television, telecommunications, primary education 
for girls, the abolition of slavery, social security laws, and the implementation of a ten- 
point private economic system, were also introduced during his reign.21   
 The 1960s marked the beginning of Royal Family entrepreneurship.  A small 
number of royal princes took advantage of King Faisal’s decision to allow princes to go 
into private business on a large scale.   During this time, several Royal-owned companies 
were started, including Saudi Plastics Products, Saudi Transport and Ports Services Co., 
Saudi Research and Development Co., Kingdom Establishment for Trading and 
Contracting, Consolidated Contractors, National Automobile Agencies Co., and Saudi 
South Eastern Drilling Co.  The princes took their companies seriously, incorporating the 
talent and knowledge of some of the local merchant families but also using their 
international connections to partner with foreign companies.22   
 Until the 1970s, oil prices and revenues experienced a constant low rate of 
increase. It was not until King Faisal, together with the other Arab oil exporting 
countries, initiated new policies, prices, and quotas within the structure of Organization 
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) that the oil revenues exploded to an 
unprecedented level.  The time between 1973 and 1980 was considered a boom period for 
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Saudi Arabia, with oil prices rising from US$2 per barrel to US$42 per barrel.  With this 
immense increase in government revenue, King Faisal was able to begin implementing 
his Second Five Year Development Plan, which included an investment into the country 
of US$142 billion.  The Plan called for building physical infrastructure, encouraging the 
private sector to increase productivity, promotion of the private sector to participate in the 
development process, and it gave priority to the expansion of agriculture and industrial 
projects in order to diversify the economy.  Two industrial cities were established in 
Yanbu and Jubail in an effort to develop a hydrocarbon-based industry with foreign 
technology and capital.  In order to meet the demands of the Development Plan, 
specialized banks were established to include funding for agriculture, industrial efforts, 
and real estate.23 
 King Faisal was a very popular king among the Saudi Arabian population for all 
of his efforts at modernization and relaxing the strict religious laws regarding women and 
basic freedoms.  He turned out to be very unpopular with the ulema because in their view, 
modernization meant Westernization, which they believed to be a threat to Islam.  King 
Faisal became aware of their dissatisfaction with him and in order to appease them, he 
allowed for extremist religious scholars to enter the country to live and teach their 
extremists Islamic beliefs.24  
 With the rapid change that Saudi Arabia was experiencing in its social and 
political realms came dissent.  The first major incident involving dissent among the 
ulema and the Royal Family occurred in 1973 when the ulema pressured King Faisal to 
use oil as a weapon to punish the United States for their tacit agreement in allowing Israel 
to continue developing lands that Arabs believed to be theirs.  King Faisal was cautious 
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to use oil as a weapon against the United States, thinking that an embargo would hurt 
Saudi interests.  In order to satisfy the growing frustration of the ulema, King Faisal 
implemented the embargo in October 1973. The embargo accomplished the goals of the 
ulema: to increase the stature of Saudi Arabia as the leader of the Muslim world while 
also distancing it from the West.  The religious establishment were often at odds with 
King Faisal and his penchant for modernization, to which the ulema are strictly oppose.25 
In 1965, King Faisal had allowed televisions into the country for the first time.  
King Faisal’s nephew Khalid objected vehemently to allowing television in the country 
and he staged a public demonstration, which is illegal in Saudi Arabia.  King Faisal gave 
the order to the National Guard to use force to quell the opposition and one of the soldiers 
killed Khalid because he had fired at them.  Ten years later in 1975, Khalid’s brother, 
King Faisal’s nephew, assassinated him in retribution for giving the order to kill Khalid.26 
 In 1975, King Faisal’s brother Khalid became king.  King Khalid was not 
interested in politics, but he was interested in building and modernizing the country.  At 
the time, the population of Saudi Arabia was four million people. Due to the rapid rate of 
building infrastructure, King Khalid began to import foreign labor in order to keep the 
progress moving.  The beginning of grand scale Royal Family corruption began during 
this time, as well.  Bribes and commissions were paid, real estate fraud was committed, 
and illegal land sales occurred. Only Royal princes can register land in the desert, which 
they did, and then sold it back to the government and to private companies and citizens at 
an exorbitant rate.  The House of Saud realized the extent to which they could earn 
money, either through legitimate or corrupt practices, and began going on lavish 
vacations in Europe and spending money on magnificent palaces within the country.  The 
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Royal Family began to lose their legitimacy with the population, as well as with the 
religious establishment.  With development occurring at an even more rapid pace than it 
did under King Faisal, the ulema discussed publicly their dislike for King Khalid.27   
 Public discontent came to a head in November 1979.  A man by the name of 
Juhaiman ibn Muhammad ibn Saif al Otaibi had been from a tribal area in Arabia that 
King Adbul Aziz had conquered.   Al Otaibi was a university student in Medina in the 
1970s and had become convinced of the illegitimacy of the Al Saud family due to the 
family’s decadence and prolific spending and indulgency. Al Otaibi and others in the 
Saudi Arabian population had believed that the Royal Family was becoming too Western 
and that they were no longer responsible Islamic leaders.  Al Otaibi had been a member 
of the National Guard before entering the university and once in school, began organizing 
a small militia modeled after the original Ikwan.  In November 1979 during the annual 
Hajj, al Otaibi and his soldiers seized control of the Grand Mosque and held control of it 
for two weeks.28  The ulema issued a fatwa allowing the government to use force against 
the rebels, but the Saudi Arabian National Guard was unsuccessful at stopping them.  
Hundreds of pilgrims were killed and some even joined the rebel forces.  French and 
Pakistani forces were brought in to help stop the rebels but the reputation of the House of 
Saud and the bureaucracy was tarnished in the eyes of the Saudi population.  Perceived 
economic corruption from oil revenues, an inability to secure the Grand Mosque, and the 
view of being religiously and politically illegitimate caused a rift between the three 
sectors of the country: the religious elite, the Royal Family, and the population.29 
 In response to the religious and public discontent, the House of Saud made a 
move to return the country back to the state of traditional Wahhabi Islam.  The Royal 
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Family invested millions into religious education for the nationals.  With the consensus of 
the ulema, the government also sent soldiers to fight with the mujahidin, Islamic fighters 
on behalf of jihad, in Afghanistan to battle the Soviet Union against communism. This 
decision resulted in the training of  20,000 young Saudi men, who quickly learned 
valuable military skills. For the 10 years that they fought the Soviet Union, they gained 
the confidence of fighting a super power, fighting for Islam, and learning fighting 
methods, which today would be considered terrorism.30  
 In 1982, King Fahd came to power and immediately befriended Saddam Hussein, 
the leader of Iraq.  King Fahd also began his reign by establishing industrial estates in 
Riyadh, Jeddah, and Damman, with the purpose of producing agricultural products, and 
in 1988, The Saudi Arabia Oil Company (Saudi ARAMCO) was finally fully 
nationalized.31   
Throughout the 1980s, an oil glut occurred throughout oil developing countries, 
dramatically receding oil revenues in the Kingdom. The Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) newly installed quota system fell largely on the shoulders of 
Saudi Arabia.  The Kingdom no longer wanted to be the swing producer of the producing 
nations, so they flooded the market with a glut of oil, which decreased oil revenues for 
other oil producing nations. By that time, Saudi Arabia had already committed to huge 
investment expenditures and the government was forced to draw down on their foreign 
assets to pay for the expenditures.  The global oil price crash in 1986, caused by Saudi 
Arabia’s violation of OPEC quotas in their attempt to regain market share and impose 
production discipline among other OPEC members, did nothing to help the economic 
stability of the nation.  Oil revenues during the last few years of the decade remained 25-
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30 percent lower than during the first few years of the decade.  The quick sale of 
government bonds stopped the monetary hemorrhaging and facilitated domestic 
confidence again.32  
 All efforts at restoring confidence in the economy and in the government 
completely evaporated after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.   Saddam Hussein’s troops 
were amassing along the Saudi Arabian border, representing an imminent threat to the 
Kingdom.  King Fahd sought consensus from the ulema to allow him to invite troops 
from the United States, Great Britain, France, and other foreign countries into Saudi 
Arabia.  In order to gain consensus, King Fahd made the extreme concession to offer the 
assurance that all non-Muslim troops would respect the traditions of the Kingdom and 
that once no longer needed, the troops would leave immediately.  The United States 
government did not understand at the time how the continued presence of American 
forces would create long-term hostility towards the United States.  Following the Kuwait 
war, the religious establishment publicly resisted the continued presence of American 
troops on Saudi Arabian soil and soon elements of extremism emerged, leading to an 
upsurge in anti-Western rhetoric.33 
 Confidence in the economic situation was also waning.  Saudi Arabia was once 
again forced to be the swing producer to make up for barrels lost in the war due to the 
destruction and fires at many of the oil wells in Kuwait. This caused domestic investment 
into social services and infrastructure to come to a standstill due to the significant 
decrease in revenues. However, following the end of the Gulf War in 1991, Saudi 
Arabia’s standing in the oil world improved. Saudi Arabia was the only major oil 
producing country that had significant excess capacity of crude oil production to make up 
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for the losses incurred during the war.  An increase in oil revenues did not correspond to 
an increase in infrastructure or a solid plan at economic diversification.34  It was not until 
1995 that oil prices started to stabilize and the government felt confident enough to start 
reinvesting in the country. Despite the internal political turmoil with the accession of a 
new leader, Crown Prince Abdullah following the stroke of King Fahd in 1995, the rest 
of the decade and into the early 2000s was considered an economic stabilization period 
for the country.35 
 The Seventh Development Plan began in the year 2000 and was completed at the 
end of 2004.  The priorities of the Plan included expanding human resource development, 
which entailed raising the productivity level of the country by implementing relevant 
training programs to the under- and unemployed.  An effort at privatization was enacted 
to increase the participation of Saudi nationals as well as allowing international 
investment and foreign capital. One important goal was to raise the efficiency of the 
government and to improve public services through the development of institutional and 
financial regulations.36   
 By 2002, the Seventh Development Plan was meeting its goals within the country 
and Saudi Arabia was back to making money via its international oil exports.  Overall, 
there was an increase in economic growth, higher per capita income, an increase in 
private sector participation, and higher trade surplus.37 Oil revenues had begun to 
increase dramatically as well, producing large budgetary surpluses.  Manufacturing, 
agriculture, and the banking sector grew dramatically in the early 2000s.  Between 2000-
2004, the focus of government spending was on economic diversification, and creating a 
greater role of the private sector in the economy.  The government aimed at achieving a 
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3.4 percent growth rate of GDP per year with the addition of 817,300 new jobs for Saudi 
nationals.  Between 2005- 2010, economic diversification was again a government 
priority, as well as integrating women into the educational system.  New universities and 
colleges with technical specializations were built, and the Hajj tourism industry became 
an even greater addition to economic diversification due to recent investment into the 
Grand Mosque and neighboring areas.38  
The Eighth Development Plan began in 2005 and ended in 2009.  The objectives 
of that plan were to safeguard Islamic teaching and values, enhance national unity, 
improve the services provided for Hajj pilgrims, to diversify the economic base with an 
emphasis on manufacturing industries, and to improve the productivity of the national 
economy.39  As of 2010, the government claimed it wanted to eliminate poverty and 
increase development and infrastructure, medical services, educational capacity, and 
residential housing through its Ninth Development Plan.  The new economic plan called 
for an increase in real GDP by 15 percent over five years, requiring significant 
governmental investment in human resource development.40 
 This chapter discussed the economic, social, and political beginnings of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  The country that began as a Bedouin and merchant class 
society evolved into the most important producer of energy in the history of the world.  
The income that has come from the precious resource of oil has provided the King the 
ability to provide subsidized benefits in areas such as housing, healthcare, education, and 
energy.   This chapter examined the history of the religious establishment, the succession 
of Kings, and the economic developments that have occurred in Saudi Arabia since 
before the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was even a state.  The remainder of this paper will 
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draw on these historical developments to analyze the actions that the House of Saud has 
been taking in order to prepare for the death of rentierism, as well as the obstacles that are 
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THE SOCIAL LANDSCAPE IN SAUDI ARABIA 
 
Rentierism in Saudi Arabia 
 
A new form of social and economic engineering in Saudi Arabia came after the 
discovery of oil in the form of rents.  The term rent refers to the monetary income 
derived from the sale of a natural resource to an international buyer.  A rentier is a state 
that derives at least 40 percent of their national income from the cultivation and 
international sale of their homegrown natural resource.  However, a rent is not merely 
income for landlords, governments, and royal families. It is considered a reward for the 
ownership of natural resources, and in Islamic countries especially, it is considered a gift 
from God.1 
Saudi Arabia, as well as Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and 
other oil-dependent Middle East countries are considered to be rentier economies.  
Rentier economies refer to the all-encompassing economic character of a nation which 
earns the majority of their income from the sale of their natural resource to buyers outside 
of their own country.2 The state is essentially supported monetarily by the sale of this 
resource, as all other forms of income fall short of being the income behemoth that the 
natural resource provides.  When the secondary and tertiary economies dwindle after the 
discovery, extraction, and exportation of natural resources, the society becomes even 
more dependent on the government.  The economy outside of the petroleum industry 
becomes unviable, often resulting in a financially poor population with limited 
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employment opportunities, few marketable or useful skills, and the mentality that the 
state should take care of them from cradle to grave.3  
While income from the natural resource is the main source of income, pure rentier 
economies do not exist.  Saudi Arabia comes statistically close to a pure rentier economy 
with 80 percent of budget revenues, 45 percent of GDP, and 90 percent of export 
earnings coming from the international sale of oil.4 Even with the high income that oil 
provides, Saudi Arabia does have income from other sources such as zakat collection, 
Hajj tariffs, and international investment.5 
An important feature of a rentier economy is that the creation of wealth is 
centered around a small fraction of the society. In Saudi Arabia, only 1.5 percent of the 
population is involved in oil production, while the rest consume it and reap the rentier 
rewards from it.  The resource, usually oil, is typically subsidized for the citizens of the 
country from which it originates and the cost of manufacturing is low compared to the 
massive amount of income that is generated from it.6 
In a rentier state, the government is the sole original recipient of the external rent.  
The job of the rentier state is to then distribute the rents according to the needs of the 
population.7 Throughout the Middle East, rent distribution is handled differently amongst 
the rentier states.  In Saudi Arabia, rents are distributed on a subsidy basis. Social 
services, healthcare, roads, education, energy, and other features of a modern society are 
paid for by the government. Kuwait, on the other hand, has such a small population that 
the government pays for all of the same social services that Saudi Arabia pays for, as well 
as giving direct cash installments to each citizen of the country. Each Kuwaiti citizen 
receives US$600 per month in direct cash transfers. Each married couple receives 
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US$1,000 per month, and parents receive US$500 per child, per month, for up to 12 
children.8 Saudi Arabia was initially a low-density rentier state with a small population, 
allowing for each national to claim the majority of benefits offered.  Over the years with 
the population increasing, Saudi Arabia has evolved into a high-density rentier state and 
individual direct cash transfers are no longer feasible, like they are in Kuwait.9 
In a rentier economy, the power that the government accumulates and is charged 
with after the discovery of a natural resource is staggering.  The livelihoods of every 
citizen and each person residing in their country are dependent on them to distribute the 
income fairly and legitimately.  If the government does not already have a substantial 
amount of power when the natural resource is discovered, then a royal family, the 
political elite, or a government structure must quickly take on the political power role 
without major political, social, and economic disruption.10  The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
was created only six years prior to the discovery of oil. The newfound income and 
responsibility associated with international trade forced the Al Saud family into an even 
more powerful position. They became the legitimate ruling authority of Saudi Arabia 
after the discovery of oil because they were charged with providing even the most basic 
of necessities to its population.11   
Saudi Arabia currently has a rentier mentality. A rentier mentality arises from the 
luck, or chance, of a citizenry base that is no longer expected to be active members of the 
society and becomes reliant upon government subsidies generated from rents.12  As a 
Saudi Arabian national under the power of a King, having all basic needs provided for by 
the government, and not being expected to contribute to the manufacturing or distribution 
of oil has created a rentier mentality.   The income of the state is not based on the 
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economic prowess or hard work of the citizens of the country.  They are not expected to 
work or risk their own financial allotment to become entrepreneurs in order to provide for 
their families, or for the government. Everything that they need to survive is handed to 
them.  There is a break in the work-reward dynamic.  The reward for being in the right 
place at the right time in history becomes a windfall gain and not the result of systematic 
hard work.  The reward is situational, vulnerable, and opportunistic.  
Rentier mentality has been prevalent since the discovery of oil in 1938, and has 
permeated the mindset and culture of the Saudi Arabian population.  This mentality has 
resulted in a limited and unmotivated workforce.  The minimal skill structure and lack of 
desire and need to work have forced an outside workforce to infiltrate even the most 
basic of service jobs in order to provide for the Saudi Arabians.  Services and activities 
are manned by an expatriate workforce who do not have the same rights as Saudi Arabian 
nationals, yet they are the backbone of society.13 With this new allocative system and 
rentier state mentality, the government moves farther and farther away from its people 
instead of growing closer to them.  The government becomes isolated from the 
population and therefore becomes unresponsive to the demands of society.  The capacity 
of the state to react to citizen demands often declines and sometimes disappears when 
they are not expected to use it on a regular basis.  Nationals do not pay taxes and 
therefore do not expect anything but social and economic allocations from its 
government.   The government simply ‘pays off’ its citizens and in return, does not need 
to provide democracy, and is not accountable to its citizens other than to provide rents. 
The population then becomes a cost and a burden to the government. 14 Since the citizens 
make minimal contributions to the state, mainly in the form of the zakat, or religious tithe 
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amounting to 2.5 percent of a Muslim’s total wealth, they then have little interest in 
controlling the elite of the state, including the Royal Family.15 
The phenomenon of rentier mentality is not unique to Saudi Arabia. Other Gulf 
States in the Middle East also have a rentier mentality and import the majority of their 
workforce. More than half the entire population of Kuwait are expatriate workers who are 
there to do the jobs that the Kuwaiti’s do not want, or have, to do.16  Thomas Stauffer 
elaborates on the term rentier to go beyond simply the economic aspect of it, and posits it 
as a social function as well.  He opines that the citizenry of the rentier state consider 
themselves to be members of a special and elite group of people.  These people do not 
have to engage in the hard labor of extracting, manufacturing, and distributing the natural 
resources that make them so wealthy. They can and do pay expatriate workers to do these 
types of jobs for them.17  Rent wealth becomes the right of citizenship, and not just a 
convenience or a perk.  In states that have high levels of rent income-to-population ratios, 
such as Kuwait, they have little in the way of securing reliable employment for their 
locals. The jobs in most rentier economies are usually a means of creating a living 
without any real productive effort.  It is usually not self-sustaining, and is usually a 
façade for production.18 
Similarly, most economies in the Middle East are characterized by differing 
degrees of dependence on nonrenewable resources. Oil, phosphates, natural gas, 
unrequited transfers of foreign aid in the form of grants or concessions, quasi rents such 
as income remittances from foreign workers, or locational rents, such as pipelines and 
canals, all contribute to rentier economies.19 The structure of the economies are 
determined not by the domestic factors of production, but by the process of adapting to, 
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and incorporating, the economic rents and the external flow of resources into the folds of 
the state budget.20  
The value of the natural resource is the difference between the market value of the 
resource and the cost of production, known as the economic rent.  However, the oil 
export prices are completely divorced from the actual cost of local production.  The 
export prices are not based on a valuation of the finished product, minus the labor and 
manufacturing costs, because the natural resource, in this case oil, is free.21  The price of a 
barrel of oil set for export is based more on regional and global production quotas, the 
international political atmosphere, and the rise and fall of global demand and 
consumption.  It costs Saudi Arabia approximately US$6 to manufacture one barrel of 
oil. Historically, on the international market, a barrel has reached prices in excess of $120 
per barrel, yet it often fluctuates. Because oil has been the most profitable natural 
resource this planet has provided, and the ramifications of it have occurred in less than 
the last 100 years, there is no established precedent for adjusting national incomes for the 
depletion of a nonrenewable resource.22  
In the case of Saudi Arabia, the likelihood that the state will be able to continue to 
be rentier is unlikely. There are three phases of rentierism and Saudi Arabia has passed 
through the first two phases of rentierism and is in their final phase. The first phase is 
called Classical Rentierism, where the state earns a large amount of money from external 
rents, and it is highly allocative with high social spending and little to no taxation applied 
to nationals.  The state at this phase is autonomous from society, and has little or no 
economic or development policies in place.  The government is typically wasteful, if not 
corrupt at this stage, and elite political relations are managed through 
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neopatrimonialism.23  Saudi Arabia could have been considered to be in the Classical 
Rentierism phase from 1938, when oil was discovered during the reign of King Abdul 
Aziz, until 1964, when King Faisal took command. 
The second phase of rentierism is called Specialized and Conditional Rentierism.  
During this phase, the state is allocative, but begins to apply some taxation. The state 
begins to implement some sort of economic policies and reforms, the state’s role varying 
across the macro and micro levels.  Saudi Arabia lingered in this phase throughout the 
reign of King Faisal, from 1964 until 2005 when King Abdullah began his leadership.   
The third phase of rentierism is called Late Rentierism. Late Rentierism occurs 
when the state is responsive, globalized, and strategic in its thinking.  Late Rentierism 
evolves from the forces of state maturity, experience with the ramifications of oil, and the 
need for the state to develop and diversify its economy for the preparation of an economy 
without oil.44 Saudi Arabia slowly entered into this last phase after King Abdullah 
succeeded the throne in 2005, is still in this phase as of the year 2012, and will continue 
to be until rentierism is obsolete.24 
The remaining section in this chapter will discuss the current social and political 
landscapes present in Saudi Arabia, all of which are a result of rentierism.  The remaining 
chapters of this paper will discuss how and why Saudi Arabia will have to quickly adopt 
a new national economic policy, alternatives to government income besides oil, and the 
education and motivation of a rentier mentality society in order to maintain their current 
way of life.  Once the government is unable to maintain their rentierism, it is certain that 
their citizens will not continue to maintain their current way of life. It is probable that if 
they do not make changes, their society will revert back to the pre-oil days of nomadic 
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pastoralism, pearling, and the reliance on Hajj income in order to survive in a nonrentier 
state. 
 
The Social Landscape in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
 Saudi Arabia is the 13th largest country in terms of landmass and the 46th largest 
according to population in the world. At the beginning of 2012, the population of Saudi 
Arabia hovered around 27 million people; of that, 21.4 million people are Saudi Arabian 
nationals, with an additional 5.6 million nonnationals and expatriate workers.  The 
population in Saudi Arabia is very young, with 70 percent being under the age of 30, 43 
percent being under the age of 14, and only 2.5 percent over the age of 65.25  The 
domestic population growth rate is 2.18 percent and the birthrate is 19.34 births per 1,000 
people, one of the highest in the world.  The death rate is only 3.33 deaths per 1,000 
people and the infant mortality rate is very low at only 13.7 deaths per 1,000 live births. 
There is a high overall life expectancy of 75.67 years. The fertility rate has fluctuated 
between 4.1 and 6.4 births per woman since 1985. High fertility rates, low death rates, 
high life expectancies, and an increasing expatriate workforce puts Saudi Arabia into the 
classification of suffering from a ‘population bomb.’26  In order to put these numbers in 
perspective, the United States has a population of 313.8 million people, of which 20 
percent are between the ages of 1-14, 66 percent between 15-64, and 13 percent over the 
age of 65.  The population growth rate is .889 and the birth rate is 13.68 births per 1,000 
people. The death rate is high at 8.39 deaths per 1,000 people with a life expectancy of 
78.49 years. The population of the United States is nearly 12 times larger than the 
population of Saudi Arabia and it has nearly one-third the population growth rate.  These 
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numbers are indicative of a population that is forced to work for its income.  Women 
make up nearly half of the United States workforce and the more women that work, the 
lower the birthrate will be.27  
Historically, the Kingdom encouraged the social policy of having as many 
children as a woman could, in order to grow the empire.  This policy proved to be a 
burden on the government once the House of Saud took on the role of being rentier and 
chose to provide and subsidize all forms of social and economic benefits.  Birth control in 
Saudi Arabia is easily accessible from local pharmacies and is available over-the-
counter.28  The Islamic ruling on contraception, however, is that permanent contraception 
such as vasectomies and tubal ligation are not allowed because according to Islamic 
scholars, it changes the human physiology.  The Prophet Mohammad is reported to have 
said, “ Marry the one who is loving and fertile, for I will be proud of your great numbers 
before the nations” (Abu Dawood Hadith No. 2050).  On a similar note, abortion is not 
acceptable according to Islam. “Kill not your children for fear of want: we shall provide 
sustenance for them as well as you: verily the killing of them is a great sin” (Al-Quran 
17:31).29  The withdrawal method is also not an acceptable form of birth control because 
according to Islam, it interrupts a woman’s pleasure and prevents a woman from 
conceiving if that is what she chooses, but the withdrawal method is acceptable if the 
woman explicitly agrees to it.  Overall, Islam permits the use of birth control for four 
main reasons. The first is to let the woman rest between pregnancies and the second is to 
prevent the transmission of sexual transmitted diseases. The third reason is if it is 
required for the health of the woman and the fourth is if the husband cannot financially 
support more children.30  The religion of Islam is, and continues to be, strongly pro- 
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family and regards children as a gift from God.  Wahhabi Islamic scholars are reluctant to 
promote the use of contraceptives for the fear of reprisal from the more conservative 
religious scholars.31  While the country is in a good social position to begin educating the 
public on the use and benefits of birth control, changing the long-standing historical 
culture of having many children will be one of the greatest challenges facing the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  The country will, however, be forced to tackle this issue head 
on in order to maintain their rentierism for as long as possible.  The burden of constant 
and sharp population growth will not only be a drain on the oil supply but on all forms of 
alternative resources as well as all social benefits for a country that will be cash strapped, 
resource barren, and educationally marginalized.  
Until the 1960s, most of the population in Saudi Arabia was nomadic but due to 
oil rents and land distribution programs, more than 95 percent of the country’s population 
is now settled in urban areas. The overall density of Saudi Arabia is 33 people per square 
mile. In urban areas, the density increases to 2,600 people per square mile due to the 
uninhabitable desert climate pervading the majority of the country’s land mass.32 The 
area around the holy sites of Mecca, which includes the cities of Jeddah and Medina, is 
the most populated region of the country and is home to 26 percent of the total 
population.   The second most populated area is the Eastern Province, which includes the 
cities of Riyadh, Ad Dammam, Khobar, and Dhahran, which house the people who work 
in the oil fields.  The least populated regions lie at the extreme north and extreme south of 
Saudi Arabia.33  
The social, cultural, and religious makeup of Saudi Arabia is incredibly 
homogenous. More than 90 percent of the native population is Arab and the remainder is 
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of African and Asian descent.  Arabic is the official language of the Kingdom. Islam is 
the official religion of Saudi Arabia and the country’s legal code and education system 
follow Islamic, Sharia law. All Saudi nationals adhere to the Islamic religion with 85 
percent following the Sunni sect, the majority of which are Wahhabi.  About 2 million 
Shia live in Saudi Arabia, most of which live in the Eastern Province.  Religions other 
than Islam are only found among expatriate workers and foreign nationals and they 
mainly adhere to the Hindu and Christian faiths.  Public worship of religion other than 
Wahhabi Islam is prohibited by law and is regulated and punished by the states’ mutawa, 
Committee for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, or religious police.  
The Saudi Arabian government has now begun to allow non-Muslim foreigners to 
practice their religion privately, but there has been no change in the actual law to allow 
for it, still making it a national crime and thus punishable by the government.   
 The government controls all mosques and is the employer of all imams, or Islamic 
leaders.  The government also controls the centers that facilitate the conversion of 
foreigners to Islam as well as all government employment appointments.  Non-Sunni 
Muslims are eliminated from consideration for government employment, as well as any 
other non-Sunni. Conversion from Wahhabi Islam and proselytizing by non-Muslims and 
even non-Sunni Muslims are crimes punishable by death by the Saudi Arabian 
government.34 
A separate reason for the population explosion has been the historically lenient 
laws regarding nonnational and expatriate relocation into the country of Saudi Arabia. 
While nonnationals and expatriates are not entitled to receive the same amount of 
government benefits that Saudi nationals receive, they still benefit from the energy and 
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petroleum subsidization programs, infrastructure, and they still have access to advanced 
healthcare and education if they choose to participate and to pay for them. Although 
living with few rights, nonnationals and expatriates are still a drain on the economy and 
will still contribute to the waning rentierism Saudi Arabia will experience when domestic 
oil production equals domestic consumption.  In May 2011, the Saudi Arabian 
government issued a directive that it will not renew any work permits for foreign 
individuals who have already spent six years in the country. This was an effort on behalf 
of the country to create more jobs for nationals as well as to decrease the foreign 
population in Saudi Arabia. This directive was part of a ten-point program in an effort at 
Saudization.  Saudization refers to the efforts in a variety of sectors in the country to 
improve the standard of living for Saudi nationals.  The program touches on efforts to 
decrease unemployment, increase individual income, increase national income, income 
diversification techniques, investment strategies, educational reform, as well as an 
improvement in international relations.35   
 
Education 
 The literacy rate for Saudi Arabian males is 84.7 and 77.8 for females.  The 
region surrounding Riyadh has the highest literacy rate of about 90 percent. The lowest 
literacy rate is in Jizan, which is located in the southwest corner of Saudi Arabia, where 
only about 75 percent of the population is literate. The government spends 5.6 percent of 
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on education and has built 20,000 public schools and 
eight public universities.  Public education is free to every Saudi national but parents are 
not required by law to send their children to school.  Approximately 50 percent of 
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children enroll in primary education, and intermediate and secondary schools.  Although 
education opportunities for girls and women have increased, classroom instruction and 
entire schools are still segregated.  Women are only allowed to attend six of the eight 
universities and they are prohibited from studying certain subjects, such as science and 
technology related to the oil industry.  All curricula must conform to Islamic laws and the 
teaching is strictly based on the Quran.36  The vast majority of government spending on 
education goes towards the thousands of madrasas, or Islamic religious schools, Islamic 
academies, al-Qaida training camps, and mosques in the United States and in Europe.  
Half of the PhDs awarded in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are in Islamic studies. Young 
men without education end up unemployed and shunned by the state and by the private 
sector. Many turn to the Islamic clerics for guidance and for something to occupy their 
time, as well as for employment.37 
 Education in Saudi Arabia is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education, 
the Ministry of Higher Education, and the General Organization for Technical Education 
and Training.  In 2003, the Ministry of Education developed the “Ministry of Education 
Ten Year Plan 2004-2014,” which set goals for the education system to be completed 
during that timeframe.  Of the sixteen goals, seven of them were general goals regarding 
the increase in accountability of the educational infrastructure to provide transparency.  
Three of the goals were directed at increasing the capacity of students at the educational 
centers to accommodate students ages 4-18 years of age.  One goal was to eradicate 
illiteracy, another was to organize technical education for girls, and the remainder of the 
goals were centered around expanding the role of Islam and national pride.38   
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 In Saudi Arabia, there are six private schools, which are geared mainly towards 
Western students who are living in Saudi Arabia with their parents who work for Saudi 
Aramco or other Western-based companies.  There is one Institute for Public 
Administration and four technical and vocational schools.  These schools specialize in 
educating students for certain careers such as for being sales agents, receptionists, jewelry 
salesmen, air conditioning sales and repairmen, auto mechanics, customs forwarders, 
Linux web developers, and as truck drivers.39  Women are not allowed to enroll in the 
majority of these courses because the ulema and government ban them from working in 
most of these fields.40    
There are eight public universities in the country, only two of which women may 
attend.  In order to attend university and receive free tuition, the student must be a Saudi 
Arabian national.  Education is limited to courses in manufacturing, chemical processes, 
chemistry, biochemistry, and chemicals as well as Islamic courses on the Sharia and 
Quran.  There are few courses offered in business management, entrepreneurship, 
economics, international relations, mathematics, English, or linguistics.  The majority of 
the courses at the university level and in the vocational schools prepare the students for 
menial labor jobs and employment in natural gas, oil, and the mining industries in the 
Kingdom.41   
The study of Wahhabi Islam continues to completely dominate the Saudi Arabian 
education system.  Starting in Kindergarten through higher education, rote memorization 
of large parts of the Quran is required and learning the application of Islam in daily life is 
the main course of study. Students are required to enroll in Islamic education courses 
along with other courses in their chosen field of study.42  Wahhabi Islam education in 
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Saudi Arabia has been known to focus on the Wahhabi ideology of hatred toward the 
unbeliever and anyone who does not follow the Wahhabi doctrine of Islam, even if they 
still consider themselves Muslims.  To tackle this problem and to encourage educators 
and students alike to focus on education that will benefit the student as well as the 
population, a comprehensive development program has been established. This 
development program is called Tatweer, and was established in 2007.  The goals of the 
program are to develop a system of educational standards and to develop a curriculum to 
meet current and future skill needs.  The reforms have been budgeted at US$2 billion 
with the underlying goal of moving public education away from Wahhabi extremism and 
to encourage students to pursue more secular and vocationally based education.43  
 
Health and Welfare 
 Some Saudi Arabian nationals enjoy a lavish lifestyle that creates and promotes a 
lack of motivation. Coupled with cultural and social restrictions, the lack of motivation 
has resulted in a 35 percent obesity rate.  Saudi Arabia ranks 5th in the world for obesity, 
only behind The United States, The United Kingdom, Australia, and Malaysia.44 Each 
Saudi national does, however, have access to unlimited, free healthcare.  The government 
spends 13 percent of the annual GDP on health care expenditures such as building and 
operating new hospitals and nonurgent care centers.  Part of the expenditure also goes to 
recruiting nonnational expatriate doctors to work in the country. Saudi Arabia’s health 
care system is two tiered, consisting of established hospitals in the urban centers and 
mobile units to visit the rural areas of the country.  The mobile units provide minor and 
preventative healthcare, leaving major surgeries and more extensive healthcare issues for 
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the doctors in the large cities to tackle.  Although there are 1.5 doctors and 2.3 hospital 
beds per 1,000 people in Saudi Arabia and the rate of specialized service providers has 
been increasing, the policy of sending patients to the United States for more complicated 
procedures continues.  In an attempt to keep patients in their home country, the Saudi 
Arabian government has invested in, and turned their attention to, improving Saudi 
facilities and local expertise.  With large amounts of investment, however, only about 20 
percent of the doctors in the country are Saudi nationals, the rest being expatriate 
physicians. 
 Although Saudi Arabia does not release national statistics on health and welfare, 
the United Nations has estimated that the country has all but eradicated HIV/AIDS, 
diphtheria, poliomyelitis, whooping cough, and measles due to the near 100 percent 
immunization of babies.  Almost the entire population of Saudi Arabia has access to 
clean water and sanitation as well as access to affordable essential drugs. Trained 
physicians attend to almost all live births, resulting in the low infant mortality rate.  
Although many technological and infrastructural advances have been made in the 
medical field in Saudi Arabia since the 1970s, problems with management have hindered 
coordination among the various state and private health care providers.45 
 An issue that has plagued the reputation of Saudi Arabia is that of domestic 
violence among women and children.  In 2003, a report by the Saudi Ministry of Interior 
estimated that 21 percent of women suffer abuse.  A study done in health centers in 
Medina in 2009 verified that statistic by asking women who came in for treatment about 
mental, physical, and emotional abuse.  Women were interviewed using questions from 
the Modern Conflict Tactic Scale, Kansas Marital Scale, and the lie scale of the 
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Minnesota Multiphase Personality Inventory. Of the 689 women interviewed, 25.7 
percent reported physical abuse and 32.8 percent reported emotional abuse without 
physical violence.  The lifetime prevalence of abuse among those women was 57.7 
percent, of which only 36 percent reported the abuse to a primary care physician.46  To 
address this problem, the Saudi government has since mandated that hospitals report any 
suspicions of violence, or admission of violence against women and children to law 
enforcement officials.47 
 This chapter examined the primary source of funding for the livelihoods of Saudi 
Arabian nationals, that being in the form of oil rents.  Rents from oil provide subsidies 
such as free healthcare, education, infrastructure, employment, as well as subsidized 
energy and water. The topic of this research is to determine what the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia is doing to prepare for the end of rentierism when domestic oil meets domestic 
capacity. As this chapter has shown, all Saudi Arabian nationals enjoy some form of oil- 
based rents.  Removing this social, cultural, and economic benefit will obligate the 
population of Saudi Arabia to seek their own profitable employment, pay full price for 
energy, water, health care, and maybe even education.  The phenomenon of the rentier 
state mentality is pervasive throughout this country with generations of people who have 
never known life without oil rents.  With many competing entities such as the Royal 
Family, the religious elite, and foreign security issues, coupled with a population that is 
increasing faster than the government can keep up with, the death of rentierism is 
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THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE IN SAUDI ARABIA 
 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
 Saudi Arabia is a monarchy run by King Abdullah and other members of the 
Royal Family.  Saudi Arabia was formed as a patrimonial society, which according to 
Max Weber is a society that grows out of a charismatic leadership or as an extension of 
patriarchalism, around one person, usually the leader of the group or tribe.1  Saudi Arabia 
was formed as a patrimonial society around the economic and kin-based relationships that 
King Abdul Aziz formed in the Arabian Peninsula before he was able to establish official 
statehood for Saudi Arabia.  Patrimonial states grow based on marital strategies within 
the family, which are meant to strengthen political alliances and the symbolic 
representations of the ruler as patriarch.  King Abdul Aziz wedded a woman from each 
major tribe in Arabia in order to solidify his power and influence among the tribes of 
Arabia.2   
 The power and authority of the patriarch extends from his own household into 
society and spreads among the entire population.  The development of any country occurs 
within a socio-economic framework and the direction of development is greatly 
influenced by the degree of positive responses of the people and the organizations of that 
country.3  Subjects of King Abdul Aziz responded with mixed feedback during his 
attempt at conquering Arabia.  He was able to gain the favor of the religious elite by 
guaranteeing them that he would spread Wahhabi Islam and operate the country as an 
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Islamic state under the rules of the Quran.  Prior to the discovery of oil, he was able to 
provide protection from neighboring tribes so that the merchants could pursue their 
business.  The Ikwan was the group that fought against him the most, but that was 
because he would not allow them to expand their empire into the greater areas of the 
Middle East after King Abdul Aziz had conquered Arabia.4   
 Some features that are staples of patrimonial societies that the Kingdom has 
experienced include close ties between rulers and office holders, private appropriation of 
office by agents who owe their power to the ruler, and the act of making the 
administration and the military the personal belongings of the ruler. There is a strong 
reliance on kinship networks and a strict adherence to tradition but the patrimonial 
society usually lacks formal accountability.  In Saudi Arabia, Ministers and other 
members of the government are usually members of the Royal Family and are therefore 
not accountable to a higher power since they are the ultimate power.  The Royal Family 
does seek consensus with the religious establishment but aside from that, there has been 
no history of formal checks and balances in the Kingdom.5 
The House of Saud is the wealthiest and most powerful dynasty in the world.  
Descendents of King Abdul Aziz Saud are currently the primary wealth holders in the 
country.  The line of succession to the throne is not via father-son but by brother-brother.  
The Al Saud family is estimated to be composed of upwards of 15,000 members but the 
most power and wealth resides in the 2,000 descendents of King Abdul Aziz. Of the 
15,000 descendents, 5,000 of them hold US$400 billion of the country’s currency.  The 
government of Saudi Arabia solely consists of the elite and upper class, most of which 
are members of the Royal Family.  The sharing of family wealth is a critical component 
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in maintaining the semblance of a united front for the Royal Family.  Depending on how 
close they are to the King, these members of the Royal Family receive between 
US$19,000- US$270,000 per month from the royal coffers.6  There are 30-40 new males 
born per month that are direct descendents of King Abdul Aziz.  Each of these sons is 
granted US$500,000 upon birth to be put towards their future endeavors as princes.  
Princesses are not given any such stipend; they are reliant on the generosity of their 
fathers and husbands.7  This amount is unmatched by any royal family at any time or in 
any place in history. Members also receive steady income from commissions, bribes, 
kickbacks from the oil industry, as well as income from arms deals.8 The Kingdom and 
its physical entirety are viewed by the Al Saud family as being a wholly owned family 
asset.9  The population of Saudi Arabia is completely dependent on the generosity of the 
Al Saud family to give them benefits.  There is a large portion of the population that, in 
fact, does not receive any benefits from the nations profitability from oil.  Of the 27 
million nationals, 20 million qualify as being from the lower middle class to being in 
extreme poverty.  Forty percent of the national GDP goes straight to the Al Saud family 
members and the rest of the population does not see the benefits of any of it.10  Ordinary 
Saudi nationals who do receive direct allowances from the government only receive 
about US$7,000 per year from the government. This is not enough to live on, especially 
for women who are supporting many, if not all, of their young, and employment aged 
children.11  Elderly women working in the traditional markets is on the rise because they 
are not allowed, due to social and cultural reasons, to work in many lines of work, 
leaving few means of making a living available. 12  
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The perception that oil revenues are not equally distributed throughout the 
population is an increasing source of social discontent.  The population witnesses the 
upper echelons of the country siphoning off all of the money and then being viewed as 
being nearly incompetent at their government jobs.  Saudi Arabia could be considered to 
be a prebendalism society, in which offices are appointed with allocative funds to family 
members who then exploit the office. Nationals see that money from oil revenues often 
skip the national treasury and go straight into the personal bank accounts of the Royal 
Family.13  According to Transparency International, Saudi Arabia earns a 62 percent 
rating on the Control Of Corruption test.  This test measures the perception that public 
power is exercised for private gain.  This test includes petty as well as grand forms of 
corruption and how much the state as been ‘captured’ by the elite and from private 
interests.  The point scale ranges from -2.5 to 2.5 and Saudi Arabia earned a .1456, which 
is equivalent to a ranking of 62 percent. The higher the number on the point scale, the 
better the governance and the less perception of corruption. Saudi Arabia scored low on 
the scale, indicating that there is definitely a perception of corruption.  On the Open 
Budget Index test, which measures the availability of public access to budget documents 
and the extent of oversight by the legislature or supreme auditing institutions, Saudi 
Arabia was ranked 1 on a scale of zero to 100. This score reflects that Saudi Arabia does 
not have an open door policy for the public to view any kind of financial documents or 
dealings and that there is no auditing of the budget and income by a higher power able to 
enforce checks and balances.14 
While the Saudi Arabian government earns unprecedented sums of money from 
the oil sector, on a national scale, Saudi Arabia ranks low in regards to economic 
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freedom.  Economic freedom is the fundamental right of every human to control his or 
her own labor and property.  In an economically free society, individuals have the 
freedom to work, produce, consume, and invest in any manner they choose.  
Governments that are economically free allow and protect the right of their citizens to 
work and to invest how they see fit. Governments also allow labor, capital, and goods to 
move freely and they only limit these activities when liberty itself needs to be protected.15   
According to the Heritage Foundation, there are four pillars of economic freedom 
on which each country is ranked in order to evaluate their level of economic freedom. 
The first pillar is the Rule of Law.  This measures property rights, and freedom from 
corruption. The second pillar is Limited Government, which measures individual and 
government fiscal freedom as well as government spending.  The third pillar is 
Regulatory Efficiency, which measures the levels of business, labor, and monetary 
freedom. The final pillar is Open Markets. This pillar measures trade, investment, and 
financial freedom.  Each country is given two scores: a fiscal freedom score and a score 
for government spending.  Since 1995, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s economic 
freedom scores have remained consistent. For the year 2012, they received a score of 
62.5 for fiscal freedom and 37.3 out of a 100-point scale for government spending.  Their 
neighbor Kuwait also received a score of 62.5 for fiscal freedom but trumped the 
Kingdom with a score of 47.2 in government spending.  To compare, the United States 
received 76.3 for fiscal freedom and a 46.7 for government spending for the year 2012.16   
While the scores for fiscal freedom are not too poor, Saudi Arabia should 
definitely be scoring higher for government spending, given their access to the most 
profitable natural resource in the world. This score simply puts a concrete number to the 
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face of monetary government corruption and misallocation of funds that the people of the 
country already recognize as being a problem. 
  
Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques 
King Abdullah 
 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy based on Islam and Sharia 
law. King Abdullah is the head of the government as well as the commander in chief of 
the military.  The King appoints a Crown Prince to help with government duties, and is 
second in line to the thrown. Currently, Crown Prince Nayef has taken on this duty.   
While the government is an absolute monarchy, the King does not have sole and 
unfettered power.  The Basic Law established in 1993 articulates the government’s rights 
and regulations and sets forth civil rights, the system of government, determines 
administrative divisions, and mandates that Islamic Law must come before all other 
considerations.  The Quran and Sunna, or Islamic custom and practice based on the 
Prophet Mohammad’s words and deeds, are considered to be the state’s constitution. The 
government, as well as society, both agree that there should be no separation of church 
and state.  The King has supreme authority, but he must also respect Islamic law and 
tradition and build consensus among members of the Royal Family and ulema, or 
religious leaders. The only way to remove a sitting king is if a majority of the Royal 
Family calls for his ouster.17  
 The current head of the Royal Family is King Abdullah.  Born in Riyadh in 1924 
to a Bedouin mother from the Rashid tribe, a tribe that has historically been enemies with 
the Al Saud family, Abdullah has always been the odd prince out.   King Abdul Aziz had 
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married Abdullah’s mother in an effort to cement a truce with the Rashid tribe, which 
was customary in order to conquer all of Arabia. King Abdullah received formal religious 
education as well as training to become a horseman.  In 1962, King Abdullah was 
appointed as the commander of the Saudi National Guard. He retained that position until 
1996 when he became the de facto ruler after his brother, King Fahd, had become 
incapacitated by a stroke.  It was not until 2005 that King Abdullah succeeded King Fahd 
in an official capacity as King of Saudi Arabia.18  During his tenure as de facto ruler and 
also as King, King Abdullah has been popular among the Saudi Arabian population for 
his more modern ways. He has pushed for social and political changes that included the 
nation’s first popular elections and he moved control of girls’ education from the 
religious elite to the Ministry of Education.  He also has worked to forge closer relations 
with the United States in an attempt to secure national and regional security and tried to 
eliminate anti-Americanism among the Saudi Arabian population.19   
 One stance that King Abdullah has consistently held is that the Kingdom has 
fallen behind the Western world in intellectual, scientific, and technological 
achievements.  In an effort to intellectually bolster his population, King Abdullah has 
invested $US12.5 billion to build a graduate institution named King Abdullah University 
of Science and Technology (KAUST) in Jeddah.  This university is his effort at creating 
wealth through innovation as opposed to solely relying on income from oil.  The 
undertaking of this academic institution is at direct odds with the religious authorities 
because at King Abdullah University, men and women are not segregated, the mutawa, or 
religious police, are banned from the property, and all religious and ethnic groups are 
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allowed to attend in an effort to advance academic freedom and international 
collaboration.20   
 Since 2009, King Abdullah has promoted sweeping changes to the cabinet by 
reshuffling and removing major conservative figures who had been obstacles to change.  
The chief of the religious police and the country’s senior judge were both replaced with 
people who have been loyal to him and willing to enact his modern approaches to social 
and political change.  In what observers called a ‘mini revolution,’ King Abdullah even 
appointed the first female deputy minister, which has not sat well with the religious 
establishment.21  Another action that was not popular among the religious elite was the 
installment of more moderate and diverse members of the Council of the Senior Ulema, 
the group of religious conservatives that determine how judges interpret Islamic law.  
This drastic action signaled King Abdullah’s public dissatisfaction with the radical 
religious elite.  This reshuffling was also an effort to discipline and modernize the legal 
system, which currently allows judges to have an unrestrained, and often severe, 
interpretation of Islamic law.22 
 King Abdullah has not only tried to reform the religious establishment, education, 
women’s rights, and international relations, he has also tried to reform his own family.  
One of King Abdullah’s initiatives within the family has been to reduce royal corruption 
and entitlements.  Although popular with the West and with Saudi Arabian nationals, 
King Abdullah has become incredibly unpopular with his family.  King Abdullah had 
always been on the outskirts of the Royal Family in terms of ethics, politics, religious 
views, and overall popularity. King Abdullah has always turned his back on the typically 
lavish traditions of his brothers, choosing to vacation in the desert eating dates and 
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drinking camels milk while his brothers spend in excess of US$5 million per day 
vacationing in Europe.  King Abdullah raised his children according to the customs of the 
desert and in conversation, he still uses Bedouin dialect.  During King Fahd’s sickness in 
the early 1990s, King Abdullah was accused of trying to provoke his brother in the hopes 
that he would die so that he may take the throne.  The rest of the family did not approve 
of King Abdullah’s reformist ideas and tried as hard as they could to keep King Fahd 
alive until Abdullah died. King Fahd eventually died in 2005 and one of King Abdullah’s 
first initiatives was to begin reducing Royal entitlements by cutting back the monthly 
allowance of the third-generation princes.  In order to make ends meet, however, the 
princes began to engage in even more corrupt practices than they had before. They began 
taking bribes from construction firms who were seeking government contracts, getting 
involved in arms deals, expropriating property from commoners, and selling Saudi visas 
to guest workers.  One of the grandest schemes that the princes concocted was to borrow 
money from the private Saudi Arabian banks and then they would simply refuse to pay 
the loans back.  The senior princes were engaging in thievery at a much greater scale. 
They were depositing revenue from oil sales into special accounts, completely bypassing 
the Saudi treasury altogether.  The accounts were not subject to government audits or any 
sort of accountability.23   
 While King Abdullah has tried to limit the corruption and entitlements among the 
Royal Family, there are too many family members receiving stipends, making it too 
difficult to control.   Essentially, King Abdullah has not been able to eradicate the 
corruption and swindling of state funds into Royal bank accounts and has only further 
alienated himself from the rest of his family.24 
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Crown Prince Nayef 
 Aside from King Abdullah being on the other side of Royal favor, the brother 
who creates the most problems for the King on his domestic initiatives is Crown Prince 
Nayef.  Minister of the Interior for the past 35 years, Crown Prince Nayef assumed the 
position of second in command on 27 October 2011, the day that the previous Crown 
Prince Sultan passed from health complications.  The Crown Prince is diametrically 
opposed to King Abdullah in most religious and political ideals and has actively vetted 
against many of the King’s reforms.25 
 Crown Prince Nayef was born in 1933 to Hassa bint Ahmad al Sudairi. Like King 
Abdullah, Nayef also received religious education but was interested in politics, 
diplomacy, and security as well.  The Crown Prince served as a mediator in disputes 
between King Fahd and Prince Sultan and when King Fahd’s health deteriorated, Nayef’s 
power within the family deteriorated.  In 2009, Nayef became the Second Deputy Prime 
Minister, causing a public split in the Royal Family.  The appointment allowed Nayef’s 
influence to dominate Saudi domestic policy and allowed him to begin formulating 
foreign policy.  In 2010, the Crown Prince undertook all Hajj-related responsibilities and 
he also controls the secret police. For the family members that are on the side of King 
Abdullah in matters of domestic social and political modernization policy, the opposing 
religiously conservative standpoint of the Crown Prince is a hindrance to progress.26  The 
Crown Prince attempts to suppress domestic opposition with an iron fist and has a very 
close relationship with the clerical establishment.  Crown Prince Nayef views any type of 
divergence from the purest version of the Wahhabi doctrine to be an erosion of the 
legitimacy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.27   
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 Further complicating matters for King Abdullah is the fact that Crown Prince 
Nayef is one of the “Sudairi Seven.”  Seven sons of King Abdul Aziz were all born to the 
same mother, Hassa bint Ahmad al Sudairi, and her seven sons make up the most 
powerful faction in the Al Saud family.  King Abdul Aziz fathered 45 sons with 22 wives 
from tribes all over Arabia between the years 1919-1952 but none have been as powerful 
as the Sudairi Seven.  Every Saudi king has been a son of King Abdul Aziz and to date, 
five sons have been King: Saud (1953-19640), Faisal (1964-1975), Khalid (1975-1982), 
Fahd (1982-2005), and Abdullah (2005-present).  King Fahd was the first of the Sudairi 
Seven to become King and now Crown Prince Nayef is in line to become the next of the 
Sudairi Seven to take the throne.  Backing Crown Prince Nayef and his religiously 
conservative take on how the country should be run are Princes Salman, Ahmad, and 
Abdul- Rahman.  There are members of the Royal Family that side with King Abdullah, 
but Crown Prince Nayef has the backing of the remaining Sudairi Seven brothers, an 
unbreakable bond that competes directly with King Abdullah’s progressive initiatives.28  
King Abdullah faced the opposition of the Sudairi Seven for the first time when he was 
Crown Prince.  When King Fahd was too physically and mentally impaired to perform 
the duties of King, it was the Sudairi Seven band that prolonged his life and his tenure as 
King in an effort to prevent King Abdullah from attaining the throne.  The power struggle 
continues to this day, with the Sudairi Seven, which includes Crown Prince Nayef, siding 





The Religious Establishment 
 The religious establishment of the Wahhabi sect of Islam has been a pervasive 
component in all social and political movements in Saudi Arabia since Muhammad ibn 
Abd al Wahhab and Muhammad ibn Saud became political and religious partners in 
1765.30  While the monarch is by definition the country’s supreme religious leader and 
the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, the King still shares authority with a powerful 
group of spiritual leaders, the ulema.  For the last 250 years, the Al Saud family has 
controlled the political aspect of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Al ash-Sheikh 
family, who are the descendents of Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab, have controlled the 
religious functions of the state.  The ulema have provided the country with one of the 
most socially and religiously stable countries in the entire Middle East. With the political 
and religious cooperation of both families, the country has been able to avoid civil war 
and revolution that has plagued the majority of the rest of the region.31 
 The current leader of the ulema is Abdul Aziz ibn Abdullah al Ash Sheikh, who is 
the Grand Mufti. The Grand Mufti is the leading religious scholar of Wahhabism and 
enforces the directive that Islam is the way of life and is all pervasive.  Al Ash Sheikh is 
second in prestige only to the Al Saudi family but the legitimacy of the House of Saudi is 
based on their alliance with the al Ash Sheikh family.  In the al Ash Sheikh family, there 
are several hundred family members but their domination is dwindling.  There are fewer 
replacement offspring, even though there is a high degree of intermarriage with the Al 
Saud family, and there are more outside religious scholars who are infiltrating the 
religious ranks of the ulema.  Currently, only a small number of family members are 
wielding real power.  The family suffered a setback when King Faisal abolished the 
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office of Grand Mufti and replaced it with the Ministry of Justice in 1969.  The position 
was restored in 1993, but the abolishment was a political setback for the family.   Many 
of the family members have been appointed to Saudi institutions and hold positions such 
as qadis, or judges, muhama, or lawyers, and imams, or prayer leaders as well as holding 
positions in state organizations where they are able to influence domestic as well as 
foreign policy decisions.32   
 The religious scholars in Saudi Arabia are overseen by the Higher Council of the 
Ulema and their input varies according to the different scenarios that the King faces, but 
they are present and consulted on every political, social, and economic decision he 
makes. The official ulema are not rubber stamps for the House of Saud, however. On 
many occasions, the ulema have disagreed with the Royal Family and have made political 
policy suggestions that have not been popular with the West, with Saudi Arabia’s 
neighbors, or with the Saudi Arabian general population.33 
 When discussing the conflicts that have arisen between the Al Saud family, the 
Saudi population, and the religious elite, it is important to remember that the evolution of 
those relationships have occurred amidst dramatic and fast-paced change and 
modernization.  The area of Arabia was known for being a Bedouin, trading, and 
merchant class part of the world, even when the country was established in 1932 and 
right up until oil was found.  In less than 60 years, the entire country has industrialized, 
institutionalized, and modernized while maintaining its devotion to Islam as its 
sanctioned way of life.  The role of the ulema is to ensure the correct application of 
Wahhabi Islam by enforcing Quranic law within the Kingdom.34   
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Conflict Within the Ruling Elite 
 Within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, there are many conflicting interests that 
make consensus on anything difficult.  Politically, socially, and religiously, Crown Prince 
Nayef sides with the religious establishment and their principle of tawhid, or 
monotheism.  The conservative religious elite considers Christians, Jews, Shi’ites, and 
insufficiently devout Sunni Muslims to be enemies.35 The conservatives are anti-
American and sympathize with al-Qaida, as well as other extremist groups, and condone 
jihad.  The doctrine of tawhid ensures the tenure of the House of Saud as the ruling elite 
because it legitimizes the repressiveness of the Saudi state as a tool to safeguard Islam 
within the country.  Nayef’s chief concern is maintaining the status quo within Saudi 
Arabia. To the religious conservatives, this means living like Muhammad in the 600s, not 
engaging in modernization, and limiting the freedom of rights of the population.36   
 King Abdullah sides with the liberal side of the political spectrum and adheres to 
the doctrine of taqarub, or the peaceful coexistence of nonbelievers.  The doctrine also 
seeks to expand the political community by legitimizing the political involvement of 
groups that Wahhabi’s consider to be enemies.  In foreign policy, the Saudi liberals do 
not condone the concept of jihad and do not necessarily believe that Islam is the only way 
to govern.  King Abdullah has advocated for relaxing restrictions on public debate and 
participation, has promoted versions of democratic reform, and has also supported the 
reduction of power among the religious establishment and Wahhabi clerics.37 
 King Abdullah has also sought friendship and alliance with the United States by 
investing heavily into the United States economy, purchasing weaponry from America, 
and sending university students abroad to the United States to learn business, economic, 
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and cultural principles from American universities in order to bring back the knowledge 
to reform the Saudi economic situation.38   
 Wahhabism is the backbone and foundation of the entire political system in Saudi 
Arabia as well as the identity of every Saudi Arabian national. If the religious 
establishment were to choose the trajectory of their future, they would most likely choose 
to discontinue modernization and relinquish all ties to the West and live without what the 
United States and other Western allies can offer.  If the liberal sector, such as King 
Abdullah, did not have to consult with the ulema and other family members, he would 
more than likely continue investing internationally and domestically in order to diversify 
the economy. Women would gain more freedom and the population would be able to 
experience greater participation in the political system. Unfortunately, the two competing 
brothers and their competing goals for the status quo are opposed to one another.  Taking 
the domestic dissention into consideration with regards to preparing the economy and the 
society for the end of rentierism, the outlook is grim.  The never-ending dissent among 
the differing groups in Saudi Arabia has all but paralyzed the country from diversifying, 
privatizing, preventing, and ultimately preparing for an economy that will no longer be 
able to provide for its citizens, for the ruling family, or for the religious establishment, as 
it has been for the last two generations of Saudi nationals. 
 
Other Sources of Political Influence 
Branches of Government 
The King is aided by the Council of Ministers. There are 22 Ministers and each 
Minister specializes in a different part of the government, such as defense, health and 
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welfare, and the economy. As a body, they are responsible for drafting legislation to be 
presented to the King.  
The legislative body, called the Majlis al-Shura, or the Consultative Council, has 
no power to act independently but is responsible for holding debates, initiating 
investigative hearings, and enforcing government-sponsored legislation.  There are 150 
members who are appointed by the King for a term of four years and the terms can be 
renewed.  Most of the members are part of the Al Saud family and the rest are tribal 
leaders, businessmen, academics, and some religious leaders.   
In the judicial system, there are numerous General Courts and Courts of First 
Instance throughout the country, led by the Supreme Judicial Council, which hear the 
majority of cases in the legal system.  They have assumed the responsibility of approving 
all death, amputation, stoning, and beheading sentences.  Saudi Arabia leads the world in 
beheadings, and it is the Supreme Judicial Council who is credited for that statistic.  They 
operate on a more independent basis than the other branches of government, as stipulated 
by the Basic Law of 1993.  The Minister of Justice oversees the judicial system but the 
King is the leader of the judicial system and he is the final court of appeal and can issue 
pardons.  Members of the Royal Family are exempt from appearing in front of the courts 
and friends of the Family have been known to receive preferential treatment from judges.  
All courts are mandated to use the Sunna and Quran as the basis for their judgments.  No 
one is allowed to be held in jail for a term longer than three days without being charged 
with a crime and according to Sharia law, the court does not give the testimony of a 
woman the same weight as that of a man.  Sharia law also allows for the judges to throw 
out any testimony given by non-Muslims.  The military has their own justice system 
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where the Minister of Defense and the King review all decisions made by the military 
court.39 
The country is divided into 13 provinces, each led by a governor and a deputy 
governor, who are usually princes or close relatives of the Royal Family.  Each province 
has its own municipal council that advises the governor and handles the economic and 
social development of the province.  They also carry out resolutions passed down by the 
Council of Ministers and mitigate regional issues. Four times a year, each governor meets 
with his provincial council to evaluate the province’s development and to make 
recommendations to the Council of Ministers regarding the provinces needs. Half of the 
municipal council is elected by the local population of adult males over the age of 21 and 
the other half is appointed by the central government.40   
 
Political Influence 
Political parties are illegal, are not recognized by the government if they are 
formed, and have no legal status in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.   While official 
political parties are forbidden, distinct political divisions do exist.  The most powerful 
group outside of the Royal Family is that of the ulema. It is their duty is to ensure that the 
King and his government observe Islamic law above all other considerations.  The Al 
Saud family pays very close attention to the powerful religious majority as well as the 
tribal organization that is still to this day an influential and powerful force in Saudi 
Arabian politics.   The traditional merchants still play an active role in the decision 
making of the Royal Family because they contribute a steady amount to government 
income and have always been politically influential to the ruling class in the Kingdom.  A 
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new class of Saudi Arabian professionals is emerging due to the privatization of part of 
the economy and their petitions for certain reforms have been acknowledged and 
implemented by the ministers.41  
In an effort to involve the public, elections were held for the first time in 2005, 
which were only open to male Saudi nationals.  These nationals had the opportunity to 
elect municipal representatives.  600 men put their names in to be elected to a mere 7 
seats. There was very low voter turnout because of the skepticism about the elected 
official’s real power but the elections subdued the dialogue of democracy in Saudi 
Arabia.  Of the 27 million people living in Saudi Arabia, only 3 million men are currently 
eligible to vote and women will not be able to vote until the year 2015, when they will 
also be able to run in municipal elections.42  
  
 Middle East Relations 
 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has never been a country to seek out war, and 
instead has been a unifier within the Middle East.  Saudi Arabian foreign policy 
objectives have been to maintain its security, defend general Arab and Islamic interests, 
to promote solidarity among Islamic governments, and to cooperate with other oil 
producing nations.  Saudi Arabia has strong ties with other countries in the Middle East, 
but their loyalty is with the other member countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC), which include the State of Kuwait, the State of Bahrain, the State of Qatar, the 
United Arab Emirates, and the Sultanate of Oman.  Founded on May 25, 1981, the aim 
was to create a political and economic unit to promote coordination between member 
states in all economic, military, religious, and social areas in order to achieve unity, 
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founded on the creed of Islam.  Combined, member nations hold 37 percent of the worlds 
total oil reserves and, as a group, is the largest producer and exporter of petroleum.43  The 
area of the GCC is home to 42 million people with an average GDP per capita of about 
US$25,000 and US$917 billion worth of oil revenues.44 
 One of the beneficial features of being a GCC member is the common market 
phenomenon. The common market grants national treatment to all GCC firms and 
citizens in member countries, thus removing all trade and investment barriers.  A second 
feature that is important to the member countries is the protection by the Peninsula Shield 
Force, a 40,000-man, two-brigade defense force that is composed of ground and air units.  
The Force was formed on the common assumption that any aggression against any one of 
the other member countries was an aggression against all of them. The Force is based in 
Saudi Arabia near the King Khalid Military City at Hafar al Batin.  The Peninsula Shield 
Force most recently made plans to expand to 100,000 members to stop local rioting and 
protests within the GCC countries, but rioting had subsided before they were forced to 
expand.45 
 One of the most important international relationships Saudi Arabia has is that with 
the other members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).  
Founded in 1960, the objectives of OPEC were to coordinate and unify petroleum 
policies among the member countries in order to secure fair and stable pricing for 
petroleum producers as well as a fair return on capital to those who invest in the industry.  
The member nations include the five founders; Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and 
Venezuela as well as Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, and the United 
Arab Emirates.46  As the world’s leading exporter of petroleum, it is vital that Saudi 
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Arabia preserve a stable and long-term market for its massive oil resources and OPEC 
provides them the platform and framework to do that. Allying with Western economies, 
Saudi Arabia has been the leader in following quotas and moderating drastic price 
movements by adjusting their output to stabilize global pricing.47 
 Saudi Arabia gained full membership into the World Trade Organization in 
December 2005.  Other international and regional memberships include the United 
Nations, Arab Bureau of Education for the Gulf States, Arab Monetary Fund, Arab Sports 
Federation, Islamic Corporation for the Development of the Private Sector, League of 
Arab States, Muslim World League, and in the International Monetary Fund.48  One of 
the largest monetary aid donors in the world, Saudi Arabia mainly gives aid to Arab, 
African, and Asian countries.  Saudi Arabia is not friendly with Israel, however, and 
supports the position that Israel must withdraw from the territories that it occupied in 
June 1967.  Saudi Arabia supports a peaceful resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, but 
publicly rejected the Camp David Accords, claiming that the resolution would be unable 
to achieve a comprehensive political solution and the status of Jerusalem would not be 
able to be adequately addressed.49   
 This chapter has shown that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is ruled by one family 
and  the very powerful religious elite. Aside from monetary allocations and subsidies, the  
population has little contact with its government.  Saudi Arabia is friendly with its oil-
producing neighbors and is involved heavily in the joint defense of its oil.  This chapter 
will be referred to in subsequent chapters when the reality of losing their rentier status 
becomes imminent.  Conflict among the ruling elite will prove to be an impenetrable 
obstacle in the preparation for a postrentier society. 
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THE END OF OIL 
 
 The first chapter discussed the history of Saudi Arabia and how it became the 
world’s largest oil exporter.   The second chapter discussed how the Saudi Arabian 
society relies on oil rents to fund their lives.  The third chapter discussed the ruling elite 
and how with their dissent, they will have a difficult time preparing for the end of 
rentierism. This chapter will discuss the end of oil--the reason why the Kingdom of Saud 
Arabia will change forever, as we now know it.  
It is not feasible to attempt to predict when the last drop of oil will be pumped 
from the ground. It is feasible and imperative, however, to determine when Saudi Arabian 
domestic production will equal domestic demand. The population in Saudi Arabia is 
expanding at a rapid rate.  With a rapid growth comes a rapid domestic demand for more 
oil.  This chapter will discuss the definitions of petroleum, it will analyze Peak Oil 
theories, and it will predict when the last barrel of Saudi Arabian oil will be exported for 
profit. 
 
The Definition of Petroleum 
Petroleum is defined as the mixture of liquid hydrocarbon and compounds, which 
contains hydrogen and carbon in varying combinations with other elements.  Petroleum is 
found in marine sedimentary basins which are overlain by ancient seas millions of years 
old.1  The question of whether or not this nonrenewable resource will actually run out is 
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irrelevant. It is a nonrenewable natural resource that has a lifespan and is finite. It is 
nearly impossible to predict the end of oil on a global scale.  It is difficult to predict the 
end of oil on a national scale. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the point is not when oil will 
run out but when domestic demand and consumption will equal that of domestic 
production, making the production of oil a zero sum game.  Once domestic consumption 
equals production, and there are no extra barrels to export for profit, is when Saudi 
Arabia will cease to be rentier. The standard of living for each Saudi national will 
decrease significantly if government income alternatives of an equal or greater value to 
that of oil exportation are not found and implemented quickly.  In order to predict when 
that will happen, it is necessary to understand the science behind Peak Oil, to make 
educated guesses about remaining oil reserves, and to quantify future domestic and 
international energy demand.  Gauging the political atmosphere now and in the future is 
also key in determining when production will equal consumption and when the death of 
rentierism in Saudi Arabia will occur. 
In the world of oil, the global classification system for assessing remaining oil 
reserves has been devised by the Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE) and the World 
Petroleum Congress (WPC).  They classify reserves into three categories; proven 
reserves, probable reserves, and possible reserves.  Western Texas Intermediate (WTI), 
also known as Texas Light Sweet, is a grade of crude oil used as a benchmark for oil 
pricing.  It is “light” because of its low density and it is “sweet” because it contains little 
sulfur.  Texas Light Sweet is the underlying commodity of the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange (CME).  The price of Brent Crude from the North Sea and Dubai Crude are 
important oil markers for future oil contracts. The OPEC Reference Basket, which is a 
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weighted average of petroleum blends produced by OPEC countries, is crucial for setting 
production quotas among OPEC nations and international pricing strategies of their 
commodity.2 
 
Peak Oil Theory 
In 1956, Marion King Hubbert first made his Peak Oil model public.  Using a rule 
of thumb by the first petroleum engineers, Hubbert observed the production curve over 
time in a well-researched oil province in the United States and came to generate his first 
Peak Oil conclusions. Hubbert’s model states that by starting at zero, production will 
grow over time until it peaks when half of the existing recoverable resources have been 
extracted, or midpoint depletion.  At this point, production will decline at the same rate at 
which it grew. Production will take the form of a symmetrical, mirror image bell curve.  
The area below the bell curve represents the cumulative production of an oil province or 
Ultimate Recoverable Resource (URR).  Hubbert’s theory claims that if an oil field has 
been sufficiently explored, it is possible to forecast when it will achieve peak production 
and when the field will run out of oil.3  
Hubbert’s original model accurately predicted Peak Oil production of the 48 
lower states in the United States by predicting that Peak Oil would occur in 1970.  The 
success with his model is attributed to the fact that the United States was and still is the 
most intensely explored and exploited area in the world for oil fields.  The knowledge of 
its subsurface is more well-known than any other region in the world by a factor of 100.  
Just in the state of Texas alone, more than one million wells have been drilled, compared 
to 2,300 in Iraq. There are 560,000 wells in production in the United States and only 
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1,500 in Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest exporter of oil.4  According to Hubbert, global 
per capita production peaked in 1979 and world oil production has been flat since 1998. 
Hubbert claims that world oil peaked on November 24, 2005.5   
 Kenneth Deffeyes’ theory takes a slightly different approach and calculates the 
point at which the proportion of annual production will be equal to zero at the current 
production trends.  The model calculates the total volume of oil that will be predicted to 
be removed from the oil fields before the production of oil ceases.6  His Peak Oil date is 
calculated to be when half of all of the oil that ever existed in the world had been 
extracted.  The first half is thought to be the easiest to extract, the most economically 
obtained and is of the highest quality that is the cheapest to refine.  The second half lies 
in places not easily accessible such as the Arctic or deep in the ocean.  The rest is 
difficult to extract and may take too much energy or not be cost-effective to retrieve. 
Even oil that is in high sulfur crude, tar sands, and oil shales were part of his prediction. 
These types of oil deposits are not liquids like the typical petroleum found in the Saudi 
Arabian oil fields. Instead, it is found as a solid and must be mined before it can be 
liquefied.7  With this model, Deffeyes posited that oil fields go through a predictable oil 
production cycle and that peak production occurs roughly 40 years after the discovery of 
oil in an oil field.  His research shows that the United States peaked after 40 years of 
production. The North Sea peaked at 30 years because it was a more recent find and 
technology had already been developed to increase production, which was applied to 
those fields, speeding up the extraction.  Deffeyes claims that global oil discoveries 
peaked in 1963.  He claims that oil is being consumed four times more rapidly than it is 
being discovered.8  The ratio between current global reserves and current global 
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consumption predict that global proven oil reserves have a lifespan that will end 31 years 
from now. By the year 2043, global proven oil reserves will be in the dusk stages of their 
lifespan.  An argument against this time frame can be that it does not take into 
consideration future demand, which will more than likely be higher and it also assumes 
that consumption grows while reserves and resources remain fixed.9 This argument then 
assumes that 31 years is too far into the future and that proven oil reserves may be 
depleted sooner than 2043. 
The problem with Hubbert’s Peak Oil model, Deffeyes’ model, and other Peak 
Oil observers is that they do not take into consideration political decisions, changes in 
consumption, pricing strategies, technological evolution, security threats, warfare, and 
population fluctuation.  Another problem is that the models can only be applied to oil 
fields, areas, regions, and countries that have been intensely explored and developed for 
oil production using the highest level of technology.  Peak production can be delayed due 
to political unrest, advances in technology, and a decline in demand or even quotas, 
which will push the tail end of the bell curve to the right and into the future.10 
 Hubbert and the theorists that adhere to his model follow the Central Limit 
Theorem, which states that the sum of a large number of erratic variables tends to follow 
normal distribution, landing in a bell curve formation.  Hubbert, as well as Deffeyes, 
underestimated the fact that while the United States was a successful example of their 
theories, because it had been intensely explored and reserves were fairly predictable, the 
rest of the world is not the United States.11  While these models have been a useful tool to 
get a ball-park estimate on global Peak Oil, they fall dramatically short of explaining and 
predicting the political, social, and economic future of Saudi Arabia. 
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 The best information that has become available is that World Peak Oil Production 
(WPOP) occurred between 2000-2008.  The date is inaccurate because the private sector 
and nationalized oil companies tend to routinely overestimate their oil reserves.  WPOP 
manifested over several years of oscillating market instability and volatile periods of 
price shocks and recessions, which dampened demand and price, indicating a terminal 
and irreversible decline in demand as well as production. The actual Peak Oil date will 
take years to determine because the only way to analyze it is from a rearview mirror 
approach.12   
 Common knowledge among the world’s leading petroleum geologists is that more 
than 95 percent of all recoverable oil has already been found.  Mankind has consumed 2.5 
trillion barrels of conventional crude oil since the first well was drilled and have 
consumed about 30 billion barrels per year.  According to US Energy Oil and Gas 
Industry Solutions, 90 percent of all reserves are now in production, suggesting that few 
major new discoveries will be made in the future of new oil deposits.  In 2001, there were 
eight new large scale discoveries in the world. In 2002, there were three large discoveries 
and there have been no significant discoveries of new oil since then.  Since 1981 the 
planet has consumed more oil than has been discovered, leading geologists to believe that 
there are no more large scale discoveries left to be made.  Given the development and 
sophistication of new technology and the education of geologists since the first discovery, 
it is highly unlikely that any area large enough to be of significance for new oil has 




Predicting Remaining Oil Reserves in Saudi Arabia  
Oil reserves are finite and it is inevitable that there must be national preparation 
for the end of oil.  Many want to believe that it will not happen, or that it will not happen 
within our lifetime.  While it may not happen within our lifetime, it is never a good 
policy to plan for the best and to also hope for the best.  Saudi Arabia is doing just that, 
planning for the best.  It may be argued that because the activity of predicting remaining 
oil reserves can be difficult, if not impossible, that it must mean that worrying about the 
end is also too difficult, if not an impossible task.  Saudi Arabia is notorious for not 
accurately and honestly reporting their remaining oil reserve numbers to the public. This 
leads one to believe, assuming that their petroleum engineers actually do have a good 
idea of what their reserve numbers are, that they are either under-reporting to extend the 
life of international investment into oil, keeping prices stable, or they are over-reporting 
their numbers in order to prevent a global oil shock. Either way, the practice of predicting 
oil reserves is complicated, even for a country with as much oil as Saudi Arabia. 
  
The U.S. General Accounting Office Report 
 By the 1970s, Saudi Arabia had just realized the extent of their power as a global 
oil producer.  Out of nowhere, this poor, newly established country was wielding power 
and global responsibilities that were disproportionate to their history, small population, 
culture, military insignificance, and archaic government institution.  They were willing to 
play by the rules of the international oil cartel, OPEC, however, even though they had 
enough oil and enough power as the planet’s only swing producer to set their own terms.  
By the mid-1970s, their giant and super-giant oil fields were already showing their first 
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signs of normal aging.  This was possibly accelerated due to their policy of raising 
production quickly in response to world demand and a hunger for the unprecedented 
profits the Kingdom was earning.14   
 In 1978, the United States government recognized the degree to which the rest of 
the world also depended on Saudi oil and became concerned about the reliability of 
Aramco and the Kingdom’s oil production and supply capabilities.  At the time of the 
investigation, Aramco was very forthcoming in showing the world how their operations 
worked.  Aramco divulged that they produce 97 percent of all Saudi output and the 
balance comes from the Neutral Zone and the Abu Sa’fah field shared with Bahrain.  Of 
Aramco’s total output, 93 percent came from just four oil fields: Ghawar, Safaniya, 
Abqaiq, and Berri.  
The report compiled by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) on Saudi oil 
supply noted that all four fields were nearing maturity.  The report also provided statistics 
on proven oil reserves given by Aramco at the time.  Aramco estimated that total proven 
oil reserves ever discovered in Saudi Arabia equaled 110 billion barrels, of which 70 
billion barrels were from the four super-giant oil fields.  The Ghawar field alone still 
accounts for half of the total.  Ghawar is the largest oil field in the world measuring 170 
miles long by 31 miles wide and it produces 6.5 percent of the world’s daily oil 
production.15  Ghawar continues to remain the largest oil field in the world, even with the 
rate of production decreasing by 8 percent per year and 55 percent of the outflow is 
watercut.16 
 The methodology used to determine the reserves was the same that was mandated 
by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for use in all their reporting 
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since the Aramco reserves were the largest contribution to the end of year report for the 
shareholders.  The GAO report claimed that from the date of discovery, only 25 percent 
of the total reserves had been produced.17  Combined, the 15 oil fields in Saudi Arabia 
were producing 9.2 million barrels per day (mbd) of oil out of only 800 different wells. In 
comparison, The United States at the time was similarly producing 9.9mbd, but out of 
500,000 different wells.  The report also noted that Saudi Arabia had 23 proven oil fields 
that were not yet in production. Aramco’s drilling program at the time was aimed at 
further developing the current wells, rather than searching for new oil fields.  Aramco 
added to the GAO report that the yet-to-be-developed reservoirs in the four super-giant 
oil fields could probably yield an additional several hundred million barrels of oil.  A 
year later, when Aramco was taken over by the Saudi Arabian government and operated 
by a Saudi Arabian management team, they adjusted reserves in the same oil fields 
upward an additional 50 billion barrels and eight years later, they changed the number 
again and added an additional 100 billion barrels, after making no new discoveries and 
without the use of any new technology.18 
The second part of the GAO report in 1978 discussed the technical issues that 
would affect Saudi oil production.  The most pressing issue was the rate at which high 
individual well flows were being produced.  The report suggested that if any of the wells 
were ‘rate sensitive,’ the rate being used would adversely affect and alter the quantities of 
oil that could ultimately be recovered.  Aramco’s engineers told the GAO investigation 
team that the reservoirs were not rate sensitive and that the current rate, at the time, of oil  
production would not reduce the ultimate recovery from the field.  Aramco did not 
recognize the danger of overproduction and rate sensitivity and believed that the only risk 
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in overproducing would be an increase in the fields’ final production cost.  The Aramco 
technicians went on to assume that the key oil fields could boost production by as much 
as 50 percent without significantly affecting the volume of recoverable oil.19   
 It is unclear why and how the technicians came to the conclusion that Saudi oil 
fields were not rate sensitive.  All technical oil experts in the world know that all 
reservoirs are rate sensitive.  It is also unclear why Aramco would think that altering the 
production levels by increasing capacity on a rate sensitive reservoir would not damage 
reservoir pressure.  Saudi Arabian reservoirs were later found to be more fragile than 
normal and were termed Super-K Zones, zones that are more porous and fragile than 
other zones. The Zones were distinct in the fact that they had a rare presence of extremely 
high permeable rock that generated abnormally large deposits of oil and made high 
productivity much easier and allowed for the use of water invasion.20   
 At the time of the GAO report in 1978, Aramco was injecting 9.2 million barrels 
of seawater into the Ghawar oil field, or watercutting, to produce 5.9mbd worth of oil.  
The other four fields were also receiving massive water and gas injections in order to 
maintain high pressure in the reservoirs.  Aramco officials, who at the time were still 
American oilmen, ignored concern over the maturity of these oil fields. The Western 
upper management who made all of the decisions regarding the Saudi oil fields were 
responsible to Western shareholders to pump out as much profit as they could before all 
operations of Aramco moved to Saudi hands in 1980.  The transition from American to 
Saudi hands occurred between 1974 and 1980 and during that time, production tripled, 




Once operations of Aramco were transferred into Saudi hands, specifically Saudi 
Oil Minister Ahmed Zaki Yamani’s hands, all reporting on oil field data in Saudi Arabia 
stopped.  Between 1950-1982 the member countries of OPEC provided detailed oil 
production data of each oil field to sources such as the Oil and Gas Journal on an annual 
and even semi-annual basis.  As the dominant member country in OPEC, Saudi Arabia 
took a stand to discontinue releasing statistics, and the rest of the member nations 
followed suit and also ceased releasing their data.  This put an end to any and all oil data 
and production transparency. This left investors, the media, and consumers around the 
globe to merely guess at the production of Middle East oil.22  Over the next 20 years, it 
was anyone’s guess as to where oil reserves stood.  Because the world was in the dark 
about Saudi Arabian production, it came as a surprise in 2003 when signs emerged that 
Saudi Arabia had already hit Peak Oil.  With Iraq’s oil industry in shambles, Venezuela’s 
oil industry crippled by the Venezuelan opposition who wanted to oust President Hugo 
Chavez, Nigeria’s oil industry intermittently paralyzed from civil disorder, and the North 
Sea depleting at 5 percent annually, Saudi Arabia was rumored to be pumping at full 
capacity.  Daily production hovered around 8.7mbd in 2003 and in 2004 it only increased 
by 3.7 percent to 9.1mbd.  When the world needed more oil, Saudi Arabia was unable to 
produce, and the world noticed.  With prices soaring at US$50 per barrel in 2004, up 
from US$37 the year before, the Saudi’s no longer had the option to increase production 
and stabilize global oil pricing.  Prices have since continued to increase and Saudi Arabia 
has not been able to manipulate production to keep the prices from rising.  Saudi Arabia 
is no longer the reliable global swing producer.23  
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 In the first months of 2012, the status of the Saudi Arabian oil fields and the 
production capacity looked to be stagnant.  After 30 years of intense geological and 
geophysical efforts coupled with exploratory drilling the country over, Saudi Arabia has 
failed to discover any significant new fields since 1967 when low-productivity and 
complex fields in the Hawtah Trend were found.  Real data on how much oil was being 
produced is still as cloaked as ever. The Energy Information Agency (EIA), Middle East 
Economic Survey, individual petrologists, geologists, and engineers have published 
reports indicating that Saudi Arabia has 260.1 billion barrels of oil left in their reservoirs.    
 Saudi Aramco has settled on publishing their countrywide reserves also at 260.1 
billion barrels of oil reserves remaining. This has left speculators no choice but to accept 
that number as their official operating goal of Saudi Arabia.  At the beginning of 2012, 
Saudi Aramco officially reported producing an average of 7.91 million barrels per day for 
a total of 2.887 billion barrels produced per year.  They claim to have just reached the 
mark, through new technology and investment, to meet 12mbd spare capacity. The Saudi 
Arabian government owns a majority share in Aramco, which is the world’s largest oil 
company in relation to production as well as reserves.  They are the world’s most 
sophisticated, fully integrated petroleum company with capabilities in exploration, 
production, refinement, marketing, distribution, and shipping.  The company of Saudi 
Aramco single-handedly produces more oil than any other country.  They are also the top 
producer and exporter of associated natural gas liquids (NGL), with 316.4 million barrels 
exported in 2010.  Saudi Aramco holds the fourth largest share of gas reserves at 279 
trillion cubic feet and has a worldwide refining capacity of 4.16 mbd, which includes 
domestic refineries and international joint and equity ventures. Their tanker fleet includes 
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14 double-hulled Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCC), one single hulled VlCC, and four 
product tankers.  Saudi Aramco employs nearly 55,000 people, 48,000 of which are 
Saudi nationals, the remainder being expatriates mainly from the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and Japan.24 
 
New Technology, Innovation, and Investment 
Saudi Aramco states that their current focus is on expanding their capability to 
discover, produce, process, and transport natural gas.  They aim to explore for non-
associated gas reserves to meet the global demand for gas to fuel industries.  By the year 
2014, they plan to expand gas production and processing capabilities by 40 percent to a 
total of 4.5 billion standard cubic feet.  Saudi Aramco is in line to also become the next 
largest supplier of hydrocarbon resources.  The new vision of the company, as well as for 
the government, is to become a fully integrated global energy and chemicals magnate 
with operations around the globe.  In order to continue with their new innovation 
strategies, Saudi Aramco has formed two centers devoted to original research and 
development. The first center is the Advanced Research Center, which works with the 
Exploration and Petroleum Engineering Center (EXPEC ARC) in order to research new 
technology in the subsurface upstream activities of oil and gas fields.  The goal of this 
research center is to discover new oil resources and to improve the recovery process of 
existing oil producing reservoirs.  To achieve these goals of improved increased 
production, Saudi Aramco employs six development teams composed of a total of 250 
scientists to focus on four strategic areas.  The Geophysics Technology department 
focuses on improving the insight into regional distribution of oil and gas reservoirs. The 
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Reservoir Engineering Technology department is used to understand the subsurface rock 
and fluid systems’ spatial distribution, size, and quantities.  The Computational Modeling 
Technology department area requires the teams to learn more about subsurface flow 
mechanisms and their processes. The Production Technology and Drilling Technology 
department is the fourth strategic area and is in charge of the development and 
application of new technologies that stimulate reservoirs to release the most economic 
quantities of oil and gas.  Since 1950, Saudi Aramco has been granted 100 patents related 
to gas and petroleum recovery. Patents and new technological discoveries have gone up 
drastically since the evolution of the Idea Management System (IMS) in 2002, an 
employee idea forum that that has led to an open and welcoming environment for 
employees to share their ideas.25 
Since the formation of EXPEC ARC in the early 1980s, many new phases of 
innovation and advanced gas and petroleum technology have been engineered.  New 
advancements in the areas of land seismic simulation and visualization have been EXPEC 
ARC’s crowning achievements.  Three industry-leading breakthrough pieces of 
technology have included GigaPOWERS, Resbots, and DesertRay oil fingerprinting.  In 
2010, Saudi Aramco debuted GigaPOWERS (Parallel Oil, Water, and Gas Reservoir 
Simulator), which is simulation technology capable of viewing billions of cells at seismic  
resolution.  The simulation models are created by integrating all of the data obtained from 
the interrelated workings of reservoir mechanics, fault systems, oil flow, and waterflood 
fronts.  The technicians also take data from the associated gas that bubbles out of the 
crude oil which then forms gas caps in the reservoirs. This technology allows for the 
company to simulate all the giant and super-giant oil fields in Saudi Arabia in their 
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entirety with accuracy in order to achieve reservoir, drilling, and production efficiency.  
This technology further provides insight into analyzing and thus predicting production 
rates of the fields. Scientists have been able to identify bypassed oil zones and additional 
zones, which has led to the drilling of new wells.  GigaPOWERS has also given 
management the ability to calculate the optimum number and placement of wells, a better 
estimation of the rate of recovery, and has allowed for better reservoir management 
strategies. 
 A second major technological development created out of EXPEC ARC is 
Resbots.  Resbots are nano-agents that are injected into the wells and then recovered after 
their journey through the reservoir where they gather data about the wells and record the 
characteristics and fluid properties.  The Resbots also release chemicals into the wells 
while they are travelling to improve reservoir conditions for enhanced recovery.   
 The third technological advancement to be debuted from Saudi Aramco in 2010 
was the DesertRay oil fingerprinting system.  The mobile system allows for scientists to 
identify oil contamination by analyzing samples to see if there are any changes to the 
‘fingerprint’ of the type of oil.  Each type of oil contains its own fingerprint, a concoction 
of unique chemical features unique to each type of oil found in the subsurface.  The 
DesertRay uses lasers to analyze the pure oil and the blends and then it formulates two-
dimensional contour diagrams which represent the fingerprint of each sample of oil.   The 
diagram detects if there has been any degradation or contamination to the oil and the rest 
of the oil in the well from which the sample came.  The results are generated in 30 
seconds and can be used as an investigative tool for geological continuity assessment.26 
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 New well design and drilling practices have also added to Saudi Aramco’s new 
technology boom.  Early wells became extinct in the mid-1990s. Early wells were 
vertically drilled, which was common in the oil industry in the first years of oil 
production.  New drilling techniques created a second generation of wells, defined as 
extended reach horizontal wells.  These wells replaced the vertical wells but soon, a third 
type of well replaced them both. These wells are called maximum reservoir contact wells 
(MRC), which have drastically refined the horizontal reach configuration.  These wells 
have multibranching lateral wells off of the main wellbore. The sophistication of 
technology allows for the down-hole sensors to automatically turn off to avoid the water 
at the bottom and gas at the top that closes in on the narrowing oil columns of the aging 
giant and super-giant oil fields.27  Other technological advancements include the practice 
of underbalanced drilling, the use of diamond-tipped bits, expandable tubular drill 
columns, top-drive drilling systems, high temperature and pressure gauges, and 
instantaneous satellite communication from the drilling rig to the computer stations in 
Dhahran.  Acid and hydraulic fracturing to open tight channels in the reservoirs has also 
become standard procedure for Saudi Aramco in their quest for more oil.28   
 Beginning in 2004 and continuing through 2010, Saudi Aramco underwent a 
massive expansion program. The company invested $US18 billion to generate an increase 
in barrel-per-day production.  The Kurais project was the single largest crude oil 
increment project in the history of Saudi Arabia and it generated an additional 1.2mbd of 
Arabian Light crude oil production capacity.  The combined investment into Abu 
Hadriya, Fadhili, and Khursaniyah contributed an additional 500,000 barrels per day of 
Arabian Light crude production capacity. The Shaybah expansion generated 250,000 
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barrels per day of Arabian Extra Light crude and Nuayyim contributed 100,000 barrels 
per day of Arabian Super Light crude production capacity.29  This investment into crude 
production capacity expansion did not create any additional barrels per day for export and 
profit. Instead, these barrels are replacing the barrels that have been lost to the depletion 
of the aging oil fields throughout the country. 
 
Depleting Oil Fields       
 Saudi Aramco claims to have 112 gas and oil fields within its borders.  Ninety 
percent of the oil produced in Saudi Arabia comes from its six largest oilfields: Ghawar, 
Safaniyah, Abqaiq, Berri, Zuluf, and Marjan. They are concentrated in the Eastern 
Province along the Persian Gulf in a corner of the country covering only 17,140 square 
miles, a little larger than the size of Switzerland.  As previously noted, no oil fields of any 
substance have been discovered in Saudi Arabia since 1967 when Shaybah was 
discovered. Saudi Aramco has relied on four oil fields to provide the bulk of their 
petroleum.   
Ghawar, the largest and most productive oil field in the world, has produced 55 
billion barrels of high quality Arab Light crude since 1951.  In comparison, the United 
States’ largest oil field is Prudhoe Bay, which has only produced 10 billion barrels.  In its 
peak year of production in 1981, Ghawar was producing 5.6 million barrels per day. As 
of 2012, it is estimated to be producing 5mbd, or 6.25 percent of total global oil 
production.  Ghawar also produces approximately 2 billion cubic feet of associated 
natural gas per day as well.  It is predicted that total oil reserves for the oil field are 
approximately 80 billion total barrels.  
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Safaniya is the world’s largest offshore oil field and is the second largest Saudi oil 
field.  Safaniyah produces the majority of Saudi’s heavy crude oil and since it was 
discovered in 1950, Saudi Aramco has produced 10 billion barrels from this field.  This 
statistic only elucidates the extreme importance of Ghawar, since Safaniyah has only 
produced one-fifth of the oil that Ghawar has, in their similar life span.  Safaniyah at its 
peak, also in 1981, produced about 1.5mbd and is predicted to be producing about 
500,000 barrels per day in 2012 and have total reserves of 30 billion barrels.  Oil in 
Safaniyah is found in sandstone formations instead of carbonate rocks like Ghawar, Berri, 
and Abqaiq.  Because Safaniyah lies on the massive Wasia aquifer, which lies beneath 
the oil-bearing sandstone, pressure remains high in the reservoir, which keeps oil easily 
flowing to the wells.  Zuluf and Marjan also lie on this aquifer and none have ever 
received water injections. 
The Abqaiq and Berri oil fields only produce about 430,000 barrels per day and 
they are estimated to only have about 12 billion barrels each, in total.  Abqaiq peaked in 
1973, producing 1mbd, and Berri peaked in 1976 while producing 800,000 barrels per 
day. These two oil fields, however, only produce premium value Arab Light and Arab 
Extra Light crude grade oil.30   
Only 5 to 10 more fields in Saudi Arabia produce in excess of 100,000 barrels a 
day, and at that, they are unpredictable and unstable.  There are still three areas in Saudi 
Arabia that have gone unexplored, and had there been hope that there were reserves to be 
found, Saudi Aramco would have already explored these areas. The unexplored parts of 
Saudi Arabia include the bottom third of the Empty Quarter, or Rub al Khali. This vast 
desert constitutes one-fifth of the Arabian Peninsula but has shown no promise for oil 
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discovery. The second unexplored area is the deepwater area of the Red Sea and the third 
is the strip of land along the western desert on the border of Iraq and Saudi Arabia.31  Of 
all the early wildcatting and drilling exploration done in Saudi Arabia, no one has been 
able to find any fields that could hold a candle to Ghawar or even any of the smaller 
fields.  It is unlikely, even if extensive exploration were to be performed in these areas, 
similar to what has been done throughout the rest of the Arabian Peninsula, that a 
miraculous discovery would be made. While it is not entirely safe to say that new oil field 
discovery in Saudi Arabia is impossible, statistics do not give the notion much hope. 
Saudi Arabia and the rest of the world must assume that the oil fields they have now will 
probably be the only fields they will ever have. 
  
Predicting the End of Saudi Arabian Oil Exports 
 Previously in this chapter, facts were discussed regarding Saudi Arabia and Saudi 
Aramco’s refusal to release reliable data about their oil fields, their oil productions rates, 
oil field depletion rates, and even how many barrels of oil reserves they predict are still in 
the ground.  The media, scientists, geologists, investors as well as competing oil 
companies have had to simply guess as to what the real numbers could be.  The point of 
this thesis is not to determine Peak Oil or to attempt to predict when oil will run out in 
Saudi Arabia.  The problem that Saudi Arabia faces is the timeframe of when domestic 
consumption will equal domestic production. Currently the country is still able to pump 
oil, because there is plenty of oil in the ground, according to Saudi Aramco. Being that 
Saudi Arabia is a rentier state, it provides and subsidizes benefits for its citizens such as 
education, healthcare, and most importantly in this case, oil.  Unless the House of Saud is 
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planning on retracting the energy subsidization benefit for Saudi nationals, the Saudi 
Arabian government must provide oil and energy for its citizens, all while the population 
is exploding and oil production is slowly depleting. 
At the beginning of 2012, the population of Saudi Arabia hovered around 21.4 
million nationals with an additional 5.6 million nonnationals and expatriate workers.  32  
The domestic population growth rate is 2.18 percent. 33  This population bomb, if not 
controlled, will consume the last bit of exportable oil, eventually rendering the 
government bankrupt.  A full 80 percent of government budget revenues and 90 percent 
of export earnings come from the export of oil.34  Large amounts of data have been 
compiled to predict the increase in population growth rates, the increase in domestic 
consumption demand, as well as determining break-even points for government revenue.   
 For this mathematical model, a set of data must be assumed.  The base population 
for 2012 is calculated to be around 27 million.  The base population growth is set on the 
far spectrum of increasing by 2.63 percent and on the near spectrum of growing at 1.55 
percent.  These statistics were calculated using the law of averages of The World Bank, 
the CIA, the United States Department of State, and using past growth trends.  As of 
2012, current domestic consumption of oil per barrel equals 24.48 barrels per Saudi 
inhabitant with domestic demand increasing by 4 percent per year.35 In his book Twilight 
in the Desert, Matthew Simmons uses technical papers from the Society of Petroleum 
Engineers from 1960-2005 to conclude that the rate of depletion in the Ghawar oil field is 
8 percent per year.  Being that Ghawar is the largest oil field in the world and produces in 
excess of 5mbd for a total of 1.825 billion barrels per year, which equals more than 63 
percent of total oil production for Saudi Arabia, 8 percent is used as an overall oil field 
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depletion level for the entire country. US$100 per barrel is used as a base line for oil 
income, since the cost per export barrel has not gone below US$100 per barrel since 
2011, and being that Saudi Arabia has proven that it is unable to be the swing producer it 
used to be, it must be assumed that without significant discoveries in Saudi Arabia or 
abroad, the cost per barrel is unlikely to drop below US$100 per barrel in the future. By 
using the most reliable, yet nonetheless questionable, statistics of Saudi oil reserves as 
hovering around 260.1 billion barrels and yearly production of 2.877 billion barrels per 
year, a bench mark for future oil production and consumption predictions has been set. 
 In order to calculate the rate at which domestic consumption will equal domestic 
production, the data were broken down into worst-case scenarios, best-case scenarios, 
the impossible scenario and the most likely scenario.   
The worst-case scenario uses an 8 percent depletion rate coupled with a 
population increase of 2.63 percent and a domestic barrel depreciation rate of 8 percent as 
well as using current production of 2.877 billion barrels per year.  When calculated, the 
worse case scenario for Saudi Arabia is that domestic consumption will equal domestic 
production in the year 2022.  Domestic consumption would equal 98.2 percent of total 
production. With a population of 34 million and a consumption rate of 36.17 barrels per 
person, per year there will only be 21 million barrels available for export and profit from 
export will be only US$2.1 billion, down from a 2012 income from oil exports of $222.6 
billion. In the following year, 2023, in this model, Saudi Arabia would be shy 158 million 
barrels to meet domestic demand, and would not have had even one barrel for export. 
The best case scenario assumes there is no depletion rate with a population 
increase of only 1.55 percent per year, a static per person consumption rate of 24.48 
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barrels per person, annually and using current production of 2.877 billion barrels per 
year.  When calculated, the best case scenario is that by the year 2050 with a population 
of 49.9 million, domestic per person consumption static at 24.48 barrels annually, 
domestic consumption will still only be 41.7 percent of domestic production and the 
country will still have 1.65 billion barrels per year for export with a national income of 
$165 billion per year. 
The impossible scenario assumes that Saudi Aramco would be able to increase 
production to 12mbd for a total of 4.380 billion barrels per year and continue at the level. 
This scenario also assumes that the population will only grow 1.55 percent per year and 
that domestic consumption remains at 24.48 barrels per person per year.  In this scenario, 
Saudi Aramco would have increased their domestic production to meet their self-labeled 
excess capacity reserve amount of 4.380 billion barrels per year, equaling an income 
profit, after domestic consumption is accounted for, of US$317.5 billion per year on 3.17 
billion exportable barrels.  This is ‘impossible’ because while Saudi Aramco claims that 
they are able to meet their excess capacity goal of 4.380 billion barrels per year, they 
have yet to do so, even when global oil prices are skyrocketing. They have failed to 
increase demand, being no longer a swing producer, and prices continue to increase. 
In the most likely scenario, production depletion would be reduced to 4 percent 
per year.  This would be a more likely depletion rate if new technology actually does 
enable Saudi Arabia to replace depleted reserves. This scenario assumes that there are no 
new oil field discoveries and that production remains at 2.877 billion barrels per year.  
The population increase is more likely closer to the 1.55 percent, since advancements in 
birth control and public education seem to be working to educate the public on having 
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less children, reducing the increase in population.  The domestic demand growth rate is 
paired down to a mere 1 percent increase in consumption per year per person, owing to 
the fact that the government is improving social education on conservation.  This scenario 
reveals that a more likely year for production to equal domestic consumption is in 2033.  
In this year, domestic consumption will equal 97.1 percent of total domestic production 
with the next year increasing to 103 percent, or more than what the country can produce 
in total.  In 2033, there will only be 33 million barrels available for export with a national 
profit of a mere US$3.3 billion.  
Comparing these scenarios, there is not much difference between the worse-case 
scenario of domestic oil consumption equaling domestic production in the year 2022 and 
the most likely scenario of 2033.  The best case and impossible scenarios are far stretches 
for a country that continually behaves as if it has an unlimited about of oil.  In one sense, 
Saudi Arabia does in fact have enough oil to last them at least 100 more years.  By taking 
the current Saudi Aramco statistic of 260.1 billion barrels of reserve oil and decreasing 
that by a current production rate of 2.877 billion barrels per year, in the year 2100, there 
will still be more than 6 billion barrels of oil left.  The concerning aspect of these 
mathematical models is not whether or not Saudi Arabia is running out of oil, but how 
much Saudi Aramco can produce in a given year using current technology and in rate 
sensitive oil fields.  With technology and oil extraction stagnant compared to the 
booming, oil hungry population, Saudi Aramco will not be able to keep up.  This fact 
cannot escape Saudi Aramco, and the rest of the world will be in for a real oil shock 
when Saudi Arabia is no longer able to export at the levels the rest of the globe is used to 
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 In the previous chapter, it was predicted that oil will move from a national 
treasure and primarily the sole income of the Saudi Arabian government to a commodity 
that is purely subsidized for the national population sometime between the years of 2022- 
2033.  In the year 2012, oil remains the main export that provides the government with 
the opportunity to subsidize many aspects of a Saudi Arabian’s life, including healthcare, 
education, and energy.  Saudi Arabia is considered to be a rentier state because it is able 
to provide all of these goods and services without having to tax its population.  To be 
rentier, a state is required to earn an income that originates from outside of the country 
from a product, usually a natural resource, which requires little domestic effort or 
manpower to produce.  The fact that in the near future, Saudi Arabia will not be able to 
produce enough oil in order to provide for domestic consumption as well as for export 
threatens their ability to be rentier.  This chapter will explore the reasons why domestic 
consumption is increasing and all options that could replace the national income that oil 
provides.  This chapter will conclude by examining other threats to maintaining 
rentierism in a post-oil-income economy. 
 
Increasing Domestic Consumption 
In 2009, Saudi Aramco’s Vice President Ahmed Al Sa’adi announced at the Saudi 
Water and Power Forum that over the next 20 years, income from oil sales would 
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decrease by 50 percent.  He attributed this initially shocking figure to the fact that a 
growing percentage of crude oil production is being used for Saudi domestic power, 
industry, and transport needs.  His reasoning for divulging this daunting statistic was to 
warn those involved in Saudi Arabia’s water and power sector that their uninhibited 
energy consumption ways would have to come to an end.  Al Sa’adi informed the Forum 
that 83 percent of the water in Saudi Arabia goes towards agriculture.  The rate at which 
Saudi Arabia converts oil to electricity is beyond inefficient, with one barrel of oil 
required to convert 630-kilowatt hours of energy. The United States operates at a level 
where only 61 percent of one barrel can produce the same amount of energy.  He also 
claimed that energy consumption within the water sector is growing faster than the 
population and the economy.  Energy scarcity creates the need for more water.  Depleting 
oil fields require more water to pressurize the fields in order to extract the remaining 
amounts of oil.  Biofuels need water for irrigation, which depletes aquifers, which then in 
turn requires more energy for pumping and desalinating.  Increase in yearly desert 
temperatures also require more water in the form of energy in order to cool down power 
stations.  It is inevitable that the water sector will require more and more energy and will 
be operating on a tighter and more expensive oil budget.1 
The population in Saudi Arabia is 27 million.  The Saudi Arabian government 
completely subsidizes water and electricity and maintains price controls for basic utilities, 
energy, and agricultural products that are often below the cost of production. Potable 
water, petroleum products, and feedstock for petrochemical industries are all provided at 
or below world prices.  For nationals as well as expatriates and nonnationals, the 
government has maintained a cap of US$.67 cents per gallon of gasoline at the pump in 
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Saudi Arabia, which reflects the low cost of production as well as their willingness to 
practically give it away for free to people living in Saudi Arabia.  The effect of these low 
prices on petroleum products and petrochemicals eliminates the need for any oil imports.2  
Saudi Arabia has the fastest growing rate of energy consumption in the world.  Much of 
the energy consumption in Saudi Arabia goes to the operation of air conditioning units.  
Money spent using energy to keep cool in the oppressive summer heat takes away from 
the amount that could be spent on investing into the economy.  Saudi Arabia just passed 
the United States as the worlds largest power consumers per capita.  Instead of using 
petroleum for energy, they are in need of transferring to alternative resources for that 
function.3 
Between the population explosion that is demanding an increase in oil barrels, and 
the wasted oil energy on desalination and air-conditioning, there are many barrels that 
will need to be replaced. The population growth in Saudi Arabia is the highest in the 
world.  Between 1975-2009, the population of Saudi Arabia increased by 333 percent 
from 7 million to 25 million people.4  Historically, the Kingdom encouraged the social 
policy of having as many children as a woman could, in order to grow the empire.  This 
policy proved to be a burden on the government once the House of Saud took on the role 
of being rentier and chose to provide and subsidize all forms of social and economic 
benefits. The population explosion is one of the greatest challenges facing the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia.  The country will, however, be forced to tackle this issue head on in 




Are Alternative Resources the Solution? 
 The need for alternative resources as a petroleum replacement has been part of a 
worldwide conversation since the early 1970s.  Efforts have been made to expand on the 
discovery and utilization of alternative resources such as wind, solar, and coal as a 
replacement for oil energy, but none have come close to the cleanliness, ease of 
extraction, transportability, and low price that petroleum has provided.  Hashim Yamani, 
President of King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy, said that power 
consumption for industrial growth, transportation, and personal energy requirements is 
increasing at break-neck speeds.  He fears that local consumption will seriously hamper 
the Kingdom’s ability to meet international demand for oil and that a new energy mix 
must be on the forefront of Saudi budget considerations to meet local needs as well as to 
maintain the Saudi Arabian leadership role in the global energy market.5  It is estimated 
that over the next 25 years, US$117 billion will be invested into the Saudi power sector 
via the King Abdullah City in Riyadh to increase power generation capacity.  In the last 
four years, total local demand for oil has grown a total of 27 percent.6  Not only is Saudi 
Arabia in need of a replacement for oil for energy, they are also in need of supplemental 
energy due to their population explosion.  If Saudi Arabia can replace the amount of oil 
that it consumes domestically with a separate form of energy, it will have more barrels 
available for export and national profit. This sector will determine where Saudi Arabia 
stands on being able to replace their barrels with alternative energy and if they will be 





 Biofuels are renewable energy resources that are produced from biomass, usually 
ethanol bearing plants such as corn, sugarcane, and sweet beets.7  Biodiesel is made from 
vegetable oil, which produces cellulosic ethanol made from wood-based biomass such as 
switchgrass, wood, and other nascent fuels like methanol.8  Ethanol is a valuable 
alternative resource to oil because as a colorless liquid produced by the fermentation of 
sugar or starch, it can power internal combustion engines.9  Ethanol was used prior to the 
discovery of oil, but oil was much easier and cheaper to convert to gasoline than it was to 
convert corn and other grains into the alcohol that could fuel the engines.  The current 
process of fermenting corn and turning it into ethanol typically requires seven gallons of 
oil to produce only eight gallons of ethanol.10  However, as technology advances, fewer 
and fewer gallons of oil will be required to produce ethanol and biomass could be a more 
economical approach to using renewable natural resources.  Biomass and biofuels are 
truly renewable in the sense that they are produced from replenishable agricultural 
resources. Biofuels may be harvested as long as there are seeds to plant these products 
and water to nourish them.11 Herein lies the problem with Saudi Arabia. Only 1.67 
percent of the entire country is arable and as it is, the country must rely on massive 
technology intervention in order to drink potable water.  The country lacks any 
permanent rivers or waterways, and the nearest water source lies in aquifers buried deep 
below the earth’s surface.12  The Middle East North Africa (MENA) region offers up to 
45 percent of the world’s total energy potential from all renewable resources that can 
generate three times the world’s total power demands through biomass feedstock due to 
its geographic location, access to fresh water, and arable land.13 However, even 
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genetically engineered microorganisms for the use in biocatalytics is impossible in Saudi 
Arabia because there is not enough arable land or water to nurture these organisms. Any 
type of biomass or biofuel initiative remains unfeasible for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
in order to replace even a part of their depleting oil reserves.  Not only is it impossible to 
replace their barrels with biomass and biofuels for domestic energy consumption, 
biofuels will not be able to aid in maintaining their rentierism because even if the country 
could grow and convert biomass, they could not produce enough in order to earn an 
income from export. 
 
Wind 
The most naturally renewable energy resources that are freely available are wind 
and solar.  During the 1990s, wind energy capacity expanded at an annual rate of 25 
percent with the cost of production declining steadily.  According to the American Wind 
Energy Association (WEA) 80 percent of the world’s installed wind energy farms are 
located in the United States, Germany, Denmark, Spain, and India. Wind conversion is 
one of the fastest growing options for renewable energy. The major challenges associated 
with wind energy is that wind is intermittent and it cannot be stored, unless batteries are 
used.  Wind cannot always be harvested to meet the timing of energy demands and good 
wind sites are usually far from areas of electric power demands.  Saudi Arabia’s 
population is centered around large cities due to the government subsidies of land that 
were distributed in those areas and the ease of utilizing state issued benefits such as 
education and healthcare. Few people live outside of the massive city centers, but the city 
centers is where the demand for energy comes from.  It is not feasible to put wind mills in 
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the middle of the cities; they must be located farther out into the desert, where 
transporting that energy is difficult and expensive if the use of batteries is needed.14 
  
 Solar 
The study of solar energy began in 1977 in Saudi Arabia during the nationwide 
recognition of a need for an alternative to oil.  The Energy Research Institute (ERI) at the 
King Abdul Aziz City for Science and Technology (KACST) was then formed as an 
international program partnered with the United States’ SOLERAS and with the Federal 
Republic of Germany’s HYSOLAR.  These three countries have worked on projects to 
generate electricity, water desalination, an agricultural application to energy, as well as 
water-based hydro cooling systems.  Saudi Arabia receives some of the most intense 
sunlight in the world. Every day, the Kingdom receives 105 trillion kilowatt hours of 
sunlight, the equivalent of 10 billion barrels of crude oil, in terms of energy usage.15  
Effective utilization of solar energy has not made reasonable progress in Saudi Arabia, 
however, because of several obstacles. The first and most severe obstacle to overcome is 
the current availability of oil.  Oil in Saudi Arabia is the ultimate energy source and has 
historically been incredibly cheap to produce and to consume for Saudi nationals.  The 
second obstacle has been the dust effect.  The prevalence of frequent dust storms that 
blow through the country can decrease solar energy power by 10-20 percent.  The third 
obstacle to implementing solar power into the Kingdom is the availability of government 
subsidies for oil and the unavailability of government subsidies for the research and 
funding of solar energy programs.  Low and medium solar thermal energy applications 
are technically and economically feasible and are a possibility for oil energy replacement 
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in the future.16 If programs are able to be fostered and expanded, solar energy has 
projected applications for use in water pumps, refrigerators, air conditioners, heaters, and 
communications equipment.17  Unfortunately, while solar energy is a good replacement 
for energy within the county, it is unable to be exported, even regionally, and therefore is 
not a feasible replacement to the income of oil or as a means of maintaining rentierism. 
 
Petrochemicals 
Currently, the Saudi Arabian national government has an economic stake in 
petrochemical and chemical companies via the petrochemical joint ventures of Saudi 
Aramco.  Petrochemicals are products derived from petroleum. Chemical compounds are 
also produced from petroleum and other fossil fuels such as coal and natural gas or 
renewable resources like corn or sugar cane.  The two petrochemical classes are olefins, 
which include ethylene and propylene, and aromatics, which include benzene, toluene, 
and xylene isomers.  The oil refineries that Saudi Aramco has built produce olefins and 
aromatics by fluid catalytics and cracking of petroleum fractions.  Aromatics and olefins 
are the building blocks for a wide range of materials, such as solvents, detergents, 
adhesives, plastics, resins, fibers, lubricants, and gels.  Saudi Aramco has been busy 
aligning investments with downstream oil strategies to become the leading petrochemical 
company in the world.  The new Chemicals Organization of Aramco oversees the 
growing petrochemical portfolio and organizes the marketing, customer service, and 
product delivery.  Since 2012, Saudi Aramco has integrated many of their oil refineries 
with petrochemical plants and are currently building new petrochemical facilities.  In 
order to use the most out of every petroleum compound it extracts, Saudi Aramco has 
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also partnered with leading global petrochemical companies such as The Dow Chemical 
Company, Total, Chinese Petrochemical Corporation, and Sumitomo Chemical 
Company.  The Kingdom’s new company, Saudi Aramco Total Refining and 
Petrochemical Company (SATORP), is set to begin production in 2013 in Jubail 
alongside France’s Total company to build a full conversion refinery.  In partnership with 
the Chinese Petrochemical Corporation, Saudi Arabia is embarking on a joint venture 
located in Jujian, China to produce high-quality refined products and petrochemicals.18  
There are a host of other companies in Saudi Arabia that manufacture petrochemicals, but 
they are individually owned corporations, such as Basic Chemical Industries, Chemical 
Marketing and Distribution Company, Saudi Water Treatment Company, Basic 
Chemicals National Company, Arabian Polyol Company, and National Adhesives 
Unlimited.19  Saudi Aramco is behind the curve on producing petrochemicals, but all is 
not lost. Petrochemicals are produced from petroleum compounds, and if production of 
petroleum is not increased, the government will have no choice but to limit the amount of 
petroleum that is allotted for the use in petrochemicals, and it will divert that amount to 
the export industry where the majority of their national income is derived.  
Petrochemicals, even if solely owned by the Saudi Government, is not a reasonable 
alternative to replace the income from lost oil. There are not enough products to do so, 
the products are produced from petroleum, which is nonrenewable, and there are many 
other companies in the private sector and in the world that are producing petrochemicals 




Minerals and Mining 
Iron ore, gold, copper, limestone, gypsum, silver, tin, tungsten, nickel, chrome, 
zinc, lead, potassium ore, phosphates, bauxite, marble, and clay are the main products in 
the Saudi Arabian mining and mineral economy. The Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral 
Resources in Saudi Arabia has identified that there are 1,270 sources of precious stones 
and 1,170 sources of other minerals, prompting them to continue issuing an increasing 
number of mining and exploration concessions.  Steps by the Saudi government have 
encouraged more private sector involvement in the development of the mining sector.  
The government has issued incentives for investment by both foreign and domestic 
companies as well as government support services to facilitate the extraction of more 
minerals.20   
The largest mineral and mining company is Ma’aden Saudi Arabian Mining 
Company.  In 1997, a Royal decree was issued for the formation of a company that could 
facilitate the development of the mineral and mining industry. The company was 
originally wholly owned by the Saudi government and then in 2008, 50 percent of its 
shares were floated on the Saudi Stock Exchange, Tadawul.  Initially, the activities of 
Ma’aden centered around the gold business, which now includes five mines and over 11 
million ounces of compliant JORC gold, or Joint Ore Reserves Committee, which is the 
Australasian Code for Reporting of Exploration Results, or the universal standard for 
evaluating minerals.  The means by which minerals are extracted, refined, and then 
transported requires massive amounts of national infrastructure cooperation.  Railway 
lines 1,500 km in length run between the phosphate mine and bauxite mine on opposite 
ends of the country and the port in Ras al Khair was built to transport aluminum and 
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phosphates. Ma’aden has a power conversion agreement with Saline Water Conversion 
Company and Saudi Electricity Company, who are constructing their own power and 
desalination plant just for uses required by mining.  Other infrastructure necessities 
include roadways, drainage, lighting, power grid connection, power transformation, 
distribution facilities, and government-owned mining concessions.21  Because the main 
mining company is now only partially owned by the government, the Kingdom now has 
little say in how the company operates, and does not have access to profits like it would if 
it were still wholly owned by Saudi Arabia.  While the mineral and mining industry is 
robust in Saudi Arabia, the infrastructure, extraction, and transportation process is too 
closely linked to the oil and water industries, which are experiencing their own problems.  
The mining industry will never be the income behemoth that oil is and therefore will not 
contribute to the replacement of oil income or the maintenance of rentierism in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
 
Hydrogen 
Hydrogen has been deemed the most promising replacement for oil because it is 
abundant, affordable, and is nonpolluting.  Hydrogen is the most plentiful element in the 
world and its supply is limitless.  Hydrogen is produced from coal, natural gas, and 
nuclear power.  Hydrogen is not an energy source, itself; it is a carrier of energy that can 
be used to store, move, and deliver energy produced from other sources.  Hydrogen fuel 
is produced in three ways: through thermal processing, electrolytic processing, and 
photolytic processing. Thermal processing for hydrogen involves the process of steam 
reforming, which through high-temperature processing, the steam reacts with the 
! &'#!
hydrocarbon to produce hydrogen.  Hydrocarbon fuels such as natural gas, diesel, 
renewable liquid fuels, and gasified coal can be produced from hydrogen.  During the 
electrolytic process, water is separated into oxygen and hydrogen through a process 
called electrolysis.  The photolytic process uses light as the agent for hydrogen 
production.  Photobiological processes use the natural photosynthetic activity of bacteria 
and algae to produce hydrogen. The photoelectrochemical processes use specialized 
semiconductors to separate water into hydrogen and oxygen.22   While hydrogen comes 
from free, associated materials, it is expensive to generate because it does not exist in a 
pure state in nature.  The production of hydrogen fuels requires large amounts of fossil 
fuels, which are nonrenewable resources, which also includes water.  Hydrogen fuel 
cannot be stored or transported through the existing oil infrastructure that includes 
petroleum service stations.23  The fact that hydrogen is only found in depleting fossil 
fuels and water that is already hard to come by, as well as the fact that it is unable to be 
transported, makes hydrogen fuel another natural resource that will not prevent the death 




 In the early 1970s, when Saudi Arabia’s oil production was beginning to soar, the 
associated gas that comes as a byproduct of oil became available. Prior to this, the 
country simply burned off the associated gas, until it realized that a need for an 
alternative to oil would be useful.  In 1975 Saudi Arabia established the Master Gas 
System (MGS) and began to use the low cost byproduct as feedstock to create the 
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enormous petrochemical complex now called Saudi Basic Industries Corporation, or 
SABIC.  The associated gas became a world-class petrochemical with uses in the 
manufacturing of steel, cement, and fertilizer as well as in the desalination of seawater.    
Liquid natural gas quickly became the primary fuel for generating reliable and affordable 
energy for use throughout Saudi Arabia.  Once the Kingdom realized that liquid natural 
gas is the most important component in desalination for potable water for its burgeoning 
population and for electricity uses, SABIC engaged in ambitious exploration programs to 
find free, unassociated natural gas.  The importance of liquid natural gas was realized and 
it was confirmed that if the country was going to depend on it for critical functions 
throughout the state, the supply of it could not be subject to the fluctuating production 
and demand of domestic and global oil markets. Natural liquid gas had to be found on its 
own. The country now could no longer simply rely on associated gas.24  Saudi Arabia 
transformed itself over the last 50 years into being the fourth largest holder of natural gas 
in the world, with 279 trillion standard cubic feet worth of gas.  The entire country 
adopted gas as their primary means for electricity and other forms of energy. This is not 
to say, however, that they are not also consuming large quantities of petroleum as well.  
As shown, demand for petroleum is calculated to be about 25 barrels, or 1050 gallons of 
petroleum per person, per year. Saudi Arabia has the fastest growing consumption rate at 
4 percent per year.25   
While natural and associated gas is a useful commodity for the local population, it 
still does not replace oil.  Gas in Saudi Arabia is purely for domestic consumption.  Gas 
is not an exportable resource, even though Saudi Aramco has stated that their new 
priority is to increase gas exploration as well as production. Gas production powers the 
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industries in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and it is the main source of feedstock for 
domestic petrochemical companies.26  One-third of gas in Saudi Arabia is used to 
generate electricity, 20 percent is used in the desalination of seawater, 25 percent is used 
in the petrochemical and industrial complexes, and the remainder is used in the operation 
of the oil-refining sector. The oil challenge is more of a monetary threat to the kingdom, 
while the challenge for discovering and harvesting new gas reserves is a threat to filling 
basic living and social needs.  The oil and gas challenges go hand in hand, however, 
because operating the desalination plants in Saudi Arabia costs US$2 billion per year to 
operate.  A full 70 percent of potable water in Saudi Arabia comes from the desalination 
plants, since the country does not have any rivers, streams, or lakes full of fresh water.  It 
can be assumed that the desalination industry will require another US$40 billion to 
increase discovery, harvesting, and transportation of natural gas just within the country to 
meet domestic demand.  Base production cost for production and delivery of natural gas 
costs about US$1.10 per cubic meter, but is partially subsidized to Saudi nationals and is 
sold to them at only 30 percent of this cost.  Unless the government plans to increase the 
price per cubic meter of natural gas that each citizen must pay, they will be responsible 
for the increasing cost that will result from supply and demand when natural gas 
production cannot keep up with demand for potable water and electricity that the 
exploding population will need for day to day sustainment of life. While increasing the 
discovery and production of gas for domestic purposes is forward thinking and necessary, 
it will not help maintain rentierism because it does not generate any foreign rents to the 




Splitting atoms, a dangerous yet efficient form of electricity, generates nuclear 
power.  Nuclear power is the most cost and production efficient form of energy and it is 
the most nonpolluting form in the world.  The United States is the leader in nuclear 
power production, generating more than 25 percent of the world’s capacity.  Nuclear 
power provides more than half of the electricity to countries in Europe and the main 
current growth markets are in China, other parts of Asia, and India.27  Uranium and 
plutonium compose the basis of nuclear fuels.  In the 1950s, there were concerns that 
because uranium and plutonium were so energy dense and abundant, nuclear power 
would be so cheap that it would replace all other forms of energy and destabilize the rest 
of the energy market.  It was soon discovered that the mining and enrichment of uranium 
and the disposal of nuclear wastes would be a huge problem. By ignoring the cost of 
mining, purification, processing, and waste disposal, nuclear energy could be delivered 
for a cost of 1-2 cents per kilowatt-hour. At full price, however, nuclear energy is the 
most expensive source of electricity.28  The cost of producing nuclear energy is expensive 
at US$10 billion for a new power plant, but still not cost prohibitive. The danger 
associated with it is, in some cases is prohibitive.  For example, Iran is a nation that has 
endured sanctions and international skeptical precaution regarding their nuclear power 
plant.  Iran launched their nuclear program in the 1950s with help from the United States 
as part of the Atoms for Peace program.  Western participation continued until the 1979 
Iranian Revolution when Iran temporarily disbanded the program.  Iran’s nuclear 
program has included multiple research sites, two uranium mines, a research reactor, and 
uranium processing facilities.  Iran sought assistance for their renewed program and with 
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help from the Russian government, the first Iranian nuclear power plant opened on 12 
September 2011.  In November 2011, The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
released a report detailing the research and experiments geared toward the development 
of a nuclear weapon.  The report examined the country’s detonator development, the 
multipoint initiation of high explosives, and nuclear payload integration into a missile 
delivery vehicle.29   
The announcement was not without controversy, with former Saudi ambassador 
to the United States Turki al-Faisal warning that a regional nuclear arms race could start 
if Iran does not curb its nuclear efforts.  He furthered those sentiments by claiming that if 
Iran does develop a nuclear weapon, it would leave Saudi Arabia no choice but to also 
develop one and to pursue policies that would lead to “dramatic consequences.”30 
Although al-Faisal does not speak in an official capacity, he is believed to be the next 
foreign minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.31   
Nuclear power is as controversial as it is dangerous.  In April 2011, Saudi Arabia 
announced that they would be building up the King Abdullah City for Atomic and 
Renewable Energy (KA-CARE) to pursue their nuclear power objectives of building 16 
nuclear reactors in the next 20 years at an estimated cost of US$7 billion each.  These 
reactors would ideally give the Kingdom the ability to become a regional exporter of 
electricity and would provide one-fifth of the country’s electricity for industrial and 
residential use, as well as for the desalination of seawater.   The program would ensure 
continued supplies of potable drinking water as well as electricity to the growing 
population. Along with the announcement that the country was planning on building 
these reactor sites, the government also announced that it would be funding a housing and 
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training center in order to educate domestic workers so they will be able to work at these 
nuclear sites.  The spending of their sovereign wealth fund will mainly be focused on 
local employment and domestic energy needs.32 
Executing the plan to build 16 nuclear reactors, mainly along the Red Sea and the 
Persian Gulf coastlines, will require help from many countries around the world.  On 13 
January 2012, China signed an agreement with Saudi Arabia for increased cooperation 
and development of nuclear power plants and research reactors and the manufacturing 
and supply of nuclear fuel elements.  The agreement was the fourth nuclear agreement 
signed by Saudi Arabia following similar agreements with France, Argentina, and South 
Korea. The Kingdom has also been in talks with the United States, the United Kingdom, 
as well as Russia and the Czech Republic.33 So far, there has not been an agreement 
under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act that would allow firms in the United States 
to sell nuclear technology to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  The United States Congress 
has voiced opinions that Saudi Arabia is an unstable country in an unstable region.  
According to Mark Hibbs, a nuclear energy analyst with the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, claims that Saudi Arabia has only a limited nuclear engineering 
workforce and lacks enrichment and related fuel-cycle facilities.  If the United States fails 
to come to an agreement about exporting nuclear reactor technologies to Saudi Arabia, 
the Kingdom’s ability to do business with other countries could be in jeopardy as well.34  
If Saudi Arabia can come to an agreement with the United States or can retrieve enough 
essential materials from other countries to build and operate their nuclear facilities, there 
is a good possibility that they would be able to meet the growing domestic energy needs 
as well as replace income from oil.35   
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In 2010, AREVA, the main French multinational industrial and nuclear energy 
conglomerate, realized US$11.9 billion in sales revenues.  The French government does 
not own AREVA; instead the government is their largest customer. If Saudi Arabia 
chooses to export nuclear energy instead of solely subsidizing it for the national 
population, nuclear energy could very well replace a large amount of lost oil income.  
With international disagreement and skepticism about Saudi Arabia obtaining the 
materials to be able to produce nuclear energy, Saudi Arabia may find many obstacles to 
becoming a nuclear power exporting country. Actually getting online, educating the right 
people, and turning nuclear energy into a profitable government business is many years 
down the road, and may be an endeavor they will never realize. 
 This chapter has shown that there are no natural resources currently available to 
Saudi Arabia that can replace the income from oil.  The best strategy for the Kingdom is 
to invest into the implementation of all forms of natural resources that could replace oil 
for domestic consumption needs. Saudi Aramco’s programs to expand unassociated 
natural gas discovery and extraction are the most feasible solution to replacing part of the 
barrel for water desalination and air conditioning needs.  Solar, wind, and biofuels are not 
plausible on the scale that Saudi Arabia needs them to be. The government has proven 
unwilling to fund exploratory ventures in these areas and the logistics getting those 
resources to the population is too complex.  Saudi Arabia is an ideal location for nuclear 
power plants because of the vast expanses of desert that are uninhabited.  The obstacles to 
begin producing energy from nuclear plants are proving to be prohibitive for the 
Kingdom.  While Saudi Arabia may have the funding to begin a project of that size, 
geopolitics is preventing them from obtaining the necessary equipment. Regional 
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political pressures are prompting the government of Saudi Arabia to seek resources to 
begin production, but global political pressure from the West is preventing it.  The best 
case scenario for Saudi Arabia is to continue to replace domestic oil demand with other 
domestic alternative resources and to make every effort to educate the population on 
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THE ECONOMIC LANDSCAPE IN SAUDI ARABIA 
  
 According to the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) and their Forty- 
Seventh Annual Report, which was completed in December 2011, actual government 
revenues for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for the year 2010 amounted to US$197.7 
billion.  Actual government expenditures equaled US$174.3 billion, resulting in a budget 
surplus of US$23 billion1.  The report attributes the surplus to the global economic 
recovery and the increase in global oil prices. Oil prices of Arabian Light rose by 26.7 
percent from 2009 to 2010 and the price per barrel at the end of 2010 was US$77.75.  
Broad money, or short duration deposits and short-term securities that are less liquid than 
currency or demand deposit,2 increased by 5 percent from 2009 to reach its highest level 
of US$288 billion by the end of 2012.  Broad money is used by central banks to forecast 
inflation because it measures the domestic money supply of the country.  By the end of 
the first quarter of 2012, broad money had increased again by 3.8 percent from the 
previous quarter,3 indicating that domestic money had not being domestically or 
internationally invested and was sitting idle in Saudi Arabian banks.  Oil revenue in 2010 
constituted 90.3 percent of total revenue for the country.  Current expenditure accounted 
for 70 percent while capital expenditure constituted 30 percent of total expenditure.4  For 
a country whose goal of implementing eight previous development plans in order to 
diversify the economy, spending 30 percent on capital expenditures is a low percentage.  
Capital expenditures are used to create future benefits for the domestic economy.  The 
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United States, which is an economically developed country, continues to invest upwards 
of 60-70 percent of total expenditures on capital expenditures and investments.5 
 
Challenges to the Saudi Arabian Economy 
 In the Forty-Seventh Annual Report issued by the Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Agency in 2011, the Agency cited the seven most important challenges to the Saudi 
Arabian economy on pages 228-230 of the report. The following section will outline what 
the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency believes to be the issues that will be the most 
challenging for the government in the preparation for an economy that is no longer 
rentier. 
1. Population Growth  
• The Central Department of Statistics and Information (CDSI) indicate that 
the population in the Kingdom is growing at an annual average of 2.5 
percent.  This growth rate increases pressure on housing, health, 
education, water, electricity, communications, transport, and municipal 
services.  The study also found that the national labor force is increasing 
by an average of 4.2 percent per year. With the large number of new job 
seekers entering the market, there is a dearth of employment available 
through the government as well as through the private sector.  Competition 
for employment with foreign workers coupled with an increasingly large 
young labor force has created one of the most challenging aspects to the 




2. Water Supply and Pressure on its Resources 
• Projections from the Ministry of Water and Electricity and from the 
Ministry of Economy and Planning show that the demand for water for 
municipal purposes is increasing by 2.1 percent per year.  The demand for 
water for industrial purposes is expected to rise by 5.5 percent annually.  
The water for agricultural purposes will decline 3.7 percent over the next 
year due to efforts made by the government in adherence to the Ninth 
Development Plan’s efforts to rationalize water for agricultural 
consumption. The development of water resources is one of the top 
development requirements in the Kingdom and will require increased 
budget revenues in order to continue to provide water to the population at 
the increasing rate of demand. 
3. Increasing Demand for Basic Services Due to Accelerated Population Growth 
• Demand for water, electricity, communications, transport, and other 
utilities is expected to increase in line with the population growth.  
According to the Population and Housing Census in 2010, the population 
of the Kingdom stood at 27.14 million and according to the projections of 
the Ninth Development Plan will reach 33.11 million residents in 2024.  
Providing basic utilities will be a challenge if the increase in population is 





4. Growing Economic Globalization Phenomenon 
• There is currently an increased integration and interdependence of the 
global economy’s segments and activities, which has resulted in an 
expanded system of trade under the umbrella of the world trade system.  
This has triggered strong competitiveness for domestic products and 
investments, requiring the preparation of the domestic Saudi Arabian 
market for competition and attraction of investments and technology 
necessary for the development of various economic sectors.  Saudi Arabia 
has had the reputation of not being a friendly investment climate for 
international investors due to the religious and cultural restrictions on 
certain types of business activity. The government of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia will have to recognize that obstacle and implement a more 
friendly international investment and business atmosphere in order to keep 
up with the globalization phenomenon. 
5. Necessity for Diversification of Government Revenue Sources 
• The state budget of Saudi Arabia is currently experiencing a surplus.  In 
order to avoid future swings of oil prices and revenues, it is advisable to 
diversify public revenue sources and expand the nonoil revenue base.  
From this reality emerges the importance of expanding and stimulating the 
private sector’s roles and encouraging it to invest in the infrastructure 




6. Facing the Banking and Financial Sector Challenges Under the WTO Laws 
• The interdependence of economic interests of all countries on a global 
scale has created challenges for the Kingdom.  A continued liberation of 
financial services for the Kingdom is needed and an expanded application 
of the policies for the liberation of trade, economic openness, economic 
freedom, and economic globalization continually needs to be 
implemented.  International standards of supervision and control over the 
banking sector is also advised.  The First Development Plan in Saudi 
Arabia outlined a strong and transparent banking model that has been used 
for the last 40 years to allow Saudi Arabia to abide by international 
banking standards. Work still needs to be done, however, to continue to 
meet ever-changing international banking standards. 
7. International Trade 
• There is a significant challenge for Saudi Arabia from the strong 
competition faced by national products in the domestic and international 
markets, especially regarding the ascension of Saudi Arabia into the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). This ascension has required the 
adoption of the best production methods to ensure the reduction of 
production cost and the improvement of the Saudi Arabian product quality 
in order to gain access to more international markets.  To continue at a 
competitive level, there needs to be continued establishment and 
expansion of economic and regional conglomerates and free trade zones, 
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accelerating the process of transforming the national economy into a 
knowledge economy in order to enhance competitiveness. The growing 
development of sciences and technologies is necessary for reaping 
economic and commercial benefits and to increase the competition of 
Saudi Arabian commodities and services. 
 While it would appear that the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency has covered all of 
the main economic challenges posed to the Kingdom’s government, the report is lacking 
two distinct details in the analysis.  The Report outlines the most pressing concerns and 
challenges and discusses the goals of the Ninth Development Plan but nowhere to be 
found is a timeline for completion.   The government is aware of what the problems are 
and will be in the future, but at no point in the Report or in other plans or documents do 
they specifically outline a plan of action for each point.  The government has been 
creating and going through the motions of Development Plans since 1970, but they 
appear to be surface plans, lacking details and implementation strategies. The section in 
this chapter that discusses what has been done by the government in regards to 
privatization is a step in the right direction, but the results are not overwhelmingly 
positive or impressive.   
 The second important point that is lacking from the Report is that they are not 
addressing the decreasing amount of revenue from oil.  According to the research in this 
paper, domestic consumption will equal domestic production in the year 2022.  That is a 
mere 10 years from when this research was conducted.  Granted, the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia will still have enormous excess capacity of oil, but as this research has shown, 
they do not and most likely will not have the technology, means, or capability of 
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increasing daily domestic production to levels that will provide for the rapidly expanding 
population and to export barrels for continued profit.  The concept of ceasing to be 
rentier, of being able to provide its citizens with the basic services and essentials and 
subsidized goods that they have come to enjoy has not come to the Saudi Arabian 
conscience yet.  While the government and the Monetary Agency is able to have 
foresight in the economic condition if government revenue stays the same, they are not 
actively planning and implementing to the degree that they need to accurately prepare for 
the death of rentierism. 
 
Employment 
 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been an oil-dependent economy since the first 
tanker of oil was exported in 1938.  The country possesses one-fifth of the world’s 
proven oil reserves and is the largest exporter of oil in the world.  Saudi Arabia’s annual 
GDP equals US$676 billion with an annual GDP growth rate of 6.5 percent. Per capita 
income stands at a meager US$24,000 compared to its neighbor Kuwait, who earns 
nearly US$50,000 GDP per capita.  Petroleum accounts for 80 percent of budget 
revenues, 45 percent of GDP, and 90 percent of export earnings and US$210 billion is 
invested back into the country,6 yet among developing nations, Saudi Arabia ranks 32nd 
out of 103 nations on the Human Poverty Index, which is a global assessment of the 
standard of living.  This puts the Kingdom above most of its Middle East neighbors, but it 
does not negate the fact that unemployment continues to rise and the standard of living is 
continually falling.7  Unemployment has reached a staggering 28.2 percent of the 
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population, of which 23 percent of males are unemployed and 46 percent of females are 
unemployed.     
Employment in Saudi Arabia is broken into three categories: agriculture, industry, 
and service.   Agriculture employs 6.7 percent of the current workforce, industry employs 
21.4 percent, and the service sector employs 71.9 percent of the current workforce.  Of 
the Saudi workforce, 80 percent are nonnational.  It is not a secret, however, that the 
young Saudi nationals are uneducated and lack the technical skills that are required by the 
private sector.  As noted previously, there are free public schools in the country, but they 
are based around a Wahhabi curriculum.  While educating the youth of the country on 
Islam, the government is doing them an injustice by not teaching them the fundamental 
skills needed to perform the necessary service and industry functions that would provide 
them with employment. Reengineering the education system in the country will take 
years, so in the meantime, the government has found the solution in an expatriate 
workforce.8 
Every year, more than 100,000 foreign workers enter Saudi Arabia to perform 
menial jobs as well as technical jobs.  The work ethic of the Saudi Arabian population is 
one of the worst in the world because they have lived in a rentier economy and developed 
a rentier mentality for their entire life.  Over 5.6 million foreign and expatriate workers 
command most of the jobs in the country where the main industry for government income 
only employs 1.5 percent of the population, which leaves very few jobs for Saudi 
nationals. Of the jobs that are available, business owners have complained that the 
selection of Saudi national candidates are not properly educated or prepared for 
workforce requirements.  Students who do attend university study their limited field of 
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choice with Islamic education but not how to run a business, read a balance sheet, or 
write a business proposal.  When the national income is reduced due to a lack of income 
from oil exports, the government will cease to be rentier and will cease to provide the 
subsidies on which the population has come to rely.  If the population does not start 
securing employment now, when government subsidies decrease, the country will be in 
for an economic shock.9   
Not only is Saudi Arabia experiencing an employment crisis, they are also starting 
to feel the drain on the economy from the expatriate workforce.  Remittances from 
foreign workers total US$27 billion per year.10  The private sector can discriminate in the 
hiring process based on knowledge and skill set and more often than not, the foreign 
worker is more qualified than the Saudi national.  The government does not have enough 
job openings to be able to provide guaranteed employment for every national, like 
Kuwait can.11  While the foreign expatriate workforce is not legally obligated to receive 
benefits and subsidies from the government, they do so vicariously.  The expatriate 
workforce uses the same infrastructure, healthcare facilities, schools, they drink the same 
desalinated water, they consume cheap petroleum, and they also procreate, adding to the 
population explosion.  King Fahd had the right idea to bring in foreign workers to help 
with the building up of Saudi Arabia, but now foreign workers have become an economic 
hardship and burden to the population and government of Saudi Arabia.   
 
Agriculture 
The economy outside of oil extraction, production, and exportation is severely 
limited.  Arable land in Saudi Arabia is only 1.67 percent of the entire country.  The 
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country experiences desertification, or the depletion of underground water resources and 
the lack of perennial rivers or permanent bodies of water. This phenomenon has 
prompted the development of extensive desalination of seawater facilities.  Because of 
the desertification and the 100 plus degree temperatures throughout the country for much 
of the year, agriculture as an industry remains challenging.12  The few agricultural 
products that Saudi Arabia does produce include wheat, barley, tomatoes, watermelons, 
dates, and sorghum. These products are used domestically and are not generated in a 
large enough quantity to export.  Agriculture does account for 4 percent of the GDP and 
Saudi Arabia is self sufficient in the production of most dairy products, including milk 
and eggs.13   
 
Industry 
 While not wealthy in agricultural surplus, Saudi Arabia was lucky enough to be 
endowed with a few natural resources, which include petroleum, natural gas, iron ore, 
gold, and copper.14  The key sectors of Saudi Arabian industry include crude oil 
production, petroleum refining, commercial ship and aircraft repair, and the production of 
basic petrochemicals, ammonia, industrialized gases, sodium hydroxide, cement, 
fertilizers, plastics, and metals.  The industry that employs the fewest people to the 
amount of income it generates is the extraction, production, and exportation of natural 
resources.  The oil industry only employs 1.5 percent of the working population but 
generates 80 percent of the states revenues.  Saudi Arabia has the fourth largest deposit of 
natural gas in the world, representing 4 percent of the worlds total natural gas reserves.  
The manufacturing industry contributes 9 percent to the GDP and employs 8 percent of 
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the Saudi workforce.  Most manufacturing jobs in Saudi Arabia revolve around the 
minerals sector.  Refining petroleum is the most lucrative activity, with the 
manufacturing of fertilizer, steel, and cement a close second.15  Cement is in such high 
demand for the building of the US$400 billion infrastructure projects that are currently 
underway that the government has imposed a cement export ban.  Prices for cement 
soared in 2008 when Saudi Arabia faced a cement shortage due to cement companies 
exporting large quantities of cement for higher profits. The ban has helped stabilize prices 
and has guaranteed the availability of cement for the 500,000 new homes in construction 
and other current infrastructure projects.16  
 
Services 
 The service sector of the Saudi Arabian economy continues to boom.  The service 
sector produces 35 percent of the GDP and employs 73 percent of the population.  Of the 
entire service sector, 16 percent work in retail, 12 percent in education, and 10 percent in 
domestic service.17 One very important aspect of the service sector is the tourism 
industry.  Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of Islam and home to the two holiest shrines in 
the Muslim world with the official name of the King being the ‘Custodian of the Two 
Holy Mosques.’ Being that the Kingdom is at the center of Islamic tradition, Saudi 
Arabia is privileged with housing all Hajj tourists that want to visit the holy sites as well 
as the tourists who perform the omra, or minor pilgrimage outside of the Hajj period.  In 
2010, 13 million tourists visited Saudi Arabia and by 2014, the number is expected to be 
15.8 million.  The hospitality and service sector will also grow by increasing the number 
of hotel rooms by 381,000 in the next three years.  Tourism accounts for 3.6 percent of 
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GDP with half of the inbound travelers going to Mecca and Medina.  The Kingdom 
issued 9.5 million travel visas in 2011, which included the 2 million foreign pilgrims that 
performed Hajj. In addition to the foreign tourists coming for Hajj, 500,000 Saudi 
Arabians participate as well.18 
 
Avoiding Dutch Disease 
 The economic theory of Dutch Disease of W. Max Corden and J. Peter Neary in 
1982 to describe the devastating economic effects resulting from the discovery of oil in 
the Netherlands in 1962 would seem to apply to Saudi Arabia, but after analysis it does 
not.  The theory of Dutch Disease states that the inflow of capital, resulting from an oil 
boom, causes the real exchange rate to appreciate.  The reason for the appreciation is that 
the domestic prices in the tradable and nontradable sector are affected asymmetrically 
with the prices of the nontradable sector rising at a faster rate.19  The result of this 
inflation is usually a decline in the manufacturing and agricultural sectors because with 
the increase in the value of the domestic currency, the domestic goods can no longer 
compete in the international market.  In Saudi Arabia when the first oil boom hit in 1973, 
the real exchange rate was 151.  It peaked at 270 in 1976 and then continued to decline 
until it was 100 in 1994.  The first half of the 1970s was characterized by high inflation, 
upwards of 35 percent in 1975.  During the 1980s, inflation fluctuated between 5 percent 
and -5 percent.20 As this paper has shown, Saudi Arabia was a land of Bedouin tribesmen 
engaging in merchant trade and minimal agriculture until King Abdul Aziz conquered 
Arabia, made a state out of the land, and subsequently granted oil concessions. 
Manufacturing was all but nonexistent in the early 1900s and it was not until the country 
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began earning revenues from oil that they were able to invest in and grow their 
manufacturing industry.  According to Dutch Disease theory, when an oil boom hits, the 
manufacturing sector decreases, but not in Saudi Arabia. The oil boom provided the 
means to expand on the manufacturing effort.  The economic Development Plans began 
in 1970 in order to develop the country and the economy, and the manufacturing, as well 
as the agriculture sectors, were two of the most important projects.  King Faisal had the 
foresight to realize that the country would need to diversify its economy and investing in 
manufacturing and agriculture was one of those ways.21 Countries suffering from Dutch 
Disease usually experience a shift in labor force movement from the agricultural sector to 
the sector of nontradables or into the booming oil sector.  In 1979, the Ministry of 
Planning in Saudi Arabia estimated that the total labor force to be 2.9 million. Agriculture 
accounted for 15.9 percent of the total work force.  By 1989 however, the total labor 
force had risen to 5.8 million, but the share working in agriculture dropped to 9.9 percent.  
Despite the decrease in employment in the agricultural sector, agricultural output 
increased, again defying Dutch Disease.22  Initially, Saudi Arabia appears to have had the 
recipe for contracting Dutch Disease. Being the world’s largest oil producer would have 
had a negative effect on the rest of the economy, according to the Dutch Disease theory. 
Saudi Arabia was able to avoid the Disease because as soon as the government issued the 
first oil concessions, they began development efforts, which occurred before the first 
major oil boom.23  The fact that the country was a merchant economy without modern 
infrastructure and that as soon as oil was discovered they started developing are the 
reasons that Saudi Arabia has never suffered from Dutch Disease. 
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 This chapter examined the current economic situation in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia and discussed the challenges that the economy is facing in light of a decrease in 
profit from oil exports and the subsequent death of rentierism.  The employment sector 
was analyzed illustrating that there is a tremendously large expatriate work force and a 
small and restive national work force.  The following chapter will examine what 
economic and political actions that the Kingdom is taking in order to secure a stable 
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PREPARATION FOR THE END OF RENTIERISM 
 
 This paper has shown that the welfare and standard of living of every Saudi 
Arabian national, expatriate, foreign worker, and every member of the House of Saud 
will be in jeopardy when the government is no longer able to produce enough barrels of 
oil for export profit.  The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is quickly approaching a dramatic 
turning point in their existence if they do not act quickly to replace the income that they 
enjoy from oil.  Since 1970, the country has formulated nine development plans in an 
attempt to diversify the economy, to find renewable resources, to explore for minerals, 
and even to build entire economic cities. So far, most of these plans have not been 
reached and the ones that have, have not changed the economic, social, and political 
landscape enough to prevent the impending domestic oil shock.   
 In order to prepare for the end of a rentier state, the country of Saudi Arabia has 
claimed to implement economic diversification techniques and programs that would 
generate government revenue from sources other than oil. Development plans have also 
included goals of privatization and of facilitating an economic environment open to 
domestic entrepreneurialism.  Once the government ceases to generate revenue from oil, 
the options for funding social benefits will be severely limited.  With government 
revenue limited to income from taxation, import duties, and Hajj tariffs, Saudi Arabian 
nationals will be obligated to pay full price for education, healthcare, energy, and other 
social benefits that they currently enjoy.   
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 There are many sectors of the country that are failing the people.  There are many 
reasons why the government does not behave the way that the population would like it to.  
There are many steps that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is failing to take in order to 
prepare for the impending death of rentierism in their country.  The main impediment to 
the economic and political actions required for that preparation, however, is the conflict 
between the state and the religion.  Members of the Royal Family are savvy businessmen 
and politicians.  The lack of preparedness for the end of rentierism is not attributable to a 
lack of business acumen or a desire by the Royal Family to watch their eponymous 
country return to a country that is reliant on merchant trade.  The lack of preparedness is, 
however, attributable to the conflict between the Royal Family, who do understand 
business and politics, and the religious elite, who do not understand business or politics.  
The religious elite would like to see the country return to the time before modernization, 
Western influence, and in their view, the degradation of society. 
 This chapter will discuss the actions taken towards preparing for the end of a 
rentier state in Saudi Arabia. This chapter will also discuss the obstacles that are 
preventing certain factions of the country from adequately preparing for the end of 
rentierism.  The relationships among those that live in Saudi Arabia are based on an 
established triangular set of linkages that include the House of Saud, the religious elite, 
and the greater Saudi Arabian society. The legitimacy of the Al Saud family comes from 
the support they receive from the religious establishment. Islam is maintained as the 
ultimate law of the land and Shariah is upheld by the Royal Family, which satisfies the 
needs of the religious elite. The Saudi society is provided for by the Royal Family in 
return for their allegiance and political quiescence.  Many of the obstacles to 
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preparedness for the end of rentierism originates from the conflicts between these three 
segments of society. King Abdullah and other reformers have begun to advance the 
country in the economic and political realms, but through great struggle. The never- 
ending dissent among the differing groups in Saudi Arabia has all but paralyzed the 
country from diversifying, privatizing, preventing, and ultimately preparing for an 
economy that will no longer be able to provide for its citizens, for the ruling family, or 




Ninth Development Plan 
 In the Ninth Development Plan, which began in 2010, the prioritized goal of the 
Council and Ministers was to develop and diversify income sources and to achieve 
optimum utilization of available economic resources to accomplish their goal of 
diversification.  The six objectives of the Ninth Development Plan are as follows: 
1. Increasing the standard of living and improving the quality of life for citizens 
2. Achieving balance between population growth and natural resources 
3. Rationalizing immigration to major urban areas in all regions of the Kingdom 
4. Reducing the ratio of expatriates in the population structure 
5. Reducing mortality rates of infants, children below 5 years, and maternity 
6. Increasing the opportunities to make use of human resources, especially faculties 
and qualifications of the youth1 
 All Development Plans since 1970 that have been unveiled to the public have all 
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offered the same 5-year time line for implementation.  They also have all had sweeping 
and grandiose ideas for what they want to happen in the economic and development 
sectors, but specific details for implementation have consistently been lacking.  Above 
are the six stated goals of the Ninth Development Plan. Missing with those six goals are 
specific allocative funding, a Minister who is accountable to oversee the goals, and 
specific actions that are needed to achieve the goals.  An example of this missing 
information is with the second goal of ‘achieving balance between population growth and 
natural resources.’ Lacking in the Ninth Development Plan report are the statistics for 
population growth rates, live birth and death rates, information about contraceptives, and 
the number of expatriates that are emigrating to the country and how many children they 
produce when they are there.2  These are essential statistics in order to have a baseline of 
what even needs to be changed.  Also lacking is information on natural resources. The 
report does not indicate what natural resources are being used, how much is being used, 
and who is using them.  In order to ‘balance population growth with natural resources,’ it 
would behoove the government to know what their target goal of ‘balance’ would be and 
the exact steps needs to achieve that goal.   
 As discussed in this thesis, there are a variety of contributing factors as to why 
there is a paralysis of development and preparation for the end of rentierism.  The stated 
goal of balancing population growth with natural resources is the key to preparing for the 
end of rentierism.  At the helm of the decision making is King Abdullah, who is 
progressive in nature and who has implemented a myriad of development initiatives to 
diversify the economy, such as expanding the capacity of the international airport and all 
tourism-related necessities related to Hajj.  Fighting him and his progressiveness is the 
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ulema, who even if they were aware of the population growth statistics would not adhere 
to a concerted effort at promoting birth control, because it goes against their religious 
values.  Aside from the two dissenting decision makers are the Ministers who would 
ideally be in charge of ensuring that the stated goals are met. As discussed previously in 
this paper, there is no accountability or checks and balances in the country to verify that 
the goals are being met.  Development goals are run ad hoc and then analyzed after five 
years to see if anything has changed.  Dissention, lack of accountability, and poor 
management skills at the government level are the main reasons why these development 
goals are not being met and why Saudi Arabia will ultimately find themselves unprepared 
for the end of rentierism. 
 
Privatization 
 The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency cites 13 achievements during 2010 that 
illustrate the restructuring of the economy and the privatization process.  The following 
list is a paired down version of all of the individual achievements, which are detailed on 
pages 27-38 of the report, but is a good indicator of what the Saudi Arabian government 
views as positive strides they have taken to privatize and diversify. 
1. Regulatory Developments in the Saudi Economy in 2010 
• Regulation of electricity and cogeneration services in the industrial cities 
• Approval of steps for addressing the phenomenon of bounced checks 
• Abolition of the requirement of owning land when applying for a loan 




2. Contributions of the Public Investment Fund (PIF) 
• Approval of the sale of state’s shares in bilateral companies to the private 
sector 
• Studying the feasibility of selling the states’ shares in national joint-stock 
companies 
• Approval of establishing a joint-stock company fully owned by the PIF 
for the purpose of owning government hotels 
3. Saudi Railways Organization (SRO) 
• Development of the railway transport sector to achieve a partnership with 
the private sector 
• Comprehensive maintenance of the railway network 
• Protecting the railways from sand encroachment with private companies 
4. Water and Sewage 
• Establishing the National Water Company (NWC) 
• Signing partnership contracts with the private sector to manage, maintain, 
and operate the water and sewage sector 
• Privatizing the sewage plants 
5. Saudi Port Authority 
• 27 investment opportunities became available to the private sector 





• Developments at the ports to increase efficiency 
6. Saudi Arabian Airlines 
• Completing privatization steps of Saudi Arabian Airlines 
• Converting minor sectors into strategic business units 
• Development of a marketing program to attract private investors 
7. Department of Zakat and Taxation 
• Application of a new tax system--increase ease of paying taxes 
• Implement electronic archiving 
• Implement new automated tax system in Jeddah, Mecca, and Ta’if 
8. The Saudi Electric Company 
• The Shuabiah Project III for water and electricity became the first 
cogeneration project in partnership with the private sector 
• Assigned main areas of activity: generations, transferring and distribution 
to subsidiaries owned by the Saudi Electric Company to a holding company 
• Registered the power transfer company with the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry 
9. Electricity and Cogeneration Regulatory Authority (ECRA) 
• ECRA created as an independent government agency to reform the 
electricity sector and restructure it to allow greater private sector participation 
• Creation of new investment opportunities, including coproductions, 
building, leasing, operating transfer lines, renting and operating existing 
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facilities, and purchasing existing power generation and water desalination 
facilities 
10. Saline Water Conversion Corporation (SWCC) 
• Approval by the Supreme Royal Court to privatize the SWCC and 
converting into a holding joint-stock company fully owned by the Kingdom 
• The subsidiary production companies will be offered to the private sector 
for development with private sector participation to be no less than 60 percent 
of ownership 
• At a later date, the shares of the holding joint-stock company will be 
offered for initial public offering 
11. Privatization of Education Services 
• To reduce financial cost and improve quality level, the Supreme Royal 
Court approves the Ministry of Education’s request for expanding 
participation in the education sector to the private sector 
• Approval for development of school infrastructure with expansion of 
school transportation and in-school catering 
• Expansion of nursery and kindergarten programs 
12. General Authority of Civil Aviation (GACA) 
• Entrusted the private sector with the management of several projects such 
as the development of a pilgrim terminal compound at King Abdulaziz 
International Airport 
• Allowing the private sector to establish and operate a water desalination 
plant at King Abdulaziz International Airport 
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• Building duty free markets in King Abdulaziz International Airport 
13. Economic Cities Authority (ECA) 
• A Royal Decree was issued to establish the Economic Cities Authority 
(ECA) and the abolition of the Economic Cities Agency 
• ECA was entrusted with full supervision of the development of the 
economic cities 
• ECA expected to increase domestic, joint ventures, and foreign 
investments to make the economic cities the most competitive environment 
for attracting investment worldwide 
 
Sovereign Wealth Funds and International Investment 
 Prior to 2008, the Saudi Arabian government deposited oil and other state-earned 
revenue into the central bank of Saudi Arabia, The Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority, 
and also into the coffers of the Royal Family.  In 2008, Saudi Arabia confirmed its 
intentions to establish a formal external investment vehicle in the form of a sovereign 
wealth fund.  The Kingdom was lenient to invest into a formal international fund due to 
its resource constraints prior to the rise of oil prices in 2003 and due to the potential 
criticism from both domestic and international actors for investing in the West.  The 
move to invest internationally in a formal investment fund was the result of positive 
budget surpluses and an effort by the Saudi Arabian government to develop and 
modernize its financial services sector.3  
 When The Public Investment Fund was established in 2008, Mansour al-Maiman, 
the secretary-general of the Pubic Investment Fund, an arm of the Ministry of Finance, 
! "$+!
began the fund with US$5.3 billion worth of capital.  The Public Investment Fund 
previously had only the mandate to only invest domestically. Al-Maiman claimed at the 
time that his intentions were to build a diversified portfolio of investments that would 
maximize long-term rates of return and also to build up the national asset management 
skill base.  Initially, the Public Investment Fund owned 100 percent of the investments 
but the sovereign wealth fund would have its own management team.4   
 Throughout 2008, Saudi Arabia became a major player in global capital markets 
through the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority and the Public Investment Fund. By 2009, 
the Saudi Arabian government expanded its international investment capabilities by 
introducing two new sovereign wealth funds, Hassana Investment Company and Sanabil 
al-Saudia, both with initial capitalization of US$5.3 billion.  Hassana Investment 
Company has been investing in real estate, commercial projects, and stock markets in the 
Middle East and in the West and is also responsible for managing the assets of the 
General Organization for Social Insurance.  Sanabil al-Saudi is a portfolio manager for 
the Public Investment Fund and invests in a broad range of global asset classes.5 
 During the first three quarters of 2011, holdings of foreign assets grew by a 
greater amount than foreign liabilities, which resulted in the year-end estimate of US$506 
billion in foreign owned portfolio assets.  Due to continually increasing oil prices of 
US$100 and more per barrel and an increased oil production level of 9.4 million barrels a 
day in 2011 to fill the gap in oil output due to the civil unrest in Libya, Saudi Arabia was 
able to realize budget surpluses and was then able to invest even more in the international 
market.6  Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency’s Muhammad al-Jasser said in a speech in late 
2011 that the government of Saudi Arabia has been well known for investing 
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internationally and that they are in no position to discontinue the practice. He also noted 
that King Abdullah had issued an economic stimulus package in the summer of 2011 
which was intended to enhance the purchasing power of its citizens and to increase 
investment in housing and healthcare, but that the initiatives would not require the 
country to draw down their foreign assets to fund the royal decrees and that they will 
continue to stockpile surplus funds into foreign markets.7 
 As predicted in 2008 when the wealth funds were initially funded, Saudi Arabia 
had released data only on the total monetary value of the sovereign wealth funds and 
there has been little to no transparency regarding the details of its operations, investment 
strategies, or holdings in the four years since the sovereign wealth funds’ inception. One 
new development that has been noticed by investment bankers is that sovereign wealth 
funds in the Persian Gulf are investing less globally than in the last three years and are 
returning to investing locally and domestically.  In 2012, new government financing to 
Saudi Arabian funds will increase by 8 percent, which is down from a 13 percent increase 
in 2011.  Civil unrest in Middle Eastern countries has prompted many countries to invest 
locally to improve domestic employment, housing, transportation, education, and their 
overall economic situations, as opposed to solely investing in an international market that 
is also in economic turmoil.  In 2011, 29 percent of new investments from Gulf sovereign 
funds were invested in North America, 19 percent in Western Europe, and 33 percent in 
the Persian Gulf.  In 2012, investments in North America fell to 14 percent, 4 percent in 
Western Europe but increased to 56 percent in the Persian Gulf.8   
 As the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency’s Forty-Seventh Annual Report has 
shown, Saudi Arabia is operating at record-breaking budget surpluses and will continue 
! "$$!
to invest those surpluses into sovereign wealth funds either internationally or 
domestically.  Due to the lack of transparency, it is impossible to know who and what the 
Saudi Arabian sovereign wealth funds are invested in and how those markets, companies, 
and funds are doing financially.  The only statistic that really matters, however, is the 
year-end total portfolio total and Saudi Arabia is on track to reach a sovereign wealth 
fund asset total of more than US$600 billion by the end of 2012.   
 Investing surplus revenue into diversified portfolio sovereign wealth funds that 
invest internationally, as well as domestically, is critical in the preparation for an 
economy that will no longer be rentier.  In the event that the security of the Saudi Arabian 
oil supply were to be compromised, with US$506 billion in sovereign wealth funds and 
annual budget expenditures of US$174 billion, Saudi Arabia has the option of cashing in 
their sovereign wealth funds to continue to meet budgeted expenditures for nearly three 
years.  During the attack on Kuwait in the early 1990s, the government relied solely on 
their international investments, sovereign wealth funds, and savings to continue to meet 
their budgeted expenditures while they had no revenue or oil exports.9  In the event that 
the prediction of this research comes to fruition and Saudi Arabia ceases to be rentier 
when domestic consumption equals domestic production of oil, three years of sovereign 
wealth funds is not going to be useful if there is no hope of returning to being a rentier 
state.  Three years out of the rest of the states existence is trivial, but in the event of a 
breach in security and oil production is slowed or discontinued, the sovereign wealth 





 There are a number of parastatal companies operating in Saudi Arabia.  Parastatal 
companies are state-owned intergovernmental organizations, companies, and agencies 
that provide revenue for the government, possess political clout and influence, but that 
are run separately from the actual government.  Parastatal companies are legal entities 
that undertake commercial activities on behalf of the government and serve the state 
either directly or indirectly.10   
 Some of the parastatal companies in Saudi Arabia include Saudi Aramco, Saudi 
Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC), and Samba Financial Group (SAMBA). Saudi 
Aramco is considered a parastatal company because it is run independently of the 
government.  It does not rely on the government to engage in day-to-day business 
activities such as recruiting, hiring, firing, new product development, exploration 
decisions, investment budgeting, and joint venture liaison work.  The income from 
Aramco was approximately US$210 billion in 2010,11 but all of that was from oil 
revenue. With the goal of diversifying the governmental income, the income from 
Aramco becomes a moot point because once domestic consumption equals domestic 
production, Aramco will not be making any money in exports; therefore, the government 
will not be making any money in exports. 
 The Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) is also a parastatal company 
with the Saudi Arabian government owning 70 percent of the company’s shares and 
private investors in Saudi Arabia and the other countries of the GCC own the remaining 
30 percent.  SABIC began in 1976 by Royal Decree and today the company has 
operations in 40 countries around the world with an international workforce of 33,000. 
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SABIC specializes in the production of chemicals, fertilizers, metals, and plastics.  Net 
profits in 2009 reached US$2.4 billion with total assets of US$79.2 billion.12  SABIC 
specializes in products that require the use of oil, which, again, is going to be a problem 
when domestic oil becomes scarce.  In the calculation, domestic oil consumption takes 
into account oil for industry; therefore, SABIC will still be an income source for the 
government. There is a possibility that their oil requirements will not be met and that is a 
scenario that the government must take into consideration while adopting diversification 
plans for government revenue. 
 Samba Financial Group is a parastatal company within Saudi Arabia that offers 
banking services at 66 different branches within the Kingdom as well as 28 international 
branches.  The company’s consumer segment offers deposits, credit cards, retail 
investment products, and consumer loans and savings accounts.  The corporate segment 
provides deposits, loans, corporate finance advisory services, as well as investment, 
trading, and derivative portfolios. The company’s treasury segment manages money 
market accounts, foreign exchange, and commission rate trading.  The company also 
offers Islamic banking and also manages real estate projects.  Revenue for 2011 equaled 
US$6.6 billion and projected income for 2012 is US$7.4 billion.13   
 Investing in banking, finance, and real estate development is one avenue that will 
not directly be affected by the reduction in income from oil.  There will be a shockwave 
across the country when the government income is no longer what it has been, but 
international investment and investors will still contribute to Saudi Arabian government 
revenue through the banking sector, even when there are no longer any barrels of oil left 
for export. 
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Taxation, Zakat, and Hajj as Income Diversification 
Taxation 
 The Saudi Arabian government imposes few taxes, relying on the income from 
oil, customs duties, corporate taxation, zakat, Hajj fees, and licensing fees for revenue. 
Government income from oil in 2010 totaled US$108 billion with a combined nonoil 
income of US$1.5 billion.14  The extent to which taxation is levied in Saudi Arabia is 
limited to foreign companies that are not from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and 
that have permanent business establishments in Saudi Arabia.  On profits less than 
US$26,667, a tax of 25 percent is levied on corporations. On profits of more than 
US$266,667, a minimum tax of 45 percent is levied and between the two is a sliding 
scale.  Foreign shareholders who share in the profits of Saudi Arabian companies are 
assessed a flat corporate income tax of 20 percent. Some foreign investors are able to 
avoid taxation either partially or completely by participating in investment incentives, 
such as 10-year tax holidays offered by the government.  A Natural Gas Investment Tax 
(NGIT) is levied to both individuals and corporate entities, which also includes GCC 
nationals. The profits of these companies are taxed at a base rate of 30 percent and 
progressively up to 85 percent, depending on the internal rate of return on investment.  
Import tariffs are 12 percent on everything except defense products and are not assessed 
on imports from other GCC nations.  Essential commodities and defense products are 
also exempt from customs duties. There is a 20 percent tariff levied on products that 
compete with local infant industries, regardless of origin, which is why there is an all- 
encompassing tax on NGIT.  All employers, regardless of GCC nation status or of 
international status, must contribute 9 percent of a Saudi nationals employment salary in 
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addition to their base salary to pay for insurance related to old age, disability, and death.  
The Saudi Arabian national employer must contribute a matching 9 percent to the fund.  
The employer must also pay a 2 percent occupational hazard tax, which is similar to the 
disability tax but is assessed differently due to the environmental hazards as well as 
hazards on the job site due to lax regulation of safety standards.15 
 
Zakat 
 There is no personal income tax levied, or taxes on personal goods or services. All 
Muslims who are mentally stable, free, and financially able and who are living within 
Saudi Arabia are obligated to pay the 2.5 percent zakat, or religious tithing, based on the 
personal total wealth of each Muslim.  Zakat is not calculated according to a Muslims 
income, but on their combined total wealth.  Zakat is calculated on capital earnings from 
personal wealth, property, and monetary acquisitions.  The zakat is obligatory according 
to the Quran 9:60 and is one of the five pillars of Islam and is also pursuant to the Royal 
Decree N.17-2-28-2077 of 1380A.H., or 1960.  The zakat is due once every lunar 
calendar year.16 
 The term ‘zakat’ in Arabic refers to ‘growth’ or ‘purification.’ By paying the 
zakat, the possessions of Muslims are thought to be purified because portions of their 
belongings are given to those in need. Similar to pruning plants, cutting back individual 
bank balances encourages new growth.  The zakat is designed to support the Islamic 
community and is intended to be used to pay for hospitals, schools, and for donations to 
the help the poor. Paying the zakat is not negotiable within the religion and six countries 
collect the zakat by law: Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Libya, Sudan, Pakistan, and Malaysia.  
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Each country has a specific institution for collecting the zakat. In Saudi Arabia, collection 
is controlled by the Department of Zakat and Income as part of the Ministry of Finance 
and National Economy.  Saudi charities and the Department of Zakat and Income receive 
approximately US$3-4 billion annually in zakat donations. Between 10-20 percent of that 
is sent abroad as aid to fellow Muslims.17  The remainder is used to help with social and 
religious causes, but there is a pervasive domestic opinion that the funds are being 
mishandled and siphoned off to religious extremist groups such as al-Qaida and the 
Taliban.  Although Saudi Arabia has a Royal Decree obligating Muslims to pay the zakat 
and the state has a Department of Zakat and Income to process and distribute the money, 
the Kingdom lacks an effective legal system to impose strict rules on transparency, 
accounting, and auditing of the Minister of Finance and his employees.  The lack of 
charity control and state regulations paired with noninstitutionalized religious 
interpretation has contributed to a system that is seemingly honest, but has turned into a 
corrupt, money laundering scheme.18   
 
Hajj and Tourism 
 Tourism in Saudi Arabia is incredibly limited to Hajj pilgrims and to men 
entering the country for specific business purposes.  Unlike the other Gulf Cooperation 
Countries, Saudi Arabia does not issue general tourist visas.  A person from outside the 
GCC may only enter if they are granted a visitor visa.  Visitor visas are exclusively 
reserved for business related trips into the country and may only be obtained from the 
company sponsoring the visitor.  The company sponsoring the visitor must vouch for the 
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good character of the traveler upon applying for the visa and once in the country, the 
sponsoring company is responsible for the traveler.19 
 Despite the strict government laws limiting the number of international tourists, 
Saudi Arabia is expecting to welcome 15.8 million visitors into the country in the year 
2014, up from 13 million in 2010. Of those 13 million visitors, 9.5 million were granted 
religious visas for the purpose of Hajj. This leaves only 3.5 million visitors entering the 
country solely for business purposes.  With the continuing increase in tourism, whether 
from Hajj or for other purposes, the hospitality sector has been booming in Saudi Arabia.  
The growth in religious, business, and domestic tourists has forced the building of at least 
381,000 new hotel rooms, mainly in the Mecca area.  The government of Saudi Arabia 
continues to use income from tourism as a diversified source of income and in 2010 
committed to invest 3.6 percent of the annual GDP to promote the growth of tourism.20 
 The expansion of the tourism and Hajj industries and the subsequent travelers to 
use the new facilities will benefit the private sector by allowing them to build and operate 
new shops, restaurants, hotels, and transportation companies.  The government does not 
operate the businesses on the ground level that are targeted at the Hajj and business 
traveler, but the Saudi nationals can and should take this opportunity to go into business 
for themselves and earn money from religious and business tourists. If nationals do not 
take the opportunity to target the market, foreign workers will do it for them. 
 The period during Hajj can be considered to be both a source of government 
revenue as well as a means for privatization.  Hajj draws between 2-3 million people per 
year to Mecca, providing local companies with revenue from shopping, transportation, 
hotels, dining, and other tourism needs. The government of Saudi Arabia profits off the 
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Hajj by charging each pilgrim to come into the country to perform the religious rite.  
Monetary values of activities related to the Hajj exceed US$30 billion per year, the 
wealthiest pilgrims spending upwards of US$40,000 per person on a Hajj pilrimage.21   
 The Hajj is a set of rituals performed every year for five days in the month of Dhu 
al-Hijjah. Pilgrims visit the Grand Mosque in Mecca and then follow the route of 
Mohammad, which begins in Mecca, moves into the desert of Mina, then to Arafat for 
one day, and then to Muzdalifah and then back to Mina for three days.22   
 The government of Saudi Arabic controls the flow of pilgrims through quotas, 
allowing each country in the world only one pilgrim per every one thousand Muslim 
citizens.  Indonesia sends the largest number of pilgrims, aside from Saudi Arabia, with 
200,000 people attending per year.23  Visiting pilgrims for Hajj must contact a travel 
agency specifically designed for Hajj travel.  Muslim pilgrims are allowed to enter the 
country with a government issued religious travel visa, but must be accompanied by a 
travel agency representative while in Saudi Arabia.24   
 By the year 2025, Saudi Arabia is expecting to host upwards of 17 million 
pilgrims for Hajj alone.  This has created the need to develop an infrastructure in and 
around Mecca that will be able to accommodate that many visitors.  The speculation of 
hosting that many pilgrims will also give the government an opportunity to profit 
handsomely off of the religious rite as an income diversification technique.  The 
government owns the land surrounding the Grand Mosque and one square meter of land 
is currently selling for US$130,000, which goes directly into government revenues.25  
 With the foresight to expect the number of pilgrims to expand exponentially, King 
Abdul Aziz ordered the first expansion of the Grand Mosque since the seventeenth 
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century.  Mohammad bin Laden, a Yemeni migrant, was given the contract and work 
began in 1955. The government of Saudi Arabia began an aggressive modernization 
project in Mecca by destroying most of the historic buildings in the city to make way for 
newer and larger buildings.   The historic marble columns were replaced with artificial 
stone, 300 foot minarets, and two gates were rebuilt.  In 1980, King Fahd constructed a 
new prayer area and new minarets were built to replicate the first ones from 1955.  Since 
1980, there has been little that has been done to expand the Grand Mosque or to 
modernize the amenities in Medina until King Abdullah made it his goal to make Hajj a 
significant source of diversified income for the country in Saudi Arabia.26   
 In the Fall of 2011, King Abdullah purchased US$10 billion worth of private 
property in Mecca to expand the Grand Mosque once again.  The expansion resulted in 
increasing the internal capacity of the Mosque from 750,000 worshippers to more than 2 
million.  The contract for the extension was given to the Saudi Bin Laden Group and it 
should be complete by 2020.  The expansion will add a gate named for King Abdullah 
and will also greatly increase the number of restrooms and shaded areas available to the 
pilgrims. The Grand Mosque in Mecca is the only mosque in the world that is not 
segregated based on sex.27 King Abdullah also initiated the expansion of the water at 
Zamzam that is purported to have healing qualities and that pilgrims drink throughout the 
Hajj.  The water is pumped into the Mosque from a purification plant and in 2010, King 
Abdullah authorized a US$187 million expansion of the plant, which would then be able 
to filter up to 1.3 million gallons per day.28 
 To update the transportation industry in the Medina and Mecca area, King 
Abdullah has made plans to include a metro that will connect the city of Medina to the 
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stops on the pilgrims Hajj route in Mina, Arafat, and Muzdalifah. A high speed rail link 
between Mecca and Medina will be built around the central part of the city, which will 
connect high rises and shopping malls.  Another construction project that is transportation 
related is the expansion of the King Abdulaziz International Airport.  As part of a 
US$11.3 billion project, which is due to be completed in 2035, the expansion will 
increase the airport’s capacity from 15 million to 80 million passengers per year.  An 
additional terminal is being built called the Hajj Terminal in order to expedite the travel 
needs of the pilgrims arriving for the Hajj rituals.29 
 Crown Prince Nayef has also had a hand in the expansion of the Grand Mosque, 
ordering the doubling of the capacity of the circumambulation area around the Kaaba.  
Since there are only certain times during the Hajj ritual that pilgrims circumambulate the 
Kaaba, which is the most sacred site in Islam, Crown Prince Nayef recognized the danger 
of people being trampled to death and with foresight demanded that the area be 
enlarged.30 
 The most impressive economic addition to Mecca and to the Grand Mosque is the 
recently completed US$2 billion Royal Mecca Clock Tower, which is surrounded by 
shopping, luxury hotels, prayer rooms, parking lots, helipads, and the Abraj al Bait 
residential complexes. The new addition overlooks the Kaaba and the building is the 
worlds largest building in square footage and is the second tallest building in the world.31  
 The investment into Mecca, the surrounding areas, and the Grand Mosque is an 
attempt at increasing Hajj tourism as well as using the event as an income diversification 
tool for the government.  At the beginning of the 1900s, King Abdul Aziz relied heavily 
on the income from Hajj as government revenue and it is not surprising that current 
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leadership is also attempting to continue and expand the profitability of being the 
Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques. 
 
Private Sector Development 
Women 
 In the United States, women-owned small businesses are the fastest growing 
segments of the economy and the strongest engine for job creation.32  In Saudi Arabia, 
the future of the economy and of the overall well-being of the country is slowing coming 
into the hands and onto the shoulders of Saudi Arabian women.  Saudi Arabian women 
currently enjoy fewer legal and social rights than women in any other country in the 
world, but they are slowly becoming educated and finding their own place in the global 
atmosphere.  Educated women who pursue entrepreneurialism is a vital sector to the 
diversification of income, to private sector development, and to the preparation for the 
end of rentierism.33   
 One indicator of the future of women in Saudi Arabian society is the amount of 
education they are pursuing. Girls in primary school in Saudi Arabia outnumber boys 
53.3 percent to 52.1.  The number of girls in intermediate schooling also outnumbers 
boys 24.7 percent to 24.3 percent.  There are slightly more boys at the secondary level of 
schooling in Saudi Arabia with 23.6 percent and with girls representing 22 percent.  Girls 
fall behind boys at the lower levels of education, representing 48.5 percent compared to 
the attendance of boys at 51.5 percent.34 
 Women are just as prevalent in higher education in Saudi Arabia as men, and 
during the 2010/2011 academic year, women outnumbered men with 52 percent 
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enrollment.  There were also more women graduates, outnumbering men 54 percent to 49 
percent.35  Women far outnumbered men in enrollment and graduation with Bachelors 
degrees, which is mainly attributed to the fact that six out of ten PhD degrees awarded are 
in Islamic studies, a subject that women are not allowed to participate in to the depth of 
earning a PhD.36 
 Because the Saudi Arabian state continues to treat women as legal minors, being 
required to obtain permission and often escort by their husbands and male relatives to 
even attend academic institutions, many Saudi Arabian women obtain their education 
abroad.  Saudi Arabian women are internationally recognized as doctors, prominent 
business women running international companies, PhD economists, scientists and 
professors, deans of colleges and universities, news anchors, journalists, and high- 
powered women who wield their weight from their education and their large supplies of 
money. These powerful women live all over the world and contribute to their respective 
societies, but in their home country, they are still unable to vote and they are still unable 
to drive themselves to their places of employment.37 
 The women that do remain in Saudi Arabia and enroll in higher-level education 
graduate at higher percentages than men do. During academic year 2010/2011, 54 percent 
of all higher education graduates were women, but only 5 percent of the entire Saudi 
Arabian workforce is comprised of women.  In 2011, nearly 60,000 women graduated 
with higher-level degrees and only 3,000 of them even entered the Saudi Arabian 
workforce.38 The Saudi Arabian government uses the Quran as its state constitution, 
leaving the case for women’s rights inseparable from women’s rights in Islam. King 
Abdullah is slowly allowing women more rights in Saudi Arabia, but the burdens of not 
! "%&!
being able to drive and forced segregation in the workplace and in school is an enormous 
cost burden on the individual women, as well as the country.  The social discrimination 
and binding law that does not allow women to drive in a country that has very limited 
public transportation makes working outside of the home difficult, if not impossible, for 
the nonelites who cannot afford to hire a chauffeur or if the men in their lives will not 
drive them.  At any given time in Saudi Arabia, there are upwards of one million foreign 
chauffeurs driving women around the country for a cost of US$4 billion per year.  Nearly 
all of that money is sent to the foreign workers’ home countries as remittances. This 
phenomenon does not help solve the limiting of foreign worker problem and sending 
US$4 billion per year in chauffer remittances outside of the country is an unnecessary 
drain on the Saudi Arabian economy. The simple solution to both of those problems 
would be to just let women drive.39 
 Change is slowly coming to women in Saudi Arabia. In 1999, the first private 
women’s college was established, named the Dar al-Hekma College.  The college was 
backed by the Jeddah business community and is one of the few Saudi Arabian degrees 
being recognized internationally.40  Change is also coming to women on the business 
front as well.  In 2001, Prince Majeed, who at the time was the Governor of Mecca, 
allowed women to create a business women’s committee with the Jeddah Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry.  In 2004, the committee was renamed the Khadijah Center. The 
center currently has its own budget, staff, research, and training for women who are 
business owners.41 
 In 2003, King Abdullah established the “National Dialogues,” which were a series 
of meetings intended to educate and persuade the Saudi Arabian population into greater 
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openness and tolerance.  Between 2003-2009, there were 8 such meetings, which ranged 
in discussion topics from reducing extremism, to issues with youth, the job crisis, health, 
and also discussions about women and their rights and roles in society. In 2004, there was 
a session only open to women and at the meeting, there was a recommendation for the 
creation of a women’s commission in the government, which would result in a balance 
between Sharia and everyday life for Saudi Arabian women. The request was denied, but 
the fact that women had their first public forum was a big step for the Kingdom.42  A 
project that was approved, however, was the al Sayedah Khadijah Bint Khualid Business 
Women’s Center.  The goal was to facilitate women’s employment and entrepreneurship 
through lobbying, research, and awareness.  The Center has since been able to identify 
obstacles to women’s’ advancement in business and slowly through research and 
lobbying is addressing the concerns and finding solutions.43 
 An important educational development occurred in 2005 when King Abdullah 
announced a new scholarship program, which would fund 5,000 Saudi Arabian students- 
men, and women, to study abroad, complete with living expenses.  The funds were 
limited to students who were pursuing engineering and science degrees and “safe” 
subjects such as linguistics.  Women still had to obtain permission from their husbands 
and fathers, but the door was open for them to study abroad on the government’s tab.44 
 The first accredited women’s university in Saudi Arabia was built in 2009 and 
named Effat University, after King Faisal’s wife. King Faisal expanded education and 
initiated girls’ public education in the early 1960s when women’s literacy was less than 2 
percent.  At the time, conservative religious leaders resisted King Faisal’s goals of 
women’s education, so King Faisal made women’s education available, but not 
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mandatory, and gave the religious authorities control over girls’ education, whereas boys’ 
education was overseen by the Ministry of Education.45   
 The first enrollment at Effat consisted of 1,000 women undergraduates.  While 
Dar al-Hekma had already been operating for the past 10 years, Effat University is 
considered to be at the forefront of a social revolution in the Kingdom.  The University 
ascribes to many new and different methods of teaching that are foreign to the religiously 
conservative and culturally and politically ethnocentric population.  All courses, 
including Islamic studies, are taught in English.  Physical education is mandatory.  Male 
professors are in the classroom, face to face with the female students.  Students are forced 
to form their own opinions on a variety of issues, including ethical, moral, and sexual 
issues.  Foreign films are regularly screened without censorship.46  The University has 
formed several international affiliations to bring new and relevant courses and degrees to 
the school.  Effat has partnered with Georgetown University in Washington D.C. for help 
with business administration and with the Instituto de Empresa in Madrid to help 
coordinate their fashion design courses.  Canada’s LaSalle College is also a partner and 
aids Effat with technology in conjunction with Microsoft.  The most ambitious program 
has been the partnership Effat Universty has with Duke University to launch its first 
engineering program for women in Saudi Arabia.  Duke has offered curriculum 
suggestions, helped build laboratories, and has mentored faculty.47   
 With all of these new education opportunities, more and more Saudi Arabian 
women are entering into the real world and are ready to own their own companies.  After 
receiving a valuable and useful education, many women emerge from the Universities to 
find that owning their own companies is challenging, mainly due to the same old social, 
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religious, and legal traditions that have been preventing women from entering the 
educational and workforce arenas for centuries.  The most commonly owned businesses 
owned by women are in fashion, jewelry, interior design, photography, beauty salons, 
retail and wholesale, consulting, marketing, public relations, event management, 
education, and childcare.48  Of female registered businesses, 72.6 percent operate outside 
of the home and 92 percent have paid employees.  These business statistics are the 
highest for women in Saudi Arabia compared to all other Middle East North Africa 
(MENA) countries.49  
 The three main challenges to the aspirations of women-owned businesses and the 
growth of the economy via educated women are: 
1. Gender obstacles in the regulatory environment 
2. Limited access to formal capital and financing mechanisms 
3. The need for increased integration of sophisticated marketing and 
technological tools50 
 Gender obstacles permeate many facets of the process for women to own their 
own businesses.  Women are required, not by law but by de facto expectations, to have a 
legal male guardian, or wakil, to conduct the business or to serve in a management 
position if the company is a registered public business. A public business simply means 
that men and women are both allowed to purchase goods or services from the company.51  
Another obstacle is the lack of available business licenses.  Socially, beauty salons, for 
example, are not an approved business for a woman to own, but sewing is, so many 
women will falsify their business application and register the company as a company that 
is approved by the business licensing division of the government in order to be able to do 
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business at all.  As discussed previously, the restriction on mobility is an impenetrable 
obstacle that severely limits the ability of a woman to own a business outside of her 
home.  Abiding by the driving restrictions incurs additional cost to the woman to do 
business, as well as to her family. The men in the family must take time out of their days 
to drive the woman to and from her business, which is an additional cost to the family.  
Women are also unable to travel internationally for business or training without being 
accompanied by a male relative or guardian.  Businesswomen must work around the 
challenges of the extra costs, delays, and limited foreign training that they are able to 
receive. Additionally, travel and business visas for foreign women entering Saudi Arabia 
are strictly limited. If foreign women were able to enter the country to educate and train 
business women in their own country and town, at least they would have some avenue for 
outside business education, but that option is also restricted.52 
 Of women who own their own businesses in Saudi Arabia, 82.2 percent rely on 
their personal savings to fund their own business ventures and 12.9 percent rely on 
contributions and loans from relatives and friends.  The reason for this is two-fold; the 
first is that banks are less willing to approve loans for women who want to do business on 
their own and secondly, Saudi women generally lack familiarity with business and 
finance tools.  Many of the women who are educated by the Saudi Arabian government 
are not allowed to attended courses in business and economics and are therefore 
unprepared for the business world of finance and economic terminology and concepts. 
Securing loans from relatives and friends is less daunting than speaking with a male 
banker who will more than likely deny the loan anyway.53 
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 The lack of sophistication and familiarity with marketing and technology is 
similar to women’s lack of business finance familiarity. Marketing and technology are 
rarely taught to females in the schools run by the government, leaving women to market 
themselves by word of mouth, leaflets, brochures, and advertisement at the bazaars.  Of 
women who own their own businesses, 56 percent do not have their own website.  Due to 
the travel restrictions imposed on women, learning about Western marketing techniques 
and technology is limited, leaving women to do the best that they can, with what they 
have.54 
 Eventually, women-owned businesses will be a significant contributor to the 
Saudi Arabian economy.  Already, the statistics of women owning their own companies 
is superior to neighboring women in the rest of the MENA region.  Saudi Arabian women 
are more likely to be the sole owners of their businesses than any other MENA country, 
but they are less hands-on in a management capacity than women in the other countries.  
Saudi Arabian women business owners are overwhelmingly more educated than the rest 
of the Saudi Arabian workforce.  Of women who own their own businesses, 58 percent 
have postsecondary degrees. Of the rest of the Saudi Arabian workforce, only 21 percent 
have postsecondary degrees. Of Saudi businesswomen, three out of ten of them 
completed their education abroad and have returned to implement their Western-learned 
business principles in the Saudi Arabian economy.55   
Women in Saudi Arabia are on the right track for educating themselves and for 
owning their own companies in order to provide for themselves and their families.  The 
Kingdom does not need to implement any sort of social or cultural programs to convince 
women of the importance of their role in a new economic society that lacks the rentier 
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state mentality.  When considering what Saudi Arabia is doing to prepare the end of 
rentierism, there is still much they need to do by way of women’s rights and 
opportunities.  While the private universities discussed in this section make women’s 
education look promising, these schools educate a small number of women compared to 
the amount of degree-seeking women that are living in Saudi Arabia. The nonelites that 
cannot afford the pricey tuition of the private universities are still able to attend 
university, but under the rule of the Saudi Arabian government.  Courses and degrees for 
women are limited to “safe” subjects that do not include business, finance, economics, 
entrepreneurialism, engineering, and most sciences.  Islamic studies are still mandatory 
and the schools are still segregated, causing unnecessary costs to the government.  While 
women are still graduating in larger numbers than men, once out of school, they are still 
faced with challenging restrictions on their travel, financing options, management 
abilities, and business licensing opportunities.  Overall, the Saudi Arabian government 
will need to recognize what an important economic asset women are and that they will 
need to loosen the restrictions on them in order to properly prepare for an economy that is 
no longer rentier. 
 
Manpower 
Reducing the Foreign Workforce 
In order to prepare for the end of rentierism, Saudi Arabia needs a reduction in 
their foreign work force.  There are approximately 5.6 million foreign workers. 
Remittances from those workers total about US$27 billion per year. This amount of 
money is an enormous amount that if earned by Saudi Arabian nationals could be put 
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back into the economy and used to boost individual monetary independence.  The Saudi 
Arabian government has begun limiting work permits, but because 70 percent of the 
population is under the age of 30 and the unemployment rate is about 28 percent, there 
needs to be a more urgent application of the limitation of foreign workers.56   
One of the current policies that has slowly come into effect over the last two years 
is the requirement that all firms doing business in the Kingdom, whether foreign or 
domestic, must employ Saudi Arabian nationals at a rate of at least 10 percent of their 
entire workforce.57  This ruling was in made in concert with the law that the government 
will not renew work permits of foreign workers who have already been working in the 
country for six years. These two actions were part of another program directed at 
Saudization, but that has not created any more job openings for nationals.58  
 In 2011, another effort at creating more jobs was introduced and it was to create 
salary protection in order to keep the majority of remittances within the country.  The 
Saudi Labor Minister Adel Fakih introduced the program that ideally was to put a 20 
percent ceiling on total guest workers in the country at a time.  The Minister claimed that 
over the next 3 years, available employment for foreign workers would decline by 50 
percent, leaving those job openings available for Saudi nationals.  This action is part of a 
30-point Saudization program that is aimed at increasing jobs for nationals, incorporating 
women into the workforce, and providing unemployment assistance to the unemployed.  
This program initiative is the first time that unemployment compensation has been 
discussed in the history of the Kingdom. What the program lacks, however, is the 
emphasis on educating nationals in order to make them marketable to the private sector.  
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What the initiative will do, is it will put 1.5 million Egyptians out or work and force them 
to seek employment in other countries or to return home.59 
In order to stave off a domestic unemployment catastrophe, the Kingdom needs to 
produce 3 million new jobs by the year 2030 and 14 million new employment slots for 
nationals by the year 2050.   Limiting the number of work visas that are issued and by 
limiting the length of stay for foreign workers will limit the population and ideally will 
open the door for more employment for Saudi Arabian nationals.  The Saudi Arabian 
plans do not, however, distinguish between skilled and unskilled labor when determining 
work permits.  This paper asserts that if it were not for the educated and knowledgeable 
workforce employed at Saudi Aramco, the oil industry would not have evolved as quickly 
or efficiently as it did. Until the education and experience level increases among Saudi 
Arabian nationals, it would behoove the Kingdom to take another look at simply putting a 
blanket limit on work permits.60  The Saudi Arabian mentality is still that of a rentier 
mentality and they still do not have the work ethic, culture, or skill set to replace all 
educated foreign nationals. If foreign worker limitations occur too quickly, the private 
sector will be annihilated. Forcing private companies to hire a certain amount of Saudi 
Arabian nationals, at higher rates than they could foreign workers, could be devastating 
to their bottom lines.  Small business closures would have an enormous impact on 
economic growth in the Kingdom. Forcing small businesses to fire an already trained and 
knowledgeable workforce would force them to swallow the costs of rehiring Saudi 
Arabian nationals, retraining their workforce, and possibly paying a higher salary.61   
Saudi Arabia needs to tread lightly on removing a workforce that will work harder 
and cheaper than a national one, but removing an increasing population of foreign 
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workers that are a drain on the national government is vital to maintaining rentierism.  
Campaigning to encourage the workforce to become educated and to desire employment 
will be vital in taking the unemployed men off the street and putting them into jobs that 
they can become financially independent while doing.  Foreign nationals drain the 
government of subsidized benefits, even if they are not given them directly. Foreign 
nationals still use the infrastructure, they use the healthcare facilities, they drink the 
desalinated seawater, they consume the cheap petroleum, and while in the country, they 
also procreate.  Saudi Arabia does not acknowledge citizenship for children born in the 
country, but they are still part of the population explosion problem. 
The best-case scenario for oil production meeting oil consumption will occur in 
the year 2033.  That scenario accounts for a population growth rate of 1.55 percent. If the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia can decrease that rate even by a few tenths of a point, the right 
side of the bell curve could be extended much farther down the line than 2033.  Every 
new person consumes 25 barrels per year and each barrel that is domestically consumed  
is a barrel that is not eligible for export and profit.  Keeping the population growth rate to 
a minimum is an imperative activity that the Saudi Arabian government needs to start 
acting on immediately. 
 
Energy Security 
The two main threats to economic and political security that would affect the 
ability of Saudi Arabia to maintain rentierism is terrorism and Iran.  When the United 
States used Saudi Arabia as a home base in the fight to contain the Soviet Union from 
invading Afghanistan, the United States formed a group of fighters called al-Qaida, 
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which means “the base.” Osama bin Laden, a Sunni Islamic fundamentalist, was the 
leader of al-Qaida and his goals for the organization were to establish the rule of God on 
earth, attain martyrdom in the cause of God, and to purify the ranks of Islam from the 
elements of depravity.62  The United States did not leave immediately after the war 
against the Soviet Union or after the war with Iraq.  Osama bin Laden became the voice 
of anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism so in 1998, bin Laden and other al-Qaida 
leaders issued a declaration calling on all Muslims to kill Americans and “those that are 
allied with them from among the helpers of Satan.”63  Since the declaration, al-Qaida has 
been linked to numerous acts of terrorism against the West, which have included 
assassinations, bombings, kidnappings, hijackings, and suicide attacks.  The organization 
has been known to target prominent symbols such as public buildings, embassies, and 
Western military personnel and housing units.64  Al-Qaida maintains and performs their 
operations by earning money from fake business operations, donations from like-minded 
supporters, and they also siphon off funds from zakat donations and from Muslim 
charitable organizations. It has been no secret that the House of Saud and fellow Saudi 
businessmen have supported militant organizations, especially al-Qaida.65  Government 
funding for mosques, madrasas, and charities have all contributed to the spread of 
fundamentalist Islam and subsequently, the spread of al-Qaida and other similar 
organizations.66  The main problem with funding fundamentalist organizations that are 
anti-Western is that they are not afraid to bite the hand that feeds them.  The primary 
threat to oil security in Saudi Arabia is from al-Qaida.  Osama bin laden accurately 
observed that oil is crucial to the well-being of the United States and his hatred of 
Western values and their modus operendi of imperialism was a threat to his views of 
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Islam and the Islamic way of life.  Bin Laden named his war against the United States as 
the ‘Bleed America to Bankruptcy War,” and claimed that the low oil prices that the West 
has enjoyed has been the “greatest robbery in the history of the world.”67 Bin Laden 
recognized that oil is an important economic power for the Islamic state and, therefore, he 
would not attack the wells themselves because all Muslims need oil.  He did agree that 
attacking the transportation and infrastructure, including pipelines, refineries, the 
executives of non-Muslim oil companies, ocean tankers, sea ports, and government 
officials that negotiate with the United States would be equally effective.  Striking oil and 
gas facilities accomplishes two goals: undermining the internal stability of the regimes 
they are fighting and economically weakening foreign powers with vested interests in the 
region.68  Attacks conducted by al-Qaida and their allies against oil infrastructure have 
been few and far between. In 2002, they attacked a French oil tanker and in 2003, there 
were preemptive attacks by al-Qaida on civilians in Riyadh. In 2004, there were lethal 
attacks on personnel of Western oil companies in Yanbu and Dhahran and in 2006, there 
was a car bomb that exploded at the gates of the worlds largest oil refinery, Alqaiq, in 
Saudi Arabia.  The attack resulted in a hike in oil prices by US$2 per barrel and it was 
termed the “terrorist premium.”69 
In 2010, Yemen-based al-Qaida leader Qassim al-Rimi called for the killing of 
Saudi Arabian rulers on the grounds of apostasy.  They suggested killing all Christians on 
the Arabian Peninsula and overthrowing the entire Saudi Arabian government.70  The al-
Qaida based in Saudi Arabia called for attacks on the government of Saudi Arabia, also in 
2010, because of their support for Western wars against terrorism in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.71  In 2010, Saudi Arabia arrested 113 alleged al-Qaida militants, of which 
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58 were from Saudi Arabia and 52 from Yemen.  Authorities found weapons, 
ammunition, and suicide belts and the intended targets were oil facilities.72  The fact that 
Saudi Arabia continues to support fundamentalist groups, yet is also friendly to the West, 
is found to be contradictory to organizations whose primary goal for existence is to rid 
the Middle East of Western influence.  While few attacks on oil facilities or related to oil 
diplomacy have occurred, the threat of it is still present and a consequence that the 
government of Saudi Arabia will have to prevent against.  If al-Qaida or a related 
fundamentalist group were to damage transportation and infrastructure to the point that 
the Saudi Arabian government no longer could earn money from exports, life as Saudi 
Arabian nationals know it would be in danger of deteriorating.  If attacks were to happen 
prior to the government finding an alternative income to oil, basically all operations in 
Saudi Arabia would stop. Mineral mining and extraction would cease because the 
industry is so heavily reliant on oil and water to conduct its business. Natural gas would 
be impossible to extract because it relies on the technology of oil extraction and the 
related facilities to refine it.  Potable water would be limited because the desalination 
plants rely on energy from oil to operate.  Energy, exports, and potable water would be in 
jeopardy if al-Qaida were to attack oil-related facilities and infrastructure.  Neither the 
House of Saud nor the government could afford to take that kind of hit to national income 
without having a back-up plan for income and basic social needs and services. This 
possibility of attack is enough of a reason to seek alternatives to the income oil provides, 
as well as the energy, even if the concept of decreasing oil is not. The Saudi government, 
as well as wealthy private nationals, must discontinue funding fundamentalist 
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organizations and neutralize the threat from al-Qaida and allies against the oil 
infrastructure as well as against the House of Saud. 
 
Iran 
The second security threat to maintaining rentierism in Saudi Arabia is Iran.  
Currently, Iran is supposedly in the process of building a nuclear weapon.  In November 
2011, The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released a report detailing the 
research and experiments geared toward the development of a nuclear weapon in Iran.  
The report examined the country’s detonator development, the multipoint initiation of 
high explosives, and nuclear payload integration into a missile delivery vehicle.73  The 
announcement was not without controversy, with former Saudi ambassador to the United 
States Turki al-Faisal warning that a regional nuclear arms race could start if Iran does 
not curb its nuclear efforts.  He furthered those sentiments by claiming that if Iran does 
develop a nuclear weapon, it would leave Saudi Arabia no choice but to also develop one 
and to pursue policies that would lead to “dramatic consequences.”74  
Since November 2011 when the IAEA report was released, economic sanctions 
imposed by the United States and the European Union have sharply escalated.  The 
United States claimed the reasons for imposing sanctions included the fact that Iran has 
conducted major naval exercises close to the Strait of Hormuz, has tested midrange 
missiles and that Iran has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz if confronted with an 
embargo on oil exports. These sanctions have sparked concerns over the availability of 
oil and of a potential Western military presence in the Middle East. In December 2011, 
the United States imposed economic sanctions on the financial institutions that deal with 
! "'*!
Iran’s central bank, which is the main clearinghouse through which Iran deals with 
trading partners around the world.  The sanctions also ban the import of Iranian oil 
among member states that agree to the sanctions.  Iran’s largest oil trading partners, 
Japan, China, and South Korea, have been forced to meet with oil producers from other 
countries in order to replace their Iranian oil imports.  Western sanctions are also in the 
works to force foreign banks to terminate all financial transactions with Iran, which 
targets private and government controlled Iranian banks.  Other sanctions also include the 
limitations on Iranian nonluxury consumer good imports, as well as stopping Iranian 
international purchases of military and nuclear related goods.75 
Iran is the fourth largest oil producer and also the fourth largest oil exporter in the 
world.  They produce 3.45 million barrels of oil per day and have a sustainable 
production capacity of 3.51mbd.  One-third of Iranian crude is exported to European 
Union nations; its main buyers include Italy, Spain, and Greece.  Thirty percent of 
Turkey and Greece’s total oil comes from Iran.  Iran is China’s second largest supplier of 
light sweet crude, as well as heavy sour crude, only behind Saudi Arabia.  Sanctions on 
Iran not only effect Iranian income potentials; they also negatively affect the export of oil 
in the entire Middle East and North African region. The Strait of Hormuz sees the 
transport of 17mbd of crude, refined oil.  If economic sanctions force Iran to fight back 
and close the Strait, shipping complications for Saudi Arabia would be enormous.  Saudi 
Arabia would have to divert 2.5mbd via the East-West pipeline to the Red Sea, severely 
complicating their transportation logistics.  Iran has threatened serious consequences to 
fellow OPEC members if they step in to replace banned Iranian crude barrels.76  
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 Western sanctions on Iran will result in a heavy burden placed on Saudi Arabian 
oil fields, as well as on Saudi Arabian relations with Iran.  If Saudi Arabia tries to resume 
its position as swing producer to replace barrels lost by the ban on Iranian crude, the rate 
at which the oil fields will be producing will further permanently damage already fragile 
oil fields.  The strain on manpower, equipment, and on the natural components that 
provide oil will prove to hurt Saudi Arabian production down the road and possibly 
drastically reduce their reserves in the future.  If the Kingdom cannot produce enough to 
cover their domestic demand as well as for their normal operations plus replacement 
barrels, someone will be short on oil.  The government of Saudi Arabia will have to 
decide whether domestic consumption will suffer of whether export income will suffer. 
 Another main obstacle to maintaining rentierism aside from dealing with 
replacement barrels also includes the fact that if Iran actually does produce a weapon, 
Saudi Arabia will be forced to produce one also.  As Turki al-Faisal warned, Saudi 
Arabia will have no choice. The amount of money and effort that would go into 
producing a nuclear weapon would directly be taken out of the money and effort that 
could go towards diversify the economy, educating its nationals, and investing in an 
alternative income to oil. The Saudi government already spends US$45.2 billion a year, 
or 11.2 percent of the GDP, on military and defense. Diverting more money and effort to 
compete in an arms race with Iran will dramatically shift the focus of the government 
from maintaining rentierism and providing for the increasing population, to investing 




Securing Saudi Arabian Oil 
The United States firmly believes that there is no end to Saudi-American relations 
while oil is still bountiful.  The United States imports in excess of 1 million barrels of 
Saudi oil every day.77  The United States is Saudi Arabia’s largest import and export 
partner.  Saudi Arabia’s exports to the United States average US$18 billion per year in oil 
and other natural resources, while the imports into Saudi Arabia from the U.S. average 
US$4.5 billion per year, which include defense, aviation, transportation, medical, and 
agricultural products.  Aside from the typical imports and exports that are exchanged, the 
Saudi Royal Family, as well as a large number of private Saudi businessmen, have large 
investments in U.S. oil, transport, tourism, and financial industries.  Going hand in hand, 
a number of these Saudi investors enjoy close relationships with some of the senior 
people in the United States political hierarchy.  These relationships have allowed them to 
participate and bid for lucrative business and investment opportunities within the United 
States, making Saudi Arabia one of the largest foreign investors in the United States 
economy.  The US Department of Energy estimates that the U.S. will be strategically 
dependent on imported oil through at least 2035, which does not take into account 
imported manufactured goods that are made from oil.  While this is the case, the United 
States has finite military power and both the United States and Saudi Arabia face threats 
to its security as well as to its oil.  The United States is one of the largest purchasers of 
Saudi oil and a continued safe supply of petroleum is vital for the economy of the United 
States.   Saudi Arabia is located in a strategic position in the Middle East and Islamic 
world.  The Kingdom occupies the largest area of land in all of the Middle East with 
coastal borders on the Red Sea as well as the Persian Gulf.  It shares borders with seven 
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countries in the region and is friendly with its neighboring oil- and nonoil producing 
nations, making countries easily accessible from U.S. bases that are located within Saudi 
Arabia.78  The United States believes that arming and training Saudi Arabia to help in the 
defense of their precious natural resources will deter potential threats and it will also 
multiply ground and air forces needed to protect against terrorism and colonialism. The 
most recent arms package creates an interdependence between the Kingdom and the 
United States, fostering a strong Saudi incentive to work with the United States for at 
least the next 15-20 years.  Due to the complicated and classified nature of the arms and 
weaponry, Saudi Arabia is dependent on U.S. machinery, replacement parts, technology 
expertise, and maintenance to keep their new purchases operational.79 
The United States has made it a priority to ensure that the Saudi military, the 
Saudi National Guard, the Saudi navy, and all types of defense outlets are well armed in 
order to protect the oil fields and the national security of Saudi Arabia as a whole, as well 
as the members of the GCC.  In 2011, the United States finalized the largest ever Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS) program in the history of their relationship.80  The sale included the 
sale of $US60 million worth of E2-A AWACS surveillance aircraft, Sikorsky’s UH-60 
Black Hawks, and Patriot and Hawk missile defense systems, 84 new Boeing F-15 
combat aircraft, air to surface missiles, 60 AH-64D Longbow Apache attach helicopters, 
72 UH-60 helicopters, 36 “Little Bird” MH-6 helicopters, M1A2 tanks, and upgrades to 
the Patriot PAC 2 missile forces.  The transaction of this arms deal meets the Saudi 
concerns of force expansion and modernization and provide the basis for full 
interoperability with U.S. military forces in crisis or conflict.  The deal assures the United 
States’ strategic position in the Middle East as well as reinforcing the level of regional 
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deterrence rather than threatening it.  A well-armed Saudi military reduces the amount of 
forces that the United States would have to commit to the region in the case of a threat 
and with superpowers like China becoming key players in global energy, protecting the 
precious natural resource that fuels the entire world becomes even more important.81 
   The massive arms deal provides the Kingdom with the ability to improve the 
overall protection of its borders and will assist against any serious domestic or 
international terror attacks and will guarantee the preparedness for attack against any 
enemies from the Red Sea and Persian Gulf region.  Yemen is also a legitimate threat to 
Saudi safety because they are an impoverished nation with primitive infrastructure, 
serious water shortages, and a large, drug-driven economy with limited oil exports.  
Yemen’s government is growing steadily weaker and the United States fears that Yemen 
could become the new base for al-Qaida operations in the region since the Yemeni Shia 
rebel group, the Houthi, have already been active in attacks against Saudi Arabia. The 
United States and Saudi Arabia have banded together to provide economic aid to Yemen 
in order to build up Yemeni military forces and counterterrorism capabilities.  The U.S. 
has carried out drone strikes in Yemen and with increased economic and political aid, the 
U.S. has hope that Yemen will be able to fight against homegrown terrorism and prevent 
Yemeni attacks against Saudi Arabia.82    
The likelihood of seeing attacks from Somalia is also on the radar for possible 
action by Saudi and U.S. forces.  Somalia is at risk for coming under the control of a 
radical Islamist extremist movement called the al Shabab, which means “the youth” or 
“the young men.” Threats of piracy off the coasts of Somalia have become a major threat 
in the Gulf of Aden and have included attacks on oil tankers and commercial shipping 
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tankers.  This situation has already led to U.S. deployments and a significant Saudi 
buildup of naval fleets in the Red Sea, mainly off the Yemeni border.  U.S.-Saudi 
cooperation to curtail these terrorism attacks has resulted in the expansion and 
modernization of the Saudi Red Sea Naval Fleet.83 
Securing the oil fields and preventing against domestic and international terrorism 
is key to political as well as economic stability in a rentier, as well as postrentier, state. 
While the state is attempting to prepare for the end of rentierism, any variation to their 
monetary or government structure would put them back significantly. The distraction of 
having to secure their primary income source or the replacement of a member of the 
Royal Family would drastically alter the political and economic landscape, and Saudi 
Arabia cannot afford to have any setbacks while trying to prepare for the end of 
rentierism. 
 
Preventing a Restive State 
 Just as preventing domestic terrorism and securing oil and natural resources are 
important political actions in preparing for the death of rentierism, so is preventing the 
uprising of a domestic restive population.  Beginning in December 2010, Egypt, Tunisia, 
and Libya experienced mass antigovernment social uprising. Acts of self-immolations 
were recorded in Tunisia, Egypt, and other parts of the Arab world, including Saudi 
Arabia.  A man in the town of Samitah, Saudi Arabia set himself on fire and died a month 
later in a hospital.84  Other countries in the Arab world have experienced social uprising 
and in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, the leaders either fled, were ousted, or were 
assassinated.  The self-immolation of the man in Saudi Arabia was the first such incident 
! "'&!
in Saudi Arabia and the act was not followed by massive uprising by the population.  
Small demonstrations over labor rights that took place in April 2011 in Riyadh, protests 
against anti-Shia discrimination, and calls for the Peninsula Shield Force to be withdrawn 
from Bahrain were the extent of the social unrest in Saudi Arabia during the Arab 
Spring.85 
 For a country that is so tightly run by one Royal Family and a very strict 
interpretation of Wahhabi Islam, it is peculiar that Saudi Arabia did not experience the 
same type of uprising that the rest of the Arab world did.  Thomas Lippman, the author of 
Saudi Arabia on the Edge posits that the leaders of the Al Saud family have spent their 
time in power skillfully and diligently extending their power and building a loyalty that is 
unrivaled in the Arab world.  Lippman explains this loyalty as “ties of blood, money, 
marriage and patronage wrapped in the green cloak of Islam.”86  The internal opposition 
that exists does not want to overthrow the family; they do seek to reform it, however. 
But, those attempts at reform have been met with exile, imprisonment, and death by those 
who have tried.  The population is so incredibly homogenous and the majority want the 
same things as their neighbors and as the Royal Family.  Saudi Wahhabi nationals do not 
want to be exposed to pornography, or to sinful substances like alcohol or drugs.  It is a 
devout population that believes in the primacy and the inviolability of Islam and therefore 
endorse its immunity from challenge. The representatives such as the House of Saud and 
the ulema are representatives of the ruled, not out of step with them.87 
 People in Saudi Arabia naturally want a degree of participation, but because of 
their rentier mentality and the flexibility of King Abdullah about the social realities that 
are ever-evolving, his population trusts his judgment.  The population believes that King 
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Abdullah will leave a country that is better organized, more stable, and has a greater 
degree of public acceptance.  There is a slow evolution of citizen participation, but it is 
there.88 
 The Al Saud family is the only leadership that the people of Saudi Arabia have 
known.  They are viewed as the creators of the modern Kingdom and are viewed as the 
glue that hold everyone together, but also the ones who provide the benefits and 
subsidies.  King Abdullah is the supreme authority, but he is not a dictator.  He rules by 
consensus and the Saudi Arabian people view the religious establishment as a legitimate 
form of checks and balances for the Family.89   
 In light of the Arab Spring, King Abdulla bestowed US$100 billion in housing, 
salary, and education benefits at the height of the unrest to his population.90  As 
mentioned in this research, the population is able to be quelled in the light of unease by 
being subsidized.  The population currently is in a position that while they may desire a 
more free and participatory role in government and social issues, they are cautious to bite 
the hand that feeds them.  The question, though is what will happen when the government 
is no longer able to provide subsidies because of the death of rentierism and their lack of 
preparation to maintain it?  There is the possibility that the population will become 
restive if they are no longer receiving the subsidies to which they have grown 
accustomed. But, in the case of Saudi Arabia, there is no alternative to leadership that 
could fill the void of rentierism benefits.  Continuing to take actions like the King did, 
and ‘paying off’ his population so that they would not rise up, was one of the most 
important premeditative policies that he could have performed.  Keeping the population 
content while the government prepares for the end of rentierism is important. The same 
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can be said about securing the oil and preventing against domestic terrorism. If any 
leadership body currently in Saudi Arabia can prepare for the end of rentierism, it can 
only be the House of Saud. 
 
Conclusion 
 The premise of this research was to determine when the end of rentierism will 
occur in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as well as to analyze the actions that the 
government is taking in order to prepare for it.  After compiling population growth, 
domestic consumption demand, and depreciating oil production statistics into four 
separate future predictive scenarios, the results were that the end of rentierism will occur 
between 2022-2033 in Saudi Arabia.  Contributing to the prediction is the exploding 
population, the rapid increase in domestic consumption demand, and the quickly 
depreciating daily oil capacity. 
 Analysis on the social, economic, and political landscapes was conducted to 
illustrate the current social and economic obligations that the government currently has.  
The research concluded that the social relationship between the population and the 
government is limited to the allocation of benefits and subsidies.  Taxation is not required 
and representation is not demanded. The economic obligation of the government is to 
provide uninterrupted benefits and subsidies to the Saudi national population as well as to 
provide handsomely for the members of the Royal Family. The research found that the 
methods that the House of Saud uses to fund their extravagant lifestyles is often corrupt 
and that it at times completely bypasses the National Treasury and goes straight into the 
bank accounts of the Al Saud princes.  The population is aware of the corruption, but 
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currently does not exhibit any tendencies or plans of turning the Kingdom into a restive 
state. 
 The political landscape of the Kingdom is one of consensus with the religious 
elite, but also one of dissent within and between the Royal Family members.  Competing 
liberal and religiously conservative ideals have paralyzed much of the modernization and 
further economic diversification developments.  There has been, however, agreement 
between the House of Saud and the ulema to expand the development of Hajj and tourism 
infrastructure as an economic diversification technique.   
 Efforts at privatization and increasing Saudi national employment have been 
stymied by a repressive religious educational system that focuses more on extreme 
Wahhabi Islam teachings and less on valuable business and economic skills that are in 
high demand in the country.  Expatriates and foreign workers come to Saudi Arabia with 
skill sets that employers require and Saudi nationals are often overlooked for the cheaper 
yet more knowledgeable foreign national employee. 
 The research showed that there are changes coming to Saudi Arabia’s women in 
the form of private schools with also some limited opportunities in business. The cultural 
and religious restrictions severely limit the opportunities that women have to make 
money and become educated and without the relaxation of many of the social restrictions 
on women, they will not contribute much to a privatized economy. 
 Alternatives to government income from oil were thoroughly examined, resulting 
in the conclusion that aside from nuclear power, which is currently not politically feasible 
in the Kingdom, there are no viable natural resource alternatives to oil in order to 
maintain rentierism.  Natural gas is a natural resource that can be used to greatly replace 
! "(*!
the use of oil domestically, thus freeing up more barrels of oil for export, which could 
possibly delay the end of rentierism, but currently, natural gas is not being used to its full 
potential. 
 Other forms of alternative income also proved to not be feasible to replace the 
income from oil.  Income from Hajj is constantly increasing, but much of the income 
from the annual pilgrimage goes to private nationals and companies and only a small part 
of the income goes straight to the government in the form of revenue.  The collection of 
the zakat and taxation has proven to also not be a feasible alternative due to the lack of 
accountability and transparency, with much of the money being siphoned off into terrorist 
and Royal Family bank accounts, or sent abroad.   
 The country is heavily invested in sovereign wealth funds, but if income from oil 
stopped this year, it would only be a matter of a few years to draw the entire amount 
down. Current international holdings equal approximately US$506 billion, but with an 
annual budgeted government expenditure of nearly US$200 billion, the country is not 
invested nearly enough to maintain rentierism solely on international investment income. 
 Parastatal companies were researched but the primary obstacles to using those 
companies as a replacement for oil is that most of the companies owned by the 
government are oil companies, petrochemical companies, or other companies that rely 
heavily on oil for their income. Whether SABIC directly uses oil or not, it is still 
completely reliant on it as a means of doing business. The parastatal companies that the 
government owns simply are not diversified away from oil to provide any kind of reliable 
alternative to oil income. 
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 In conclusion, after researching all possible avenues for the government of Saudi 
Arabia to maintain rentierism, even combined, these options are not enough.  The 
population is growing too fast and the economy is not keeping up. Oil is a finite natural 
resource that has resulted in a rentier mentality and a nearly pure rentier economy.  The 
government has committed to providing subsidies and benefits to a population that is 
experiencing rapid growth and as the barrels of oil set for export dwindle, so will 
government revenue and thus social benefit allocation.  The country as a whole is 
currently severely unprepared for the death of rentierism.  The prophecy of Sheikh 
Rashid bin Saeed al Maktoum may come to fruition for the country of Saudi Arabia if 
they do not begin setting economic diversification goals that have timelines and 
accountability.  The desert may just very well reclaim its former inhabitants if the 
religious and familial dissent cannot be overcome, if the population growth rate keeps 
skyrocketing, and if the population refuses to abandon their rentier mentality and 
continues to refuse to become educated and to take whatever employment is offered.   
 With limited arable land, little to no manufacturing outside of the oil and 
petrochemical sectors, combined with a population who are unmotivated to work and a 
Royal Family that will siphon off as much money as they can get away with, the outlook 
for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia looks grim.  It may seem like an exaggeration to think 
that the people of Saudi Arabia may return to a Bedouin lifestyle, complete with a return 
to a merchant class system and camel trading. But, if the cities no longer have anything to 
offer by way of security, employment, or government income, the idea of returning to the 
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